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Das Höchste wäre: zu begreifen, daß alles Faktische schon Theorie ist. [...]
Man suche nur nichts hinter den Phänomenen: sie selbst sind die Lehre.3
- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe -
This thesis presents a study on the subject of reserve forces’ reforms in times of economic
turmoil. In a total of six chapters, this topic is explored by discussing and comparing
British and German attempts to restructure their national reserve forces following the 2008
financial crisis and in response to the economic challenges of the 1970s. This first chapter
constitutes the introduction of the thesis and encompasses both the research focus and the
methodological considerations that framed this study.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The Thesis in a Nutshell
This study aims to investigate whether and how reservists’ roles and responsibilities
change when governments conduct defence reviews in times of economic turmoil. This
subject is explored by examining Britain’s and Germany’s defence posture following the
2008 financial crisis and during the 1970s when both countries were confronted with
severe economic challenges brought about by the 1973’s oil price shock. Central to the
3 ‘The ultimate thing would be to realise that everything factual is already theory. [...] Do not look for the
hidden meaning of the phenomena: they themselves are the teaching’. Translated by the author; ibid.,
Google Books Online Reader, 74.
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discussion is the respective reserve forces’ reform; namely, the British Future Reserves
2020 (FR-2020) and Germany’s 2012 Conception of Reserve (2012-COR) as well as their
historical 1970s counterparts.4 Based on a comparative analysis of these examples, this
thesis argues that incumbent governments envisaged and widely implemented a shift of
responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force; most notably as regards homeland
defence. In this context, it is reasoned that governments undertook this step to allow the
professional elements of the militaries, namely, the regular force, to concentrate on cost
and training intensive tasks such as overseas deployments. This study further argues that
governments did not solely advocate this step based on reservists’ alleged proficiency in
homeland defence, but instead perceived it as a necessity to implement redundancies in the
regular force to realise required economies and to balance national budgets.
1.1.2 Research Questions
The author’s interest to conduct a study on the implications of economic turmoil on reserve
forces’ structures was sparked by the commencement of Germany’s 2010 Bundeswehrre-
form. Accelerated by the economies imposed on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the Bundeswehr had entered a profound transforma-
tion process, which, mainly due to the suspension of conscription, was branded the most
significant military reform in postwar Germany.5
While scholars from various backgrounds have widely recognised this correlation between
government finances and defence reviews, their analyses tended to focus primarily on
general reform plans and somewhat neglected to address the subsequently launched reserve
forces’ reforms;6 at least as regards the Bundeswehr’s reserve. Intrigued by this gap in
4 The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Re-
serves 2020 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2011), and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung,
Konzeption der Reserve (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2012), accessed 27 April 2014,
http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FctBCoAwDAXRs3iBZO_OW6i7VL8SKmlpQwu
e3srsHgzvPDJpeotrMnl45e3QOXQK_QRVL1CPRXA5qKCiNFBM9iL_A6n5IEXnHJfpA4F1hnk!/.
5 cf. Tilman Brück, ‘Die Ökonomie der Bundeswehrreform’. DIW Berlin, Wochenbericht Nr. 37/2010,
2010, accessed 18 December 2014, http///www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw\_01.c.361115.
de/10-37-4.pdf.pdf.
6 See, for example, Christina Mölling, and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, The Impact of the Financial
Crisis on European Defence: Annex, European Parliament, 2011, accessed 12 November 2012,
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Moelling\_Brune\_EU\_
Studie\_2011\_Teil2\_ks.pdf, Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Breaking the Mould: The
United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010’, International Affairs 86, No 2 (2010): 395-410,
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the literature, the author decided that exploring the implications of the 2012-COR would
constitute an interesting starting point for a project aiming to examine the influence of
financially driven defence reviews on reserve forces’ reforms. Hence, the 2012-COR was
defined as the springboard example for this thesis.
With this inductive approach to the research topic, the author sought to draw informed
conclusion from empirical data rather than to test a hypothesis.7 In other words, it
was aspired to develop a theory on how governments restructure their reserve forces in
times of economic turmoil by exploring and describing examples of this phenomenon.
Consequently, the following two research questions were phrased to guide this study:
1. How do reserve forces’ structures, roles and responsibilities change in the course of
financial driven defence reviews?
2. Do financially driven defence reviews similarly shift reserve forces’ responsibilities
in different European countries?
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 The Most Similar Systems Design
1.2.1.1 Theory
When considering the research questions, three factors can be identified that are important
as regards the methodology. First, examples of reserve forces’ reforms in times of economic
turmoil should be investigated. Second, these examples should be compared to one another.
Third, the sample size is limited due to the European focus and, therefore, rather small than
large. Combined, these three aspects, therefore, suggest that this study falls into the realm
of comparative politics; more precisely, they indicate that countries and their governments’
decisions need to be compared.
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00888.x, and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, Marcel Dickow, Hilmar Linnen-
kamp, and Christian Mölling, ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, SWP Comments 13,
(2010), accessed 27 March 2013, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/
2010C13_brn_ks.pdf.
7 cf. Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures, (Oxen, and
New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 41.
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Most Similar Systems Design. When reviewing the literature on comparative politics,
it quickly becomes apparent that scholars have identified both the Most Similar Systems
Design (MSSD) and the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) as the preferred method
of choice for conducting studies that exhibit the aforementioned characteristics.8 Derived
from Mill’s methods of difference and agreement, Przeworski and Teune first advocated
specifying Mill’s approaches in 1970 by differentiating more rigorously between the
MSSD and the MDSD.9 While both methods aim to select examples purposefully rather
than randomly, they begin research from different angles.10
According to Peters, the MSSD is the preferred method scholars use in comparative
politics.11 When applying this approach, researchers first need to identify countries, which
are most similar as regards their extraneous variance and exhibit the same (political)
outcome, hereafter also referred to as dependent variable or phenomenon.12 In doing
so, it is aspired to limit the influence of external factors on the dependent variable.13 In
this context, Jahn alluded to the examples of European countries.14 According to Jahn,
Western European countries are easier to compare to one another than trying to compare
them to their Eastern European counterparts as these two groups are too different as
regards their postwar history of democracy and socialism.15 In addition to high extraneous
variance, Jahn emphasised that countries need to display a high experimental variance;16
i.e., countries with high extraneous variance should be different as regards factors relevant
to the research focus, e.g., foreign policy objectives. By seeking a high experimental
8 cf. Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 234.
9 According to Mill’s method of agreement, the presence of an explanatory factor must result in the
same outcome for all examined examples. The method of agreement, on the other hand, stipulates that
the absence of this factor explains why different examples experience a different outcome; cf. Adam
Przeworski, and Genry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York, NY: John Wiley
and Sons, 1970), 31 et seq., B. Guy Peters, Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science:
Theories and Methods (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 39, and John Stuart, Mills, A System of
Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 8th ed (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1870) cited in Detlef
Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 167-168.
10 B. Guy Peters, Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods, 39.
11 ibid., 40.
12 ibid.





variance, Jahn argued that an explanatory factor for the outcome could be identified
with more certainty, because the experimental variance already eliminated other potential
explanatory factors.17 On the other hand, the absence of the explanatory factor may explain
why the phenomenon in question did not manifest itself in other examples.18 Therefore,
by looking at empirical evidence, a theory on the cause of the dependent variable can be
developed.19
Most Different Systems Design. While the MSSD is believed to be the ideal choice for
conducting small sample size studies, Peters has argued that it is less suitable for studies
aiming to test hypotheses.20 According to Peters, this shortcoming stems from the fact
that no researcher can be sure that s/he has eliminated all potential explanatory factors;21
however, this reasoning was opposed by Jahn, who asserted that any factor unrelated to
the research focus might be omitted in the investigation.22 Nonetheless, both authors
agreed that researchers aiming to test hypotheses and transfer their conclusions to other
examples should apply the MDSD.23 Again, examples are selected by examining countries’
extraneous variance.24 In contrast to the MSSD, however, the MDSD seeks to identify
nations that are most different as regards their extraneous variance while exhibiting the
same political outcome.25 Moreover, the level on which research is conducted differs.
While the MSSD approach usually focuses on examining countries and systems, the
MDSD is mostly applied to study developments on the subsystem level, e.g., individuals’
behaviours.26 Using the MDSD approach, therefore, seeks to prove that the emergence of
a particular explanatory factor may cause the outcome in question in any given setting;27
17 ibid.
18 cf. B. Guy Peters, Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods, 40.
19 ibid.
20 ibid., and Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 234.
21 B. Guy Peters, Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods, 40.
22 Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 234.
23 ibid., 234-235, and B. Guy Peters, Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories
and Methods, 40.





i.e., the MDSD attempts to examine causal relationships of variables.28
1.2.1.2 Application
In summary, the MSSD is most suitable to examine countries and systems, while the MDSD
seeks to support studies that hope to generalize findings by studying the relationship of
variables on the subsystem level.29 In theory, both methods could have been applied in
this thesis; i.e., based on the springboard example, countries with either a low (MDSD) or
high (MSSD) extraneous variance in comparison to Germany could have been selected to
examine reserve forces’ reforms in times of economic turmoil. In a MDSD approach, Asian
or Latin American countries would have constituted good examples as they show a low
extraneous variance compared to Germany as regards historical, political, and economic
aspects.30 Nevertheless, this comparison would have contradicted the second research
question, which explicitly asks to examine reserve forces’ reforms in Europe. Moreover, a
study involving countries from such diverse backgrounds would need to be conducted by
a multi-lingual team to ensure the full exploitation of primary sources, e.g., government
publications, in their original language.31
Extraneous Variance. Based on the aforementioned considerations, the author decided
to apply the MSSD. For the selection process, four English and German-speaking countries
in Europe were considered; namely, Austria, Britain, Ireland, and Switzerland.32 First, the
28 cf. ibid.
29 ibid.
30 cf. ibid., 40.
31 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 84.
32 In addition to these countries, France would have constituted an interesting example due to her
high extraneous variance in comparison to Germany; especially when considering that the former
hereditary enemies France and Germany have intensely been collaborating in security matters since
1987. Back then, then-President François Mitterrand and then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl established
the German-French Defence and Security Council, which was intended to facilitate close defence
collaboration. Following this milestone in bilateral relations, the Franco-German Brigade was founded
to manifest the permanent military cooperation of both countries. However, the selection process had
to be limited to English and German-speaking countries only, as the author does not possess working
proficiency in other languages; cf. ibid, and Deutsch-französischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat
(1988), http://www.france-allemagne.fr/IMG/pdf/VerteidigungsratProtokoll88.pdf, 18 March 2018,







countries’ extraneous variance in comparison to Germany was examined. As highlighted
in Table 1.1, the political, economic and defence-related situation of each country in 2010
was considered.33
When consulting Table 1.1, it first appears as if all countries exhibit a high extraneous
variance with Germany. For instance, all examples are considered to be stable post-
war democracies. Furthermore, except for Switzerland, all other countries had launched
comprehensive defence reviews following the 2008 financial crisis.34
In addition to these two factors, the territorial security environment, which this thesis
defines as the absence of an imminent threat to a nation’s territorial integrity, was judged
to be stable. However, the countries already differ as regards the second component
of the security environment, namely, the ideological element. Although acknowledging
that geography plays a vital role in the assessment of countries’ security environments,
official alignment with international defensive alliances must be taken into consideration
as well. For instance, during the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were geographical neighbours. However,
due to their respective Western and Eastern allegiances, their territorial integrity did not
depend on their location but rather on the decisions made by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, membership in either the European
Union (EU) or NATO may force a nation to go to war even if her territory is not under
attack. Therefore, these memberships should be considered when estimating countries’
33 The only exception is Switzerland’s number of troops. Here, numbers from 2019 had to be included
as the number of troops in 2010 was not published; cf. ‘Die Armee in Zahlen’, Eidgenössisches
Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport, accessed November 19 2019, https:
//www.vbs.admin.ch/de/vbs/zahlen-fakten/armee.html.
34 In contrast to most of Switzerland’s neighbours, the 2008 crisis primarily affected UBS, Switzerland’s
largest bank, and only to a lesser extent the country’s overall economy. Austria, on the other hand exper-
ienced a sharp rise in debt numbers between 2007 and 2010 and subsequently launched a comprehensive
review of her militia forces as of mid-2013. Ireland was in a similar situation. Here, the government
aspired to cut defence budgets by 15.00 per cent over the course of four years to combat soaring debt
numbers following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, the government decided to continue and expand
the examination of the national reserve force in 2012; cf. Jean-Pierre Roth, Globale Krise: Wie ist die Sch-
weiz betroffen?, Speech (Frankfurt Main, 2009), published by Schweizerische Nationalbank, accessed 12
July 2017, https://www.snb.ch/de/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20090302_jpr/source/ref_20090302_jpr.de.pdf,
4-5, Christian Mölling, and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European
Defence: Annex, 35, and 55, Christoph Vavrik, Anfrage der Abgeordneten Christoph Vavrik, Kollegin und
Kollegen an den Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung und Sport betreffend Neuausrichtung der Miliz,
1, Department of Defence, Strategy Statement 2011-2014 (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2012), 14,




Table 1.1: Extraneous Variance: Austria, Britain, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland
Austria Britain Germany Ireland Switzerland
Extraneous Variance
Post-War Democracy stable stable stable stable stable
Financially Driven Defence Reviews yes yes yes yes no
Territorial Security Environment stable stable stable stable stable
EU Member** yes yes yes yes no
NATO Member** no yes yes no no
Political Neutrality yes no no semi yes
Gross Domestic Product* 354.67 2283.51 3198.28 201.48 416.85
Number of Troops** 27.300 175.690 250.613 10.460 140.304***
Professional Forces no yes as of 2011 yes no
*Average GDP 2007-2012 in bn US$.
**In 2010.
**In 2019.
Sources: European Parliament, NATO, Swiss Army, and OECD, including own calculations.
As seen in Table 1.1, only Britain and Germany are a part of both alliances, which suggests
that they are more likely to be obliged to contribute troops to missions undertaken by these
defensive oragnisations, while Austria, Ireland and Switzerland may opt to participate or
not.35 This discrepancy is further illustrated by political neutrality. Britain and Germany
are not neutral countries and, therefore, must take additional threats into account when
planning defence strategies.36 In conclusion, these factors suggest that only Britain
has a comparable extraneous variance to Germany as regards her ideological security
environment.
35 This thesis was composed from 2013 through 2018 and covers events from 2010 through 2015 as
well as from 1970 through 1979. Moreover, by the time this thesis was submitted after final revisions
in late 2019, Britain was still a member of the EU. Therefore, the subject of Brexit was excluded
from the analysis; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO Member Countries’, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, accessed 11 May 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm, and
European Union, ‘Countries’, European Union, accessed 11 May 2017, https://europa.eu/european-uni
on/about-eu/countries_en.
36 While Ireland is not considered neutral in the context of international law, such as Austria and
Switzerland, Ireland’s foreign policy objectives and her decision not to join NATO reflects that
Irland can be considered semi-neutral; cf. Ronan Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality: An Historical Re-
view’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 1, No 3 (1982): 27-38, accessed 21 November 2019,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/30001722.
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While factors such as the state of nations’ post-war democracy and security environment
are a widely accepted measures of extraneous variance, one could argue that the reference
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or military capabilities (number of troops) should
be moved to the experimental variance examination.37 However, in the context of this
thesis, these two factors constitute framing conditions as both economic power and military
capabilities are the basis for defence planning; i.e., these factors are starting conditions
(extraneous variance) rather than experimental elements. As regards GDP, it is apparent
that Britain, again, exhibits the highest extraneous variance to Germany, while Austria,
Ireland and Switzerland show significantly smaller economic power. This discrepancy
must undoubtedly be attributed to the countries’ relatively small size. Still, it also suggests
that Austria, Ireland and Switzerland cannot spend as much on defence in real terms
as Britain or Germany. This reasoning is also somewhat reflected when considering
military capabilities. As highlighted in Table 1.1, Britain’s number of troops is again more
comparable to Germany’s than Ireland’s or Austria’s.38 Switzerland, on the other hand, is
an outlier in this context as she has a similar number of troops at her disposal as Britain.
Nevertheless, this number does not suggest comparability to Britain or Germany. Like
Austria, Switzerland maintains a based militia system.39 Therefore, total troop numbers
may not entirely reflect military capabilities as not all counted service members may
be fully trained to engage in combat. This reasoning is also reflected in Austria’s and
Switzerland’s military personnel statistics. In Austria, young adults complete their basic
obligatory military service in six months, while participation in subsequent training is
usually optional.40 Therefore, upon completion of their basic training, former conscripts
37 cf. Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 234.
38 Britain seems to have 75,000 fewer troops at her disposal than Germany. However, the Bundeswehr
numbers must be treated with caution, as the statistics also include 30,000 conscripts. When subtracting
the latter and comparing the number of service members to the countries’ population, it shows that
0.70 per cent of the British population are members of the armed forces, while 0.26 per cent of
Germans serve in the Bundeswehr. Thus, the 2010 indicate a good level for comparison; cf. ‘The
World Fact Book: United Kingdom’, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 10 May 2017, https:
//www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html, and Central Intelligence Agency,
‘The World Fact Book: Germany’, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 10 May 2017, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html.
39 See ‘Dauer des Grundwehrdienstes’, Oesterreich.gv.at, accessed 19 November 2019, https://www.oester
reich.gv.at/themen/leben_in_oesterreich/wehrdienst/3/Seite.1401081.html, ‘Dienstpflicht’, Schweizer
Armee, accessed 19 November 2019, https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/mein-militaerdienst/allgemeines-zu
m-militaerdienst/dienstpflicht.html, and BV Art. 59.
40 By law, participation in military exercises is mandatory for all, who completed basic military training.
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are not included in personnel statistics.41 In Switzerland, on the other hand, basic obligatory
military service, the Rekrutenschule, lasts only 4.5 months;42 however, graduates of the
Rekrutenschule remain members of the armed forces for 12 years after completing basic
military training.43 Switzerland has, therefore, more troops at her disposal than Austria; at
least statistically speaking.
Experimental Variance. In summary, only Britain exhibited sufficient extraneous vari-
ance compared to Germany in 2010. Therefore, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland were
excluded from further evaluations, which, as elaborated before, need to include the experi-
mental variance.44 Recalling from the paragraph on the theory of MSSD, examining the
latter serves the purpose of identifying other aspects that might have caused the dependent
variable other than the assumed explanatory factor.45 Moreover, variables defined as
experimental variance should be relevant to the research focus.46
The first section of Table 1.2, therefore, lists four aspects that were defined as influential
factors on defence planning. The first one considered was British and German attitudes
on how defence policies should be enforced. Here, it was judged that Britain pursues a
proactive strategy while Germany adheres to a rather reluctant approach. This conclusion is
best explained by looking at politicians’ reactions to a recent crisis in international security.
In 2014, when the Ukraine crisis worsened, different journalists independently confronted
both the British and German defence ministers with the same query;47 namely, they were
However, citizens are usually not drafted for training when enough volunteers report for duty. These
post-basic military service exercises are primarily designed to train future officers; see ‘Dauer des
Grundwehrdienstes’, Oesterreich.gv.at, accessed 19 November 2019, https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/th
emen/leben_in_oesterreich/wehrdienst/3/Seite.1401081.html.
41 cf. ibid.
42 ‘Dienstpflicht’, Schweizer Armee, accessed 19 November 2019, https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/mein-mil
itaerdienst/allgemeines-zum-militaerdienst/dienstpflicht.html.
43 During this period, citizens have to return to the armed forces for annual training to refresh and advance
their skills. In total, citizens must participate in six Wiederholungskurse, which last for 19 days each; cf.
ibid, and MG Art. 13.
44 cf. Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 234.
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
47 Widely regarded by the West as a violation of international law, Russia’s annexation of the Crimean
Peninsula in 2014 has exacerbated political tensions between NATO and Russia. Due to Russia’s
subsequent conduct of concentrating troops at her border with Ukraine, NATO members in Eastern
European have urged the alliance to increase military presence in their countries; see, for example, Philip
Hammond, interviewed by Andrew Marr, The Andrew Marr Show, broadcasted by BBC Two, 30 March
2014.
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asked to elaborate what they considered the most appropriate reaction to the increasing
tensions in Eastern Europe.48 Responding to this question, then-British Defence Secretary
Philip Hammond asserted that it was necessary to demonstrate military strength and
stressed Britain’s commitment to the safety of NATO’s Baltic member states.49 German
Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, on the other hand, emphasised that economic
power rather than military might constitutes Europe’s competitive advantage.50 Hence, so
she continued, financial resources such as sanctions should be used to enforce diplomatic
solutions.51




Defence Policies/Enforcement proactive reluctant
Political Self-Perceptions positive critical
Foreign Policy Objectives global European
Attitudes towards the Armed Forces positive/neutral negative/neutral
Explanatory Factor
2008 Financial Crisis yes yes
Financially Driven Defence Reviews yes yes
Dependent Variable
Post-2010 Reserve Forces’ Reform yes yes
Source: OECD, including own calculations.
At first glance, these statements seemed to express consent as regards the ends (desired
outcome), namely, preventing further breaches of the territorial integrity of sovereign
European states.52 Looking more closely, however, politicians unintentionally highlighted
48 ibid., and Ursula von der Leyen, interviewed by Günther Jauch, Günther Jauch, broadcasted by ARD,
04 May 2014.
49 Philip Hammond, interviewed by Andrew Marr.
50 Ursula von der Leyen, interviewed by Günther Jauch.
51 ibid.
52 cf. Bruce Reider, ‘Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq’, Parameters XXXVII, No
Winter 2007-08 (2007): 46-57, accessed 01 December 2014, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/p
ubs/parameters/Articles/07winter/reider.pdf, 48.
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their countries’ differences regarding the desired ways (strategy) and means (resources) to
enforce the said outcomes.53 Reasons for this discrepancy can be found in the respective
country’s contemporary defence strategy papers. For instance, the 2010 National Security
Strategy (2010-NSS) stated that Britain’s ‘[...] national interest requires [Britain] to
project power and [...] to act well beyond [her] shores’, while the 2011 Defence Policy
Guidelines (2011-DPG) elaborated that ‘[...] Germany is prepared to use the complete
spectrum of national policy instruments [...] to defend itself’.54
These citations emphasise Britain’s and Germany’s differences as regards their approach
towards defence policy and their willingness to deploy armed forces. However, they
also implicitly hint at Britain’s and Germany’s divergence regarding their self-perceived
role in world affairs. Britain openly accepts to play an active part in the global theatre,
while Germany is rather critical and prefers to remain passive and use force purely as a
means of self-defence. Further evidence for this inference is found in the 2010 Strategic
Defence and Security Review (2010-SDSR), which stated that Britain aims to contribute
‘to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks [...] and [by] applying
[her] instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment and tackle
potential risks at the source’.55 Germany’s 2011-DPG, on the other hand, stressed that
‘[m]ilitary operations have far-reaching political consequences’ and that ‘[...] there must
be a clear answer to the question of whether German interests and the related fulfilment of
international responsibility require and justify an operation and what the consequences of
non-action would be’.56
This proactive British approach, and Germany’s cautious attitude, further alludes to the
countries’ different strategic focuses. Again referring to the policy papers, it becomes
apparent that the former’s objectives are on a global scale where ‘power projection’ and
‘strategic presence’ around the world is necessary.57 Germany’s strategic focal point,
53 ibid.
54 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm
7953 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010), 21, and German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy
Guidelines (Berlin: German Ministry of Defence, 2011), accessed 05 November 2017, https://www.fil
es.ethz.ch/isn/157024/Germany%20engl.pdf. 3.
55 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
Cm 7948 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010), 9.
56 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 4.
57 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 4, and HM
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however, is European and the 2011-DPG support this claim as its authors purposely
juxtaposed the striving for national objectives to Germany’s dedicated role ‘as a strong
partner in a united Europe,’ who is ‘committed to serving world peace’.58
Considering Britain’s and Germany’s experience with the use of force in the 20th century,
these different attitudes are not surprising. For instance, authors’ of the 2010-SDSR
affirmed that ‘[...] [w]e have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and
we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come.’59 This excerpt
implies that military involvements have been beneficial for Britain. For Germany, on the
other hand, the experiences of the two world wars still exercise a significant influence
on the formulation of security policies. For instance, the 2011-DPG stated that ‘German
security interests are a result of our history’ and that overseas deployments require ‘[t]he
involvement of the German Bundestag with regard to the employment of the armed forces
as stipulated in the constitution’ as this ‘[...] will continue to be an indispensable basis of
German security policy’.60
Besides these political aspects, the respective public’s different attitudes towards the armed
forces are rather interesting. In the context of this thesis, this point is quite important,
as the public’s acceptance of the military strongly correlates with the MoD’s potential to
recruit.61 In Britain, the public’s opinion of the military is believed to be split between
support of the armed forces and a critical stance on the overseas missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan.62 As noted by Hines et al., this discrepancy might be explained by Britain’s
former status as a global empire, which required frequent overseas deployment of troops.63
Meaning, the public is somewhat used to this process and values the service of its military
staff while simultaneously questioning the necessity of the said deployments.64 However,
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 12.
58 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 4.
59 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
3.
60 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 3-4.
61 See Lindsey A. Hines et al., ‘Are the Armed Forces Understood and Supported by the Public? A View






Cornish and Dorman relativised this judgment by stating that ‘the murder of Drummer
Rigby in May 2013 and the protests against some of the homecoming parades of British
forces indicate that there are elements of society that are not only hostile to UK foreign
policy but also view Britain’s armed forces as potential targets’.65 In Germany, this friction
between the public and the armed forces manifests itself even beyond the topic of overseas
deployments. In general, the public expresses little to no interest in the Bundeswehr.66
In 2012, Reeb predicted that this problem might further increase in the course of the
suspension of conscription as no more former draftees would return to civilian life.67 One
year later, statistical proof for his prognosis was delivered; according to a Bundeswehr
survey, almost 80.00 per cent of Germans receive information about the armed forces from
mainstream media and not from personal interaction with service members.68 Moreover,
20.00 per cent express hostile opinions about the Bundeswehr.69 As regards overseas
deployment, public consent seems to be tied to the nature of the said mission.70 In general,
it appears that the public tends to judge deployments more positively when they involve
less military and more humanitarian aspects.71
Explanatory Factors. The evaluation of Britain’s and Germany’s experimental vari-
ances suggests that both countries are somewhat different as regards their strategic defence
thinking. While comparable defence and foreign policy objectives would have sugges-
ted an explanation for taking similar strategic steps in defence planning, these aspects
can be excluded as explanatory factors for launching defence reviews in 2010; i.e., the
experimental variance does not reveal why the dependent variable emerged. However,
65 Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Fifty Shades of Purple? A Risk-Sharing Approach to the
2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review’, International Affairs 89, No 5 (2013): 1183-1202,
DOI:10.1111/1468-2346.12066.x, 1191.
66 Hans-Joachim Reeb. ‘Wandel der Sicherheitskultur durch die Bundeswehrreform’, ed. Detlef Buch
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 32.
67 ibid.
68 Thomas Buhlmahn, and Meike Wanner, Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image der
Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“:
Forschungsbericht (Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr,
2013), 6.
69 ibid.
70 See Matthias Mader, ‘Bevölkerungseinstellungen zu Auslandseinsätzen’, (doctoral thesis, University of
Bamberg, 2016).
71 ibid., 44 and 93.
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as indicated in Table 1.2, two other intertwined factors can be identified as explanatory
factors; namely, the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequently launched financially driven
defence reviews.
To assess whether Britain and Germany were affected by the 2008 financial crisis, the
development of national GDPs was examined. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, both countries
experienced a similar downward trend in GDP, starting in the second quarter of 2008 and
reaching a negative peak in the first quarter of 2009. Thereafter, Germany’s GDP resumed
positive growth in the second quarter of 2009, followed by Britain in the subsequent
quarter; negative growth, therefore, concentrated in 2009, which echoes the peak of the
2008 financial crisis in Europe.72
Figure 1.1: GDP Change in Per Cent, Britain and Germany (2007-2012)
Source: OECD.
As the GDP is an important indicator to measure national income, these negative de-
velopments suggest that both Britain’s and Germany’s economies experienced severe
ramifications following the 2008 financial crisis. Subsequently, namely, in 2010, both
Britain and Germany launched comprehensive defence reviews. In Britain, findings of the
72 cf. Stormy-Annika Mildner, ‘Germany and the Financial Crisis: Lessons to be Learned’. China and
Germany as Actors in World Politics - Mutual Challenges, Common Positions?, (Beijing: Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, 2010), 61 et seq.
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review were consolidated in the 2010-NSS/SDSR package.73 Moreover, besides this parent
review, the British government commissioned a report on the reform of the reserve;74
it was published in 2011.75 In Germany, on the other hand, aims of the 2010 Bundes-
wehrreform were expressed in three independent documents, namely, in the report by the
2010 Commission on Structural Reform (2010-CSR), in the 2010 review of the Inspector
General of the Bundeswehr, as well as in the 2011-DPG.76 Similarly to Britain, Berlin
followed London’s example in 2012 by publishing the 2012-COR.77 As discussed in more
detail in Chapters Two through Five, the parent reforms were primarily driven by financial
considerations and set the objectives for the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR respectively.
Dependent Variable. In addition to covering the experimental variable and the explan-
atory factors, Table 1.2 further alludes to the dependent variable; i.e., the phenomenon
this thesis aims to study. As highlighted in Table 1.2, both Britain and Germany launched
reviews of their national reserve forces after the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis.
The dependent variable is the main focus of this study and is examined in Chapters Two
through Five.
1.2.1.3 Sample Size and Assessment Periods
Contemporary Examples. This project commenced based on the motivation to explore
reserve forces’ reforms in times of economic turmoil. Building on the defined springboard
example, Britain was selected as a suitable candidate for comparison to Germany by using
the MSSD approach. Therefore, the assessment period was set to span from the publication
of the FR-2020’s and 2012-COR’s parent reforms, namely, the British 2010-SDSR /
2010-NSS and the 2010 Bundeswehrreform, to the implementation of the FR-2020 and
73 cf. HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, and HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review.
74 cf. The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserves
2020.
75 ibid.
76 cf. Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7.
Juni 2010, 2010, accessed 27 April 2015, http://www.sicherheitspolitik-bremen.de/media/5a3794b2ced
6c3b7ffff80b1ffffffef.pdf, and German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines.
77 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve.
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2012-COR.78 Accordingly, the core period was defined as 2010 through 2015. However,
noting that the economic implications of the 2008 financial crisis had to be reference
frequently, pre-2010 developments were considered in the research process as well.
Historical Examples. The evaluation of the above mentioned contemporary examples
already promised to deliver sufficient answers to the first research question. However,
findings of the comparative analysis would somewhat be limited as they are only valid for
these two countries during one period. Therefore, it was judged that additional examples of
reserve forces’ reforms in times of economic turmoil should be investigated in this thesis
to enhance theory building and increase the validity of findings.
As other countries had already been excluded due to their low extraneous variance, Britain’s
and Germany’s postwar history was, therefore, assessed further. Again starting with the
dependent variable, the author sought to identify examples of economic turmoil and
subsequent defence reviews. Here, it was discovered that both Britain and Germany
exhibited this constellation in the 1970s. In Britain, the so-called Mason Review was
launched in 1975 and was accompanied by the review of reserve forces’ structures and
roles within the army, navy and air force.79 Similar to the situation in 2008, Britain was
also confronted with severe economic problems when the Mason Review was conducted.
As highlighted by Cairncross, Britain experienced continuous growth after World War
Two;80 however, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, GDP started growing negatively and (or)
fluctuated at low positive numbers when the price of oil and other commodities rose in the
course of the 1973 oil price shock.81
A similar pattern was found in Germany. As noted by Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding,
postwar Germany had experienced strong and stable economic growth. However, after
78 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
and German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines.
79 cf. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975 (London: Ministry of Defence, 1975), The National
Archives Digitalised Records, Electronic Archive Signature CAB 129/181/21, chap. IV-1 et seq.,
Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review), The National
Archives, Reference DEFE 70/349, and Roy Mason, Our Contribution to the Price of Peace: Britain’s
Defence Policy and Expenditure (London: Ministry of Defence, 1975), The British Library, Reference
Dewey: 355.6/22.
80 Alexander Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1964-1990’, eds. Roderick Floud, and
Donald McCloskey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1994), 67, and 81.
81 ibid.
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Figure 1.2: GDP Change in Per Cent, Britain and Germany (1970-1979)
Source: OECD.
the exponential rise in oil prices as of 1973, governments were confronted with severe
economic turmoil, which lasted throughout the remaining years of the decade.82 Simul-
taneously, as attested by the publication of five Defence White Papers between 1970 and
1979, the Bundeswehr as well Germany’s defence policy underwent a thorough reform
process.83 Moreover, in the course of these defence reviews, the Bundeswehr’s reserve
force was profoundly restructured, and their importance for Germany’s defence posture
was emphasised.84
82 cf. Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paqué, and Holger Schmieding, The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of
Market Economy in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 185.
83 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage
der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1970), Digital Archive of the Bundestag, Drucksache VI/765,
Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1971), Digital Archive of the Bundestag, Drucksache
VI/2920, Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1974), Digital Archive of the Bundestag,
Drucksache 7/1505, Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1976), Digital Archive of the
Bundestag, Drucksache 7/4554, Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1979 Zur Sicherheit
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Paul Dierichs, 1979),
Digital Archive of the Bundestag. Drucksache 8/3568.
84 cf. Ekkehart Guth, ‘Reservisten der Luftwaffe’, ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler), 215,
Wilhelm Langer, ‘Reservisten des Heeres’, ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler, 1998), 125,
and 153, and Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland: Analyse und Optionen (Bonn: Wehrstruktur-Kommission, 1972/1973).
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These developments demonstrate that both Britain and Germany exhibited similar depend-
ent variables and explanatory factors in the 1970s and following the 2008 financial crisis.
Moreover, both countries were Western democracies and members of NATO and the EU’s
predecessor, namely, the European Economic Community (EEC); hence, a comparable
extraneous variance can be assumed. Considering these factors, the second assessment
period was, therefore, first set between 1973 and 1979. However, to respect all Defence
White Papers published by the German government during this decade, the assessment
period was eventually defined as 1970 through 1979.
1.2.2 The Mixed Methods Approach
1.2.2.1 Theory
Similar to numerous other projects in the social sciences, this thesis’ research focus cannot
be examined in the laboratory setting.85 Reasons for this are twofold. First, the author
can neither influence whether and when an economic crisis occurs nor can she change
governments’ subsequent decisions on defence policy;86 i.e., the dependent variable and
explanatory factor emerge without the control of the author. Second, alternative strategies
regarding reserve forces reforms cannot be simulated. Consequently, developments must
be studied as they present themselves in real life.
Combined with the inductive character of the research questions, the aforementioned
factors indicate that this thesis’ research focus is best studied by qualitative means.87
However, while certainly valid, this reasoning does not fully take the economic dimension
of the research questions into account. Although economic developments may also be
studied in a narrative, gathering and analysing data such as defence budgets needs to be
done in a quantitative setting.88
85 cf. Anthony M. Omrum, Joe R. Feagin, and Gideon Sjoberg, ‘Introduction’, eds. Joe R. Feagin, Anthony
M. Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press), 6-7.
86 cf. Anol Bhattacherjee, Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices, 2nd edn. (Tampa:
Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 84-85.
87 cf. Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures, 39-41 et
seq.
88 cf. John W. Creswell, A Concise Introduction to Mixed Methods Research (London: Sage, 2015), 2.
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Multiple Methods Approach. In principal, the literature suggests two strategies for
dealing with research problems that encompass both qualitative and quantitative com-
ponents.89 Morse and Niehaus, for instance, discussed the multiple methods design as a
rigorous strategy to apply both qualitative and quantitative approaches.90 Nevertheless,
they also highlighted that a ‘[m]ultiple method research program is a series of complete
related qualitative and/or quantitative research projects’. 91 Furthermore, studies using
the multiple methods approach must apply all aspects of the selected research approach
and cannot mix qualitative and quantitative methods.92 As this strategy is rather time-
consuming, Morse and Niehaus recommend the application of multiple methods only for
extended or related sequential projects.93 For other studies that wish to combine qualitative
and quantitative means, the authors recommend the mixed methods approach.94
Mixed Methods Approach. Instead of integrating all aspects of each method, research-
ers using the mixed method approach must select a core and a supplement component.95
The core component drives the research and can either be qualitative or quantitative.96
However, it must be chosen based on the research questions;97 if they are inductive, namely,
when they ask to study a phenomenon with empirical means, the mixed method study
must be qualitatively driven.98 Conversely, when the research questions ask to investigate
relationships of variables, the project is deductive and, therefore, quantitatively driven.99
In any case, both qualitative and quantitative data may be gathered and analysed.100 This
conduct, therefore, allows investigating the phenomenon in question from different angles,
which is believed to advance the researcher’s understanding of the research problem and,











100 John W. Creswell, A Concise Introduction to Mixed Methods Research, 2.
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therefore, adds validity to the findings.101 Nevertheless, both qualitative and quantitative
methods need to follow their innate inductive or deductive character whenever they are
applied.102
1.2.2.2 Application
As already mentioned above, this thesis research is driven by qualitative means that need
to be supported by qualitative elements. Therefore, the mixed method approach is applied
by using a qualitative core and quantitative supplementary component. This strategy
allows investigating the research questions in five steps. First, relevant policy papers
and the accompanying political discourse are examined for empirical evidence of the
presence of the explanatory factor. In other words, documents are scrutinised for proof that
economic turmoil has influenced the respective defence review. Second, to underscore these
empirical findings, national defence budgets are examined before and after the emergence
of economic turmoil. This step, therefore, aims to highlight the relationship between
financial crises and government spending. Third, in order to assess the threats that regular
service members and reservists face, Britain’s and Germany’s territorial and ideological
security environments are examined. This step is accomplished by consulting relevant
government publications. Four, changes to the role and responsibilities are explored and
described by looking at the implications of the respective reserve forces’ reforms on
national reserve forces. Again, qualitative and quantitative reasoning is used here. On
the one hand, policy papers as regards the reserve reforms are examined for envisaged
plans. On the other hand, personnel statistics are used to illustrate how the composition of
the reserve forces changed after the impact of economic turmoil. Five, the comparative
analysis considers and compares these (new) roles and responsibilities of reservists in light
of the financially driven defence reforms and security environments. In doing so, it aspired
to develop a theory on how governments reform their reserve forces in times of economic
turmoil. A detailed description of how and which sources were gathered and analysed is
presented in Section 1.4 of this chapter.
101 ibid., and Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures, 14.
102 ibid., 39-40.
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1.3 Academic Discourse and Research Gap
1.3.1 Literature Analysis Process
Authors in the field of defence studies discuss a vast number of specific topics and, therefore,
contribute uncountable works to the literature every year. While reading publications on
a variety of subjects can be an entertaining pastime, the process of reviewing available
and relevant sources for this study served two particular purposes. First, publications
discussing topics specifically related to this thesis’ research focus, e.g., works focusing on
the relevant defence reviews or reserve forces, were consulted to identify research gaps.
Second, the literature needed to be consulted to locate works that would support exploring
the stipulated research questions.
To sort through the vast collection of related literature, the analysis had to follow a
structured process. To cater to both the demands of the research focus and the selected
examples, it was, therefore, divided into two steps. First, the research scope had to be
respected; although reserve forces’ reforms can be categorised as a topic in defence studies,
examining the former in the light of economic challenges also somewhat placed research
in the realm of (political) economy. Thus, to consult the appropriate sources in both fields,
the author decided to group the literature into five clusters as regards their thematic focus.
Second, as this thesis employed Britain and Germany as examples, works discussing the
individual themes needed to consider either Britain or Germany or both. As the latter
is rarely found, it was further decided to break down the thematic clusters and, where
applicable, to review the themes separately as regards Britain and Germany.
When research for this thesis commenced, the author, in line with the stipulated springboard
example, first consulted the literature on the 2010 defence reviews and the subsequent
reserve forces’ reforms. This step was taken to gain an overview of the available publica-
tions and to determine to what extent scholars had already discussed the study’s selected
research focus. After concluding this first assessment, the same approach was repeated
for exploring the relevant literature on the historical cases. Following this analysis, the
author consulted complementary publications for context building. Here, publications on
Anglo-German (defence) relations were consulted. Finally, works that were believed to
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aid in theory building and background analysis, e.g., literature on economic theory and
defence economics, were reviewed to select the most relevant publications.
1.3.1.1 2010 Defence Reviews
The 2010-NSS/SDSR. In Britain, the 2010-NSS/SDSR package drew much attention
and scholars commented on developments in two phases, namely, pre-publication and
post-publication. Prior to the 2010-NSS/SDSR package’s release, the discussion chiefly
focused on offering advice on how to approach the upcoming defence review to prevent its
failure at the implementation stage.103 In this context, Cornish and Dorman specifically
stressed that the review process itself needed to be conducted thoroughly.104
While authors generally expressed a benevolent attitude towards the upcoming review, their
opinion became increasingly hostile in the post-publication phase. Cavanagh, for instance,
stipulated that the government had ‘missed the chance for conducting a serious defence
reform’.105 His opinion was seconded by Philips, who highlighted that the government
had neglected to set a clear direction, which, as argued by Dover and Phythian, lead to
rendering the 2010-SDSR’s main objectives obsolete.106
The 2010 Bundeswehrreform. Similar to the British discourse, German scholars began
commenting on the 2010 Bundeswehrreform already during the review process. At this
stage, authors again published their recommendations; however, in contrast to their British
colleagues, they primarily focused on highlighting desired outcomes rather than comment-
ing on the review process itself. Brune et at., for instance, strongly advocated enhancing
the Bundeswehr’s deployment capabilities by providing troops with suitable equipment
and training.107 In addition, former Defence Minister Scharping admonished the MoD not
103 See, for example, Wyn Rees, ‘A Strategic Defence Review: Lessons From the Past’, The Political
Quarterly 81, No 3 (2010): 424-427. DIO:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2010.02105.x, and Paul Cornish, and
Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Breaking the Mould: The United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010’.
104 ibid.
105 Matt Cavanagh, ‘Missed Opportunity’, The RUSI Journal 156, No 5 (2011): 6-13, DOI:10.1080/0307
1847.2011.626268, 214.
106 Mark Phillips, ‘Policy-Making in Defence and Security’, The RUSI Journal 157, No 1 (2012): 28-35,
DOI:10.1080/03071847.2012.664361, 32, and Robert Dover, and Mark Phythian, ‘Lost Over Libya: The
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review - An Obituary’, Defence Studies 11, No 3 (2011): 420-444,
DOI:10.1080/14702436.2011.630175.x.
107 cf. Sophie-Charlotte Brune, Marcel Dickow, Hilmar Linnenkamp, and Christian Mölling, ‘The German
Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, 1-2.
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to jeopardise military capabilities by significantly reducing the number of troops.108
Following this general approach to the topic, the discourse soon turned more specific, and
authors who evaluated the ramifications of the suspension of conscription started to dom-
inate the discussion.109 Here, the risk of losing democratic control over the Bundeswehr
after turning into an all-volunteer force was the most frequently quoted concern.110
2010 Thematic Commonalities. Although British and German scholars approached
their respective country’s defence reviews from different angles, there were also some
common themes present in both academic discourses, namely, financial aspects and
capability gaps. As regards the former, scholars in both countries agreed that economic
considerations and not security concerns had sparked and guided the 2010 defence reviews.
For example, Cornish and Dorman, as well as Punyani, claimed that British government’s
primary concern was to stop economic deterioration by limiting rising debt numbers.111
Concerning the 2010 Bundeswehrreform, judgement was less harsh; however, Brück
insinuated that ‘it [was] not a coincidence that one of the most profound reforms of the
Bundeswehr [was] being planned during one of the most severe economic crises of recent
decades’.112
As regards military capabilities, British scholars outlined that the ability to conduct ‘endur-
ing stabilization operation such as those undertaken recently in Iraq or Afghanistan would
be significantly reduced’ as with decreasing budgets, the government was not capable of
tackling all potential hazards threatening Britain.113 In Germany, on the other hand, authors
108 Rudolph Scharping, ‘Sicherheit nach Kassenlage’, Berliner Republik, http://www.b-republik.de/archiv
/sicherheit-nach-kassenlage?aut=822, 27 April 2014.
109 See, for example, Wenke Apt, ‘Demographischer Wandel als Rekrutierungsproblem?: Regionale
Ungleichheit und unerschlossene Potentiale bei der Nachwuchsgewinnung der Bundeswehr’, SWP-
Aktuell 41, (2010), accessed 05 December 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/prod
ucts/aktuell/2010A41\_apw\_ks.pdf, and Detlef Buch, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, ed. Detlef Buch
(Frankfurt Main: Peter Lang, 2012).
110 See, for example, Harald Kujat, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 61, No
48 (2011): 3-7, and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, ‘Wehrpflicht und Zivildienst: Bestandteile der Politischen
Kultur’, APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 61, No 48 (2011): 39-45.
111 Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman. ‘Dr Fox and the Philosopher’s Stone: The Alchemy of
National Defence in the Age of Austerity’, International Affairs 87, No 2 (2011): 335-353, DOI:
10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00976.x, and Sameer Punyani, ‘The Economics of National Defence in an
Age of Austerity’, Chatham House in collaboration with McKinsey & Company, Meeting No. 3: On
Year on from the SDSR, accessed 16 November 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chath
amhouse/public/Research/International%20Security/171011report.pdf.
112 Tilman Brück, ‘Die Ökonomie der Bundeswehrreform’. Translated by the author.
113 Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman. ‘Dr Fox and the Philosopher’s Stone: The Alchemy of National
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anticipated military capabilities to decline as a result of the suspension of conscription.114
Kujat, for example, predicted that the state’s inability to draft would result in a shortage in
manpower, both quantitatively and qualitatively.115 Apt, on the other hand, argued that
shrinking age cohorts, as well as factors such as lack of physical aptitude and improving
levels of education, would exacerbate recruitment challenges.116
1.3.1.2 1970s Defence Reviews
The 1975 Mason Review. Although the 1975 Mason Review is not a frequently ad-
dressed topic in the recent academic discourse, earlier publications such as books and
journal articles discussed this defence reform sporadically. As regards the former, authors
usually embedded the discussion on the 1975 Mason Review in a broader analysis of Bri-
tain’s postwar security policy. Dockrill, for example, referred to the 1975 Mason Review
in the context of Britain’s defence policy on the 1970s.117 Elaborating that this decade was
characterised by severe economic turmoil, Dockrill insinuated that the review’s primary
purpose was to reallocate government funding from defence to welfare, social security, and
government investments in the private sector.118 Furthermore, Dockrill alluded to rising
equipment costs, which he mainly attributed to advancements in military technology.119
Here, Dockrill stipulated that investments in equipment would have pushed defence ex-
penditure to 11.25 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP), if the government had
not taken action.120 Therefore, Dockrill concluded that the inevitable rise in equipment
costs further contributed to then-Defence Secretary Roy Mason’s motivation to conduct a
comprehensive defence review.121
While Dockrill approached the 1975 Mason Review from a somewhat neutral angle,
Defence in the Age of Austerity’, 336, and Robert Dover, and Mark Phythian, ‘Lost Over Libya: The
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review - An Obituary’, 423.
114 See, for example, Wenke Apt, ‘Herausforderung für die Personalgewinnung der Bundeswehr’, APuZ
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 61, No 48 (2011): 24-30, and Harald Kujat, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’.
115 ibid.
116 Wenke Apt, ‘Herausforderung für die Personalgewinnung der Bundeswehr’.






Chichester and Wilkinson discussed this defence review somewhat tendentiously.122 Ac-
cording to their estimates, Labours ‘left-wing’ defence approach had left Britain de-
fenceless by the end of the decade, which they mainly attributed to the incisive cuts to
expenditure, equipment and withdrawal from foreign deployments such as from the Medi-
terranean.123 Although attesting that then-Defence Secretary Roy Mason was a realist, they
explicitly blamed then-Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healy, for the disproportional
decrease of the MoD’s funds.124
Cary, on the other hand, approached the analysis of the 1975 Mason Review more benevol-
ently and even called it the ‘best-managed’ as regards finances.125 Having been involved
in the review process, he alluded to two specific points to underscore his judgment;126
first, compared to the other 16 major and minor defence reviews he has been part of, Cary
welcomed the fact that he and his colleagues had sufficient time to conduct the review,
which also allowed consulting external experts and drafting a comprehensive ten-year
defence plan.127 Second, Cary explicitly emphasised that the government accepted the
expert’s assumptions that costs can only be reduced in the long term and that these long
term effects should not be jeopardised by striving for realising short-term savings goals.128
However, Cary also agreed that the 1975 Mason Review’s main purpose was to reduce
the MoD’s share of GNP.129 Seconding Cary’s somewhat positive evaluation of the 1975
Mason Review, World Today stipulated that the Labour government merely inherited an
unfavourable economic and defence situation from the Conservatives.130
The 1973 Wehrstrukturreform. Similar to the British discourse, authors often addressed
the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform in the context of discussing the Bundeswehr’s overall history.
122 Michael Chichester, and John Wilkinson, The Uncertain Ally: British Defence Policy 1960-1990
(Aldershot: Gower-Publishing, 1982), 43 et seq.
123 ibid., 46-47.
124 ibid., 47.
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Clement and Jöris, for instance, briefly referenced the reform while elaborating on the
1970s détente and stipulated that the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform was a necessity for mod-
ernising the Bundeswehr.131 Schlaffner and Sandig chiefly agreed with this reasoning but
also specified that the reform’s main goal was to consolidate and structure responsibilities
within the MoD.132 Additionally, they allude to the Blankeneser Erlass;133 this document
was introduced by then-Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt and stressed the importance of
the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr while emphasising that s/he still remained bound
by instructions of the Bundestag.134 Moreover, they insinuated that the Blankeneser Erlass
was the foundation that enabled the Heeresstruktur 3, which integrated the Command for
Territorial Defence into the structures of the German Army.135
Rink also cited the Heeresstruktur 3, which he addressed in conjunction with implemented
measures in the German Navy and Air Force.136 Briefly referring to the latter, Rink
merely stated that the Air Force had been subject to restructuring efforts;137 however, as
regards the former, Rink elaborated that the Navy received numerous new ships and that
its responsibilities were expanded to guarding larger parts of the North and Baltic Sea.138
Besides mentioning the structural aspects of the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform, Rink also
stipulated that this reform marked a generation change for the Bundeswehr as the majority
of former Wehrmacht’s soldiers entered retirement age.139 According to Rink, it was due
to this fact that the MoD was finally able to truly enforce the principle of parliamentary
control over the Bundeswehr.140 This attempt, so he inferred, was primarily hindered by
service members adhering to the old Prussian directive of placing defence-related decisions
131 Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005 (Hamburg: Mittler, 2005), 107.
132 Rudolf J. Schlaffer, and Marina Sandig, Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2015: Sicherheitspolitik und Streit-
kräfte in der Demokratie. Analysen, Bilder und Übersichten (Berlin: Rombach, 2015), 82.
133 The Blankeneser Erlass came into effect on 01 April 1970; cf. Rudolf J. Schlaffer, and Marina Sandig,
Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2015: Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte in der Demokratie. Analysen, Bilder
und Übersichten, 79.
134 ibid.
135 Following the Blankeneser Erlass, the Army consisted of two major parts, namely, the Feldheer and the
Territorialheer; ibid.
136 Martin Rink, Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 65 et seq.
137 ibid., 65.




in the hands of the military leadership and the aristocracy.141
Bald’s analysis somewhat mirrored Rink’s reasoning and further explained that in the
course of the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform, the Bundeswehr’s composition changed signi-
ficantly and started to resemble the public’s profile.142 In addition to the retirement of
Wehrmacht soldiers, Rink also attributes this development to overall MoD efforts to offer
opportunities for service members to acquire transferable skills.143 Here, he primarily cited
the establishment of Bundeswehr Universities, which had supposedly attracted recruits
from various backgrounds.144
1.3.1.3 Reserve Forces
The FR-2020. Scholars frequently addressed the British reserve and, similar to the 2010-
NSS/SDSR package, the discourse was split into a general, a pre-, and post-FR-2020
discussion. Taking a general approach, Griffith, for instance, briefly outlined common
characteristics of reserve forces in seven countries, including Britain.145 Arguing that these
commonalities have emerged following governments’ decisions to end conscription after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, he outlined that all countries’ reserve forces trace their
origins back to local militia forces that were only mobilised during times of conflict.146
He continued to elaborate that soon after the end of World War Two, reservists started to
take on responsibilities that mirrored those of the regular force, which created the need to
establish firm reserve forces’ structures and organised training efforts.147
Dandeker, Greenberg, and Omre also alluded to the history of reserve forces by addressing
the British reserve’s post-Cold War development.148 Moreover, having published their
article shortly before the release of the FR-2020, the authors highlighted that different
141 cf. ibid., 45.
142 Detlef Bald, Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte,1955-2005 (Munich: Beck, 2005), 81 et. seq.
143 ibid., 84-85.
144 cf., ibid.
145 On two pages, Griffith discussed Israel, Switzerland, the United States, Sweden, Australia, France, and
Britain; James Griffith, ‘Reserve Forces After the Cold War: An International Perspective’, Armed
Forces & Society 37, No 2 (2011): 209-215, DOI:10.1177/0095327X10396027, 211-212.
146 ibid., 209.
147 ibid., 209-210.
148 Christopher Dandeker, Neil Greenberg, and Geoffrey Orme, ‘The UK’s Reserve Forces: Retrospect and
Prospect’, Armed Forces & Society 37, No 2 (2011): 341-360, DOI:10.1177/0095327X11398332.
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views as regards the future of the British reserve existed among experts.149 According to
Dandeker, Greenberg, and Omre, some experts expected the MoD to reduce the number of
reservists as they considered them ill-prepared for overseas deployments;150 this, so some
experts claimed, meant that the reserve was too costly in its contemporary form.151 On the
other hand, the authors stipulated that other experts demanded the reserve be augmented
and to mirror the structures, strength and responsibilities of the United States’ National
Guard.152
Besides addressing the British reserve in general terms or prior to the release of the
FR-2020, scholars also specifically focused on the latter after its publication. Similar to
Griffith, Keene adopted a comparative approach by treating the post-FR-2020 reserve as a
springboard example to elaborate how Britain could serve as a role model for the United
States’ reserve forces.153 In this context, Keene identified two main aspects, namely, the
reserve’s ability to contribute to defence more cost-efficiently than regulars and reservists’
skill sets, which could be used to compensate for missing competencies.154 Experts at
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), on the other hand, outlined four points they deemed
crucial for a successful implementation of the FR-2020.155 First, so they argued, regulars
needed to change their attitudes towards the reserve to ensure that 30,000 could be better
integrated into the Army’s structures in the course of the Whole Force Concept.156 Second,
RUSI scholars emphasised that the MoD had to implement measures to recruit, train and
retain a sufficient number of reservists.157 Third, experts highlighted that incentives for
and collaboration with civilian employers should be intensified as planned.158 Fourth, to
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should be deployed in pre-defined units rather than on an individual basis.159
The issue of recruiting and retaining reservists was also highlighted by Edmunds et al.,
who outlined that the Army had significant recruitment problems at the time the FR-2020
commenced.160 However, according to the authors, this trend gradually began to reverse
as of 2015.161 Edmunds et al. further alluded to the FR-2020 in the context of changing
security environments.162 Here, they outlined that the British reserve was increasingly
involved in highly complex missions, which required reservists to be trained at the same
level as regulars.163 Therefore, according to Edmunds et al.’s judgment, reservists were
starting to face the same obstacles as regulars to balance family life and their military
commitments.164
Also, Edmunds et al. addressed finances in their analysis.165 Here, they pointed out that
the British public was not in favour of additional defence spending, why, as argued the
authors, personnel costs were identified by the MoD as a means to realise economies.166
Dover largely mirrored Edmunds et al.’s judgement as regards financial constraints and
the reserve;167 however, he stipulated that the FR-2020 should be understood as the
government’s attempt to retain the British Armed Forces’ current capability levels, namely,
‘[...] as a medium sized power, "punching above its weight", as a force able to say
"yes" to the interventionist whims of its political masters and to be as "full-spectrum" as
possible’.168
The Post-Mason Reserve. In contrast to the FR-2020, the post-Mason Review reserve
must be considered a niche topic in the academic discourse. Keene, for example, only
159 ibid.
160 Timothy Edmunds et al., ‘Reserve Forces and the Transformation of British Military Organisation:
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briefly referred Britain’s Cold War reserve by stating that reservists were merely perceived
as a tool to augment the regular force in case of a Warsaw Pact attack and were not used in
any foreign deployments such to the Falklands.169
A rather comprehensive work on the reserve forces, however, was provided by Douglas-
Home in 1969.170 Here, the author addressed the history of the reserve in all three services
and specifically commented on the Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve (TAVR)’s
reform of 1967.171 Emphasising that the latter did not affect the Royal Navy (RN)’s or
the Royal Air Force (RAF)’s reserve forces, Douglas-Home stipulated that the TAVR
underwent scrutiny to identify ways to reduce public spending.172 This reform is also
referred to by Peedle, who described the changing of the Territorial Army’s name to TAVR
in the same year.173 Thompson and Nevill also alluded to this renaming process and
further highlight that restructuring efforts, as well as large-scale reductions, accompanied
this reform.174 Moreover, the authors pointed out that by 1971, several of the envisaged
measures were being reversed, which even lead to changing the name back to ‘Territorial
Army’ in 1979.175
A more detailed account of the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) was provided by Howarth,
who discussed the reserve’s 20th-century history.176 Here, the author pointed out that a
reform was inevitable at the beginning of the 1970s as most war-experienced personnel left
service during this decade.177 In this context, Howarth also alluded to the 1974 Mitchell
Committee, which was supposed to review the RNR’s roles and potential employment
in war and peacetime for the next 20 years.178 As stipulated by Howarth, the outcome
of the review was somewhat positive, as the Mitchell Committee report attested that the
169 Shima D. Keene, The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United
Kingdom Reserve Model, 6.
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RNR’s contribution benefitted the RN.179 Nevertheless, Howarth also described that, due
to economic pressures, a system of hull-sharing was introduced, which basically meant
that the RNR had to share its ships.180 According to Howarth’s analysis, this conduct was
not well received by reservists.181
The 2012-COR Reserve. In contrast to the British reserve, the mainstream academic
discourse somewhat neglected the 2012-COR. A notable exception, however, is Stockfisch,
who introduced the concept of ‘vacancy management’, which he briefly described as one
of the 2012-COR’s primary goals.182 According to his analysis, the 2012-COR included
the necessary tools to compensate missing personnel in the regular force.183 Nevertheless,
Stockfisch also pointed out that the reserve would not be fully capable to fill this void
as, for instance, the Navy’s manpower was supposedly 45.00 per cent short of required
numbers. Müller, on the other hand, only briefly mentioned the 2012-COR in the context
of discussing the reserve’s postwar history.184 While he implied that the 2012-COR might
have the potential to help strengthening the Bundeswehr’s connection to society, he also
surmised that most MoD measures merely constituted attempts to cover up structural
shortcomings.185
Other authors, namely, those writing on behalf of the Reservists’ Association, have contrib-
uted more frequently to the discourse. In this context, the Regional Security and Support
Units (RSSU) were one of the most commonly discussed themes. Von Bruch, for example,
stipulated that by establishing RSSUs, the MoD has given reservists the opportunity to
continue their service close to home, which, as he called it, gave them ‘a new military
home’.186 To underscore the progress of the RSSU implementation process, writers also
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Rhineland-Palatinate’s RSSU was successfully certified to carry out guard service for
sensible infrastructures.188 Besides the RSSU, the reserve’s collaboration with civilian
employers was addressed. In this context, Dittmar emphasised the need for creating aware-
ness among business owners that reservists do not pose a burden on the company but, due
to acquired skills, were an asset to the corporation.189
The 1973 Wehrstrukturreform’s Reserve. As regards Bundeswehr reservists in the
1970s, scholars widely addressed the topic within the context of the Bundeswehr’s reserve’s
postwar history. Brugmann, for example, examined the reserve’s structures from the
founding of the Bundeswehr in 1955 to the end of the Cold War.190 In his analysis he
noted that without reservists, the Bundeswehr would not have been capable of defending
West-Germany against the aggression of the Warsaw Pact.191 Nevertheless, according to
his judgement, both politicians and military planners had refrained from recognising the
importance of the reserve force until the 1970s.192 Langer, Guth, and Stockfisch mirrored
this point in their analyses of the history of reservists in the German Army, Air Force, and
Navy respectively.193 Especially Langer stressed that with the Heerestruktur 3, reservists
received greater responsibilities in homeland defence.194 As regards the Bundeswehr’s
medical service, Köhnke emphasised that reservists had already assumed crucial roles
from the beginning, but were subject to profound restructuring efforts as of the 1970s.195
While these scholars addressed the Bundeswehr’s reserve in the postwar context, Schössler
approached the subject more comprehensively.196 Although also referring to the 1973
Taktikausbildung’, Reserve Aktuell, No 1 (2014): 5.
188 cf. Rudi Meiszies, ‘RSU-Kompanie Rheinland-Pfalz für den Wachdienst zertifiziert’, Reserve Aktuell,
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1998), 93 et. seq.
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Wehrstrukturreform, he embeds the topic in the broader historical setting and traces the roots
of conscription and reservists to the Prussian military reforms of the late 18th-century.197
Moreover, he elaborated reservists’ roles and responsibilities in the light of democracy and
international law.198 In a previous work, Schössler, together with Steinkamm, examined
the 1971 Conception of Reserve (1971-COR) on behalf of the Bundeswehr’s Reservists’
Association.199 Assessing the 1971-COR from reservists’ point of view, the authors did
not only address structural weaknesses of the reform but also discussed challenges that
reservists faced during their service.200
1.3.1.4 Anglo-German (Defence) Relationship
Stereotypes. Often, scholars tend to study Anglo-German relations by looking at ste-
reotypes. Oltermann and Emig, for instance, both dedicated entire books to this topic.201
Here, both authors independently agreed that the British public, presumably goaded by
the tabloids, still harbour negative attitudes towards Germany.202 Germans, on the other
hand, are believed to cherish most of what Britain has to offer, including pop culture and
humour;203 according to Oltermann, the only frequently quoted negative stereotype is the
presumably bad food on the island.204
Word Wars and Cold War. The countries’ 20th-century military ‘encounters’, namely,
the two world wars and relations during the Cold War, were also intensively addressed by
scholars. The most prominent work to mention in this context is Ramsden’s ‘Don’t Mention
(Regensburg: Walhalla und Praetoria Verlag, 1979).
197 ibid., 1 et seq.
198 ibid., and ibid., 16 et. seq.
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(London: Macmillan, 2000).
202 ibid.
203 Rainer Emig, ‘Introduction’, ed. Rainer Emig (London: Macmillan, 2000), 1-3, and Philip Oltermann,
Keeping up with the Germans: A History of Anglo-German Encounters, Google Books Online Reader,
chap. ‘Heinrich Heine can’t bear William Cobbett’s Swearing’.
204 ibid.
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the War’.205 Beginning by describing initially good relations in the 19th century, his book
alluded in detail to the chronology of events and (or) political decisions and attitudes that
led to the deterioration of the relationship.206 The Cold War era’s relationship, on the other
hand, was characterised by various academics as a period of ups and downs. Schaad, for
instance, pointed out that the first two decades after World War Two were dominated by
British attempts to influence German domestic and foreign policies.207 In this context,
Schaad specifically cited the example of Britain trying to use Germany as a vehicle to
influence other EEC partners.208
According to Nicholls, who basically agreed with Schaad’s views, relations had a small
chance of turning benevolent in the early 1970 when the British Labour Party and the
German Social Democrats entered offices in London and Bonn respectively.209 However,
Nicholls also pointed out that relations soon turned sour again after the British government
tried to undermine then-Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik, which the government
in London interpreted as a German attempt to intensify collaboration with the Soviet
Union.210 Although the British had acted in consultation with the United States and France,
Nicholls further highlighted that German politicians and the public chiefly blamed London
for the attempt of meddling in German foreign policy.211 According to Macintyre, this
judgement primarily stemmed from the fact that Britain had not treated Germany as equal
partners for the preceding two decades;212 a conduct, which, according to Macintyre, only
slowly abated when Britain joined the EEC due to her ongoing economic problems.213
205 John Ramsden, Don’t Mention the War: The British and the Germans Since 1890 (London: Abacus,
2007).
206 ibid.
207 Martin P. C. Schaad, Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration, 1955-61 (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 1 et seq.
208 ibid., 9.
209 Nicholls based this estimate primarily on then-Chancellor Willy Brandt’s policy of pushing for a fast
reunification with East Germany; Anthony J. Nicholls, Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends?
Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001 (London: The German Historical Institute, 2004), 7.
210 ibid., 13-14.
211 Nicholls notes that, due to the United States status as a global power, Germans respected American
opinion more than British concerns. As regards France, Nicholls points to the fact that Germany was
more inclined to accept criticism from the Parisian government as both countries closely worked as
equal partners in the EEC; ibid., 16-18.
212 Terry Macintyre, Anglo-German Relations during the Labour Governments 1964-70: NATO Strategy,
Détente and European Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), Google Books
Online Reader, chap. ‘Introduction’.
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While Nicholls further highlighted that relations certainly did not get better under Margaret
Thatcher, whose strong anti-German attitudes he emphasised, Ludwig pointed out that
the foundation for warmer relations was laid after Labour’s Tony Blair and the Social
Democrat Gerhard Schröder assumed offices in the late 1990s.214 Furthermore, Ludwig
expressed optimism as regards the prospect of relations as he anticipated that the EU would
work as a facilitator to strengthen collaboration.215
Silent Alliance. Notwithstanding the described challenges to Anglo-German relations of
the 20th-century, selected authors have also tried to shed a positive light on the relationship.
Kroener, for instances, emphasised the countries’ historical connections by citing the
British Royals’ Hanoverian ancestry.216 Moreover, as regards Britain’s and Germany’s
defence relations, he referred to Prussia as Englands closest ally, who fought alongside
England during her wars with France.217 In this context, Strachan even went a bit further
and suggested that without the Prussian Army, England could not have won the battle of
Waterloo.218
Other authors, most notably Forster and Schmidt, took a more contemporary approach to
highlight positive aspects of the Anglo-German relationship.219 Although they noted that
no bilateral agreements currently align the two nations, the scholars emphasised that Britain
and Germany have always cultivated a silent alliance, which was supposedly supported by
their memberships in the EU and NATO.220
Forster and Schmidt further suggested a possible reason for postwar British hostility
towards Germany. Contrary to other authors, who mainly cited the countries’ war-history
214 Anthony J. Nicholls, Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-
2001, 21, and Andreas N. Ludwig, Auf dem Weg zu einer ‘Achse Berlin-London’?: Die deutsch-britischen
Beziehungen im Rahmen der Europäischen Union unter Gerhard Schröder und Tony Blair (1998-2002)
(Hamburg: Diplomica, 2011).
215 Ludwig expressed this opinion in 2011, when Brexit seemed to be a highly unlikely scenario; ibid.
216 Berhard R. Kroener, ‘The Electorate of Hanover: A Continental Milestone, Military Alliances and the
Balance of Power 1704-1758’, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional No 52 (Oxford,
Rhodes House, 2004), 10-11.
217 ibid.
218 Hew Strachan, ‘Anglo-German Military Relations 1815-1914’, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute,
The Occasional No 52 (Oxford, Rhodes House, 2004), 23.
219 Edward Forster, and Peter Schmidt, Anglo-German Relations in Security and Defence: Taking Stock
(London: The Royal United Services Institute, 1996).
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as the origin of negative British attitudes, Forster and Schmidt surmised that ‘there is a
prickly awareness across all classes that in Britain decline has followed victory whereas
in Germany defeat was followed by national resurgence’.221 To overcome this quandary,
Nicholls suggested that both Britain and Germany needed to tone down their quest to
foster a ‘special relationship’ with the United States and turn to allies that are more close
to home.222
1.3.1.5 Economics
Economic and Financial Crises Theory. To gain a better understanding of the under-
lying economic mechanism of financial crises, publications on economic theory were
reviewed. In this context, Mankiw’s book on economic principles, which delivers a
profound introduction to both microeconomics and macroeconomics, was treated as a
reference book throughout the entire research process.223 Gerber’s book on international
economics was used in a similar way;224 however, it was mostly consulted to gain insight
into the theory of economic crises. Here, Gerber stipulated that economic crises usually
appear in the form of financial, banking or exchange rate crises and originate from two
leading causes, namely, from macroeconomic imbalances and volatile capital flows.225
2008 Financial Crisis. Despite frequently citing selected real-life examples, Gerber’s
books is primarily theoretical;226 Baumol and Blinder, on the other hand, took a more
blended approach.227 Second by Zandi, Baumol and Blinder identified the United State’s
housing market and mortgage-backed securities as the primary cause of the 2008 financial
221 ibid., 5.
222 cf. Anthony J. Nicholls, Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations
1949-2001, 26-27.
223 Mankiw, N. Gregory, Principles of Economics, 6th edn. (Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage, 2011).
224 James Gerber, International Economics, 3rd edn. (Boston, MA: Pearson Education, 2005).
225 Macroeconomic imbalances are referred to as expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, which have the
potential to create a budget deficit; especially when these policies are paired with a peg exchange rate
system. Volatile capital flows are discussed in conjunction with the increased interconnectivity of global
markets through advanced technology; cf. ibid., 268-273.
226 Gerber, for instance, cites Mexico’s mid-1990s pesos crisis as an example for a crisis originating from
volatile capital flows; cf. ibid., 273.
227 William J. Baumol, and Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy, 12th edn. (Manson, OH:
South-Western Cengage Learning, 2012).
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crisis.228 While Halm-Addo chiefly agreed with this statement, he took a step back and
alluded to the United States 1999’s Financial Services Modernisation Act as the primary
enabler of the recent crisis.229 According to his analysis, this deregulation of the financial
markets worked as the primary facilitator for the creation of mortgage-backed securities or
other related products such as default credit swaps.230
Economic History. Concerning the historical examples, relevant information on the
1970s economic challenges were found mainly in publications on economic history. Al-
though, or especially because, most works are ordered by theme rather than chronology,
these publications provide a detailed overview of British or German economic history.231
Floud and McCloskey, for example, collected essays by numerous contributors, which dis-
cuss the British economy from 1939 through 2000 by specifically addressing developments
in the various industries and economic sectors;232 furthermore, economic policies are
presented in the context of this period.233 A similar approach was taken by Giersch, Paque,
and Schmieding, who discuss Germany’s postwar economic history until reunification.234
Despite their different country focuses, the scholars widely agreed that the 1973 oil price
shock stood at the beginning of the 1970s economic downturn.235 A development which,
according to Walpuski, was enabled by the West’s high dependency on the import of
commodities.236
228 ibid., 190, and Mark M. Zandi, Financial Shock: A 360°Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and
How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2009).
229 Albert D. Halm-Addo, The 2008 Financial Crisis: The Death of an Ideology (Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance,
2010), 1-3.
230 ibid.
231 See, for example, Roderick Floud, and Donald McCloskey, eds, The Economic History of Britain Since
1700, 2nd edn., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz
Paque, and Holger Schmieding, The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany.
232 Roderick Floud, and Donald McCloskey, eds, The Economic History of Britain Since 1700.
233 ibid., 189 et seq.
234 Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paque, and Holger Schmieding, The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of
Market Economy in Germany.
235 cf. ibid., 185, Michael Kitson, ‘Failure followed by Success or Success Followed by Failure? A
Re-Examination of British Economic Growth Since 1949’, in The Cambridge Economic History of
Modern Britain: Volume III Structural Change and Growth, 1939-2000, 27-56 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 48, and Alexander Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1964-1990’,
67.
236 Günter Walpuski, Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und
Sicherheitspolitik (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1984), 185.
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Defence Economics. Bridging the subjects of economics and defence studies, Hartley
and Sandler are the most renowned producers of literature in the field of defence economics.
In their book from 1990, they provided a detailed introduction to this subject, which they
defined as ‘the application of economic reasoning and methods to the study of defense-
related issues’.237 Besides addressing issues such as arms race and procurement, Hartley
and Sandler thoroughly discussed the influence of defence spending on economic growth,
which, according to their analysis, has only marginal influence on a given economy’s
growth rate;238 at least in developed countries.239
Hartley and Sandler further alluded to the economics of military manpower.240 Histor-
ically speaking, so they argued, conscription has kept expenditure on manpower down,
while advancement in military technology, which often requires handling by experts, has
significantly raised these costs.241 This subject is also addressed by Warner and Negrusa,
who suggested that expenditure on manpower depends on the rules of supply and demand
as well as on the force’s structure.242 Generally speaking, Warner and Negrusa stipulated
that payroll costs tend to be higher in all-volunteer forces, especially when the military’s
demand for new service members exceeds the number of volunteers.243 In this case, costs
of all-volunteer force rise exponentially as recruitment measures need to be intensified
and wages have to be increased to competitive levels.244 Conversely, Warner and Negrusa
surmised that a high number of applicants, e.g., due to low prospects in the private job
market, not only decreases recruitment costs, it also allows governments to pay lower
salaries.245
Conscription-based militaries, on the other hand, may also be a costly endeavour for
governments. According to Warner and Negrusa, expenses rise when citizens’ can easily
237 Keith Hartley, and Todd Sandler, eds., The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey
(London: Routledge, 1990), xi.
238 ibid., 200 et seq.
239 ibid.
240 ibid., 156 et seq.
241 ibid., 156-158.
242 John T. Warner, and Sebastian Negrusa, ‘The Economic Case for All-Volunteer Forces’, eds. Cindy





avoid draft, e.g., through legal means.246 Moreover, society as a whole is burdened with
additional costs in this kind of system, as conscripts cannot contribute to the workforce
during their term.247
1.3.2 Research Gap and Contribution
Analysing the related academic discourse has revealed that discussions on defence reviews
are an integral part of research in the field of defence studies. Nevertheless, while scholars
also quite frequently address the British reserve, available academic analyses of the
Bundeswehr’s reserve are somewhat limited. Besides, the discourse on Anglo-German
relations, including defence matters, usually focuses on various themes but the reserve.
With this thesis, the author, therefore, aspires to contribute to the literature in three ways;
first, this study aims to close the gap as regards Germany’s reserve force. Second, by
explicitly discussing the examples’ reserve forces in the context of financial constraints,
the thesis strives to add to the subject of reserve forces to the discussion on financially
driven defence reviews. Third, by comparing Britain and Germany, the author attempts to
contribute another perspective to the field of Anglo-German defence studies.
1.4 Sources and Data Collection
1.4.1 Primary Sources: Types of Sources Used
1.4.1.1 Government Publications and Commissioned Reports
British Defence Reviews and Strategic Papers. Government publications assumed a
critical role in the discovery and analysis stages of this study. In particular, documents out-
lining the main goals of the respective defence review, as well as accompanying materials
on reserve forces, were considered most valuable. For the contemporary British example,
the 2010-NSS and the 2010-SDSR constituted the research foundation as these publica-
tions outlined the government’s strategic thinking and envisaged post-reform structures.248
246 ibid., 129-132.
247 ibid., 125-126.
248 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, and HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review.
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To access specific information on the British reserve forces, complementary reports were
evaluated; these included, among others, the Independent Commission’s report and the
MoD’s annual manning reports.249
Analogous to the contemporary example, research regarding the 1970s commenced by ana-
lysing the main defence review, namely, the 1975 Statement on the Defence Estimates.250
In addition, similar to the contemporary example, supplementary documents, most notably
materials compiled in the so-called Majury Review folder, were reviewed.251
German Defence Reviews and Strategic Papers. Similar to the British example, pub-
lications by the German government were deemed an invaluable source of information
on both the contemporary and historical example. As regards the 2010 Bundeswehrre-
form, the key documents reviewed were the 2010-CSR’s as well the Inspector General
of the Bundeswehr’s reports.252 In combination with the 2011-DPG, these publications
can be considered the German counterpart to the British 2010-NSS/SDSR package.253
Concerning the German reserve forces, the 2012-COR as well as accompanying MoD
guidelines for the reserve were judged to be crucial for evaluating how reservists’ roles
and responsibilities changed.254
As regards the historical example, the five Defence White Papers published from 1970
through 1979 were analysed to access information on Germany’s defence strategy, military
structures and security environment.255 To find more specific data on the 1970s reserve
249 The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserves 2020,
Ministry of Defence, Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation’s Security Together, Cm 8475
(Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2012), Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020:
Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2013), and Ministry of Defence, UK
Armed Forces: Annual Manning Report, Analysis by Rank and Age (National Statistics, 2011), accessed
09 February 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/280426/1-april-2011.pdf.
250 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975.
251 See, for example, Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury
Review), and Roy Mason, Our Contribution to the Price of Peace: Britain’s Defence Policy and
Expenditure.
252 Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni
2010, and Jürgen Weise et al., Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010 (Berlin:
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2010).
253 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines.
254 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, and Bundesministerium der Verteidi-
gung, Freiwillig Dienen: Ein Wegweiser zum Freiwilligen Wehrdienst (Berlin: Bundesministerium der
Verteidigung, 2015).
255 See, for example, Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
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force, reports issued by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces were
evaluated as well.256
National and Federal Finances. While policy papers helped to frame arguments as
regards defence reviews and reserve forces’ reforms, consulting national (Britain) and
federal (Germany) finances chiefly served the purpose of collecting numbers on overall
government spending and defence expenditure in particular. Moreover, information on
planned austerity measures was extracted from these documents. For the British examples,
these figures were retrieved by accessing the annual Financial Statement and Budget
Reports.257 For the German examples, on the other hand, federal budget numbers for the
contemporary example were found in the published budgets while historical figures needed
to be accessed by consulting the 1970s budget acts.258
1.4.1.2 Election Manifestos and Coalition Agreements
Besides government-issued documents, additional publications were considered to ascer-
tain political attitudes toward defence and budget planning. Here, two particular kinds of
documents have proved to be most valuable; namely, election manifestos and coalition
agreements. The former was considered relevant to estimate the political landscape in
both Britain and Germany.259 On the other hand, coalition agreements, in comparison to
und zur Lage der Bundeswehr.
256 See, for example, Fritz-Rudolf Schulz, Jahresbericht 1970 (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1971), Digital Archive
of the Bundestag, Drucksache VI/1942.
257 See, for example, Dick Taverne, Financial Statement and Budget Report 1970-71, 649 (London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970), The National Archives, Reference T 328/436, and Stephen Timm,
Budget 2010: Securing the Recovery, Her Majesty’s Treasury, HC 451 (Norwich: The Stationery Office,
2010).
258 See, for example, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ‘Haushalts- und Finanzpläne ab 2006’, Bundesmi-
nisterium der Finanzen, accessed 31 March 2014, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/T
hemen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/Haushalts_und_Finanzplaene/haushalts_finanzplaene.
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Manifesto 2010, Conservative Party (Bellbrook Park: Pureprint, 2010), Liberal Democrat Manifesto
2010, Liberal Democrats, accessed 01 February 2016, http://www.maniffesto.com/wp-content/uploads
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Party, accessed 01 February 2016, http://www.maniffesto.com/documents/labour-general-election-
manifesto-2010/, Die Mitte stärken: Deutschlandprogramm der Freien Demokratischen Partei, Freie
Demokratische Partei (2009), Archiv des Liberalismus, Electronic Archive Signature IN5-290, Bündnis
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51
the parties election manifestos, served as a source to estimate the degree of compromise
agreed on by the coalition partners as regards to defence matters. Although these kinds of
publications were also interesting as regards the contemporary British example, coalition
agreements were mostly reviewed for the German examples, as coalition governments tend
to be the norm rather than the exception in Germany.260
1.4.1.3 Economic Indicators and Statistics
To explore the British and German economies during the set assessment periods, the author
gathered data on selected economic indicators and reviewed several statistical data sets and
reports. As regards raw data, GDP, inflation, exports and national/federal debt numbers
were processed in a secondary data analysis to estimate the respective economy’s success
or the lack thereof during the specified period.261 Moreover, contextual analyses, such
as the economic surveys provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) aided in completing the picture.262
Besides economic figures, defence statistics were consulted. Here, the composition of the
armed forces, namely, total troop numbers, reservist numbers as well as the relation of
regulars to reservists were most useful.263 These figures were chiefly retrieved from the
Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Wir haben die Kraft: Gemeinsam für unser Land, Regierungsprogramm 2009-
2013, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Berlin: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 2009), and
SPD-Parteivorstand, Sozial und Demokratisch. Anpacken. Für Deutschland: Das Regierungsprogramm
der SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Berlin: SPD-Parteivorstand, 2009).
260 See, for example, HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (London: Crown
Copyright, 2010), and Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und
FDP, 17. Legislaturperiode, Christlich Demokratische Union-Christlich Soziale Union-Freie Demokrati-
sche Partei, 2009.
261 See, for example, OECD, Quarterly GDP (indicator), accessed 12 May 2017, DOI:10.1787/b86d1fc8-en,
OECD, Inflation (CPI) (indicator), accessed 04 July 2018, DOI:10.1787/eee82e6e-en, and OECD, Trade
in Goods and Services (indicator), 2017, accessed 12 May 2017, DOI:10.1787/0fe445d9-en.
262 See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, United Kingdom: Novem-
ber 1970 (Paris: OECD Publications, 1970), and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment, Germany: April 1970 (Paris: OECD Publications, 1970).
263 See, for example, Ministry of Defence, UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report (National Statistics,
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respective MoD’s publications such as Britain’s Annual Personnel Report.264
1.4.1.4 Newspapers and Newscasts
Newspaper sources and newscast reports were sporadically used to retrieve factual informa-
tion and data such as specific dates and chronological sequences concerning events that had
developed over an extended period of time.265 Moreover, published and (or) broadcasted
unabridged interviews, political speeches or live reporting on current events served as
sources for factual information.266
1.4.1.5 Moving Images and Sound Recordings
MoD ‘Marketing’ Channels. Complementary to the aforementioned printed sources,
this thesis further employed selected moving images and sound recordings to collect data
and information. One frequently used source was the British and German Armed Forces
official YouTube channels.267 Here, the respective MoD provides clips on various different
topics, which, among other, give insight into the militaries’ marketing, recruitment and
training strategies.
Broadcasted Interviews and Panel Discussions. To gain access to a broad range of
contemporary witnesses statements and other first-hand accounts, the author consulted
documentaries, television broadcasts, newscasts and podcasts. Of particular interest
were those pieces featuring one-on-one interviews, speeches, embedded interviews in
documentaries and panel discussions focusing on current developments in defence related
matters and (or) historical themes such as the Northern Ireland Conflict and the Red Army
264 See, for example, Ministry of Defence, UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report.
265 Event considered included, for instance, the sequence of terror attacks in Europe or the unfolding of the
war in Syria; see, for example, ‘Terror in Europa: wo Anschläge verübt wurden’, Süddeutsche Zeitung,
23 July 2011, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/chronologie-terroranschlaege-in-europa-1.1123846,
10 April 2017, and ‘Chronologie: Der syrische Bürgerkrieg im Überblick’, Zeit Online, 12 April 2018,
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/chronologie-der-syrische-buergerkrieg-im-ueberblick-1.2652348,
12 April 2018.
266 See, for example, ‘Verteidigungsminister de Maizière hält Regierungserklärung zur Bundeswehrreform’,
News broadcast, reported by Christian Thiels, 01:31, posted by tagesschau.de, 16 May 2013, accessed
16 May 2013.
267 The Bundeswehr, as well as the individual branches of the British Armed Forces, maintain official
YouTube channels; see, for example, ‘Bundeswehr’, https://www.youtube.com/user/Bundeswehr, 19




Ethical Approval. In addition to the aforementioned broadcasted and published inter-
views, the author intended to gather information by interviewing individuals who, due to
their professional affiliation or personal background, would be able to comment on British
or German defence or related topics. Following King’s College London’s research policy,
ethical approval from King’s College London’s Research Ethics Office was sought before
approaching potential interviewees. First, approval for conducting serendipitous research
was obtained by submitting the appropriate form to the Research Ethics Office.269 Second,
full ethical approval for conducting interviews was sought from the War Studies Group
Research Ethics Panel (WSG REP);270 the application was approved and is registered with
the Research Ethics Office under REP(WSG)/12/13-47.271
Interviewees. In total, the author identified and spoke to five individuals, namely, a
British Army reservist in training, a retired German defence lawyer, a former German
1968s activist, a retired Swiss Air Force private and a Swiss grammar school teacher of
physics. The British Army reservist in training was introduced to the author by a mutual
friend. In this conversation, the author aspired to understand how a reservist in the British
Army perceives his service and training. As regards the retired German defence lawyer and
former German 1968s activist, the author sought first-hand accounts on how conscientious
objection was dealt with in the 1970s and how young adults viewed military service in
this period. Both individuals are close friends of the author’s family, whom the author has
known since childhood. The retired Swiss Air Force private is a close personal friend of
the author. By speaking to him, the author sought to gather information on the mandatory
Swiss military service and substitute service. This step was deemed necessary at the early
268 ‘Deutsche und Israelis: Geschichte einer besonderen Beziehung’, political talk show Forum Demokratie,
hosted by Michaela Kolster, broadcasted by Phoenix, 08 November 2015, Kriegsgefahr in Europa: Ist
Putin noch zu Stoppen?’, Political talk show Günther Jauch, hosted by Günther Jauch, broadcasted by
ARD, 04 May 2014, and Philip Hammond, interviewed by Andrew Marr, The Andrew Marr Show.




stages of this project as Switzerland had previously been considered as the third example
for this study. The Swiss grammar school teacher of physics is also a close personal friend
of the author. She was asked to explain the physical principal of the free fall, which the
author sought to use as an example to illustrate the non-laboratory nature of this thesis’s
research phenomenon.
Obstacles. Even though all interviewees spoke to the author, obtaining and using inform-
ation from the interviews proved to be somewhat difficult. The British Army reservist in
training, for instance, was rather reluctant to answer questions. This hesitation became
most apparent when he cited security concerns even when the conversation did not touch
any classified areas. Whether these concerns stemmed from the fact that the author is not a
British national or from other factors could not be ascertained conclusively. The German
and Swiss interviewees, on the other hand, were more straightforward in expressing specific
worries as regards their privacy and data protection. Since this study was conducted under
the umbrella of King’s College London, interviewees voiced concerns that their personal
information was not safe with a British public university. These concerns were mostly
expressed by a retired German defence lawyer and a former German 1968s activist, who
feared that their identities would be revealed due to a potential data leak at King’s College
London. While this reasoning may sound far-fetched, their arguments must be understood
in the light of the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden, who claimed a high involvement
of British intelligence services in the mass surveillance of European citizens.272
Although interviews with the identified individuals would probably have benefitted this
study, the author had to respect the individuals’ request for full anonymity. However, the
latter could not be guaranteed under King’s College London’s ethical research guidelines
as a signed consent form, which contains personal information on the interviewee, must be
submitted to King’s College London. Therefore, the author and interviewees agreed that
their conversations would be treated as private communication, which cannot be used or
cited in this thesis. Moreover, all information, e.g., notes taken during the conversations,
were destroyed. Nevertheless, these conversations gave the author valuable insights, which
272 ‘David Miranda Row: Seized Files "Endanger Agents"’, BBC News, 30 August 2013, https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-23898580, 01 September 2013.
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she used to identify other sources, e.g., documentaries or published interviews, for this
thesis.
1.4.2 Primary Sources: Access and Sources Collection
1.4.2.1 Visited Archives and Libraries
Britain. This thesis’ topic required collecting and accessing primary sources concerning
Britain and Germany. Thus, various archives and libraries were visited in both countries to
examine relevant documents. As regards sources on the British examples, collections of
two particular institutions were consulted often; namely, those in the National Archives
in Kew and the ones in the British Library in central London. Discovery in the National
Archives primarily focused on identifying policy papers, internal reports and communica-
tion regarding the Mason Review. Besides the Mason Review itself, materials gathered
in the so-called ‘Majury Review’ folder have proved to be valuable for examining the
implications of the Mason Review for the TAVR.273 In the British Library, on the other
hand, complementary sources such as reports discussing MoD expenditure in the context
of Britain’s global military commitments were accessed.274 Besides, the British Library’s
extensive collection of magazines and newspapers was exploited.
Germany and Switzerland. As regards German archives, the catalogue of the Bundesar-
chiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau was reviewed. Being home to the German
national archive’s military collections, discovery focused on retrieving historical Defence
White Papers and budgets.275 In addition, the University of Zurich’s Zentralbibliothek’s
newspaper archives was utilised for research.
273 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, and Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review
1973-1974 (the Majury Review).
274 See, for example, Roy Mason, Our Contribution to the Price of Peace: Britain’s Defence Policy and
Expenditure.
275 See, for example, Bundesminister des Inneren, Weißbuch zur zivilen Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Cologne: Drei Kronen Druck, 1972).
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1.4.2.2 Archives and Libraries: Digital Access
Archival Websites. In addition to visiting the aforementioned archives and libraries, the
author made use of the institution’s online resources. First and foremost, online catalogues
were searched to identify and order relevant documents. However, when travelling to the
respective location was not feasible, the author also used the downloading and copying
services offered by the National Archives, the British Library and the Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv to retrieve sources.
Parliamentary Digital Archives. Besides accessing government publications through
‘traditional’ archives, documents such as Hansards, policy papers or bills were consulted in
the parliamentary digital archive. To find materials on Britain, the author primarily used
the database ‘U.K. Parliamentary Papers’ which she accessed via her home institutions’
ProQuest subscription. This database has proven particularly useful for both the contem-
porary and historical British examples, as it holds current documents as well as materials
dating back several centuries.
Archive of the Bundestag. Similarly, documents regarding Germany were accessed via
the digital archive of the Bundestag. Again, this database was helpful in identifying and
retrieving materials concerning both assessment periods, as the Bundestag’s digital archive
contains scanned copies of parliamentary discussions, reports and bills since 1949. In
contrast to ‘U.K. Parliamentary Papers’, the digital archive of the Bundestag is accessible
free of charge through open pathway.
Political Parties’ Archives. Archives maintained by political parties were chiefly con-
sulted to retrieve historical and contemporary election manifestos and coalition agreements.
While British sources could also be found in the British Library, other London based collec-
tions or online, publications by German parties are usually stored in the archives of parties’
affiliated foundations. Therefore, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Conservatives), the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Social Democrats) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation
(Liberals) were consulted to access relevant documents.276
276 An exception to the rule were documents published by The Greens party, which were chiefly accessed
online via the party’s official website. In addition to the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the
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Newspaper and Magazines Digital Archives. In addition to consulting articles in the
British Library and the Zentralbibliothek Zurich, online archives from various newspapers
and magazines were browsed for relevant information. Sources included, among others,
The Guardian, Spiegel Online or Zeit Online.277 All archives were accessed via the internet
through open pathway (e.g., The Guardian and Spiegel Online) or paid memberships (e.g.,
Zeit Online).
1.4.2.3 Government Ministries and Affiliated Institutions
Documents retrieved from British ministries were usually accessed securely via the UK
Government Assets Publishing Service. Here, the ones most consulted were publications
authored by the British MoD and HM Treasury.278 As regards Germany, again the MoD
and the Ministry of Finance served as the main sources. As no secure publishing service is
available in Germany, websites and documents were verified by reviewing the respective
websites’ encryption and security certificate.279
1.4.2.4 Statistical Offices and Databases
In addition to the aforementioned ministries, websites of the Office for National Statistics
(Britain) and the Federal Statistical Office (Germany) were accessed to retrieve relevant
statistics and economic data.280 Besides, the author used data provided by the UK Data
Liberals, and The Greens, the left-wing party ‘Die Linke’ is considered a major party in German political
landscape. However, ‘Die Linke’ has never been elected into power or has participated in a coalition
government on the federal level, their agenda has never met the consensus of the broader German public.
Thus, their election manifestos have been neglected in this study. The same reasoning applies to the
Alternative für Deutschland, why their election manifestos have been omitted as well.
277 See, for example, ‘The Archive’, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/gnm-archive, 01 Septem-
ber 2013, ‘Nachrichtenarchiv’, Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/nachrichtenarchiv/, 02 September
2013, and ‘Archiv’, Zeit Online, https://www.zeit.de/thema/archiv, 02 September 2013.
278 See, for example, Mark Hoban, Budget 2010, Her Majesty’s Treasury, HC 61 (Norwich: The Stationery
Office, 2010), Ministry of Defence, How Defence Works, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/360143/20140930_24153_How_Defence_Works.pdf, 27
November 2014, and ‘Fact Sheet 1: Our Approach to the National Security Strategy’, accessed 19
November 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62483/
Factsheet1-Our-Approach-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
279 See, for example, Peter Struck, Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr, (Bundesministerium der
Verteidigung, 2004), accessed 13 October 2014, http://www.rk-marine-kiel.de/files/bundeswehr/in
formationen/grundzuege_der_konzeption_der_bundeswehr_(2004).pdf, and Bundesministerium der
Finanzen, ‘Die Struktur des Bundeshaushaltes’, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 15 January
2016, https://www.bundeshaushalt-info.de.
280 See, for example, Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt, ‘Arbeitsmarkt’, Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt,
accessed 27 July 2014, https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/Konjunkturindikatoren/
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Service as well as histat: Historische Statistik to obtain information on national surveys
and historical statistics.281
As regards global economic and defence related data, databases of OECD and the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) were consulted regularly. While the latter
provides an extensive collection on defence expenditure, the former was mainly used to
retrieve time series economic figures such as GDP from 1950 onwards.282 Moreover, since
OECD publishes economic indicators’ values in $US, OECD numbers were primarily used
in tables and (or) figures that compared countries with different currencies.
1.4.2.5 Television Broadcasts and Media Platforms
Moving images and sound recordings were accessed in two ways; first, the author watched
and took notes during live television broadcasts. Second, media platforms were consulted.
Noting that open media platforms such as YouTube bear the risk of using materials origin-
ating from dubious sources, the author only considered documentaries, newscasts, podcasts
and YouTube clips from reputable providers. For instance, documentaries and newscasts
were primarily accessed via public broadcasters’ media centres, e.g., BBC iPlayer, ARD
Mediathek and ZDF Mediathek. Podcasts were obtained via iTunes, SoundCloud or Spo-
tify; however, they were only considered when legitimate providers such as King’s College
London’s War Studies Department, RUSI or Chatham House were listed in the credentials.
As regards YouTube, the armed forces official and verified channels were consulted via the
platform.
1.4.3 Secondary Sources: Types of Sources Used
As highlighted on the previous pages, primary sources such as policy papers, statistics
and national budgets have proved valuable in analysing governments’ decision-making
processes and economic developments; moreover, figures used in various calculations,
Arbeitsmarkt/arb210.html.
281 Lutz Köllner, (1982 [2006]), Die langfristige Entwicklung der Militärausgaben in Deutschland, GESIS
Data Archive, Cologne, histat, Study Reference: 8232, Date File Version: 1.0.0, accessed 01 March
2015, DOI: 104232/1.8232.
282 SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2015, accessed 19 June 2015, https://www.sipri.org/
databases/milex, and OECD, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Indicator), accessed 13 June 2017,
DOI10.1787/dc2f7aec-en.
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tables and graphs were extracted from these documents. While secondary sources were,
to some extent, used similarly, they served two additional purposes. First, as government
publications may be prone to biased editing in favour of the governing party’s political
agenda, secondary sources were believed to aid in identifying said editing.283 Second, by
consulting works on related topics, the research focus was put into perspective and context.
Therefore, it was possible to recognise sub-themes and research gaps.
1.4.3.1 Books
Books constituted the first set of secondary sources reviewed for this thesis and were used
mainly for two purposes. First books proved to be an invaluable source to understand
the underlying mechanisms and origins of financial crises.284 Moreover, publications on
defence economics helped in building a sound research foundation for the topic of reserve
forces’ reform in times of economic turmoil.285 Second, works on national defence policies,
as well as Anglo-German defence co-operation and security environments, provided in-
depth insight into the respective subject, both as regards recent developments and the
historical examples.286
1.4.3.2 Journals and Think Tank Publications
Due to the contemporary nature of events examined in Chapters Two and Four, it soon
became apparent that other secondary sources in addition to books had to be considered;
therefore, channels which enable scholars to publish responses to current affairs more
promptly had to be employed. Here, peer-reviewed and professional journals, as well as
think tank publications, were used on a large scale to fill the said information gap.
283 cf. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 36.
284 See, for example, William J. Baumol, and Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy.
285 See, for example, Keith Hartley, and Todd Sandler, eds., The Economics of Defence Spending: An
International Survey.
286 See, for example, Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945, Tom Dyson, The Politics of German
Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post Cold-War Era (New York,
NY: Bergham Books, 2013), and The Blenheim Conference Papers: The Silent Alliance, 300 Years of
Anglo-German Cooperation, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional No 52 (Oxford,
Rhodes House, 2004).
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Britain. The British example, and specifically the review process and the evaluation
of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package received extensive coverage from British scholars, who
submitted their works to various English-speaking journals, including ‘International Affairs’
and ‘The Political Quarterly’, or to the London-based think tank Chatham House.287
Although these articles already provided sufficient information on British defence and
defence reviews in general, publications from the independent think tank RUSI or ideas
expressed in ‘Armed Forces & Society’ proved to be more relevant for this study as scholars
used these channels to publish views on the British reserve in general, its history as well as
service members’ relationship to society as a whole.288
Germany. While journals and think tank publications were somewhat used as a comple-
mentary source in the British case, they have proven to be an almost irreplaceable source
for research on the contemporary German example. The reason being that security studies
are slightly underrepresented in the mainstream academic discourse, which, regarding
security-related subjects, mainly focuses on peace research.289 A notable exception, how-
287 See, for example, Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Breaking the Mould: The United Kingdom
Strategic Defence Review 2010’, Timothy Edmunds, ‘Complexity, Strategy and the National Interest’, In-
ternational Affairs 90, No 3 (2014): 525-539, DOI:10.1111/1468-2346.12123, Clara Marina O’Donnell,
‘Britain’s Coalition Government and EU Defence Cooperation: Undermining British Interests’, Inter-
national Affairs 87, No 2 (2011): 419-433, DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00980.x, Robert Dover,
and Mark Phythian, ‘The Politics of the Strategic Defence and Security Review: Centralisation and
Cuts’, The Political Quarterly 83, No 1 (2012): 163-171, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02278.x,
John Gearson, and James Gow, ‘Security, Not Defence, Strategic, Not Habit: Restructuring the Political
Arrangements for Policy Making on Britain’s Role in the World’, The Political Quarterly 81, No 3
(2010): 406-419, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2010.02106.x, and Sameer Punyani, ‘The Economics of
National Defence in An Age of Austerity’.
288 See, for example, Mark Phillips, ‘The Future of the UK’s Reserve Forces’, Royal United Services
Institute, Occasional Paper, accessed 22 November 2014, https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Philli
ps_-_Future_of_UK_Reserve_Forces.pdf, Trevor Taylor, ‘What’s New? UK Defence Policy Before and
After the SDSR’, The RUSI Journal 155, No 6 (2010): 10-14. DOI:10.1080/03071847.2010.542662,
James Griffith, ‘Contradictory and Complementary Identities of U.S. Army Reservists: A Historical
Perspective’, Armed Forces & Society 37, No 2 (2011): 261-283, DOI:10.1177/0095327X09354167,
Christopher Dandeker, Neil Greenberg, and Geoffrey Orme, ‘The UK’s Reserve Forces: Retrospect and
Prospect’, and Eyal Ben-Ari, and Edna Lomsky-Feder, ‘Epilogue: Theoretical and Comparative Notes
on Reserve Forces’, Armed Forces & Society, No 2 (2011): 361-371, DOI:10.1177/0095327X10396652.
289 In contrast to universities in Britain or the United States, German higher education is somewhat reluctant
to host security studies departments. This observation might merely be explained by the fact that
policy-makers, on the grounds of historical arguments, are unwilling to finance defence related degree
programs at public universities; please refer to Chapter Three for more details. A notable exception is the
Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University; however, recent student body protests against the institute
show that the public is neither keen to finance such research in Germany; cf. Lena Greiner, ‘Studenten




ever, is the independent think tank SWP-Berlin, which regularly publishes comprehensive
articles on current developments in German defence policies and the Bundeswehr. Here,
the study primarily made use of publications from the research division ‘International
Security’.290 Another frequently employed source was Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte.
Although Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte is published by the Federal Agency for Civic
Education and might, therefore, be subject to governmental editing, the author judged this
publication to be credible and useful for this study. This estimate was primarily based
on the fact that writers who submit to this journal come from a variety of backgrounds,
including academics but also former or current service members and military staff, who are
able to provide a unique insight into the topic of German defence policies and the reserve
forces.291 Building on this judgement, it was further decided to consider Reserve Aktuell
as a source for this thesis. However, as the German Reservists’ Association publishes
this journal, opinions expressed here were treated with caution; it was, therefore, mainly
employed to retrieve information on reserve force structures and to ascertain reservists’
understanding of their role within the armed forces.292
1.4.3.3 Newspapers and Newscasts
While newspaper publications can also be classified as primary sources, information
retrieved from articles focussing on analyses and (or) editorials were grouped as secondary
sources. To reflect opinions from different political camps, multiple British and German
news outlets were considered. In Britain, The Guardian, The Times and The Independent
290 See, for example, Wenke Apt, ‘Reform der Bundeswehr: Chancen und Risiken des Personalabbaus’,
SWP-Aktuell, No 80 (2010), accessed 07 March 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/conte
nts/products/aktuell/2010A80_apw_ks.pdf, Alexander Bitter, ‘"Lessons Learned": Auf dem Weg zur
Armee im Einsatz’, SWP-Studie S 27, (2007): 61-67, accessed 07 March 2017, https://www.swp-berlin
.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2007_S27_mrs_ks.pdf, and SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, and GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung:
Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch’, accessed 26 April
2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhpo
l_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf.
291 See, for example, Harald Kujat, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, ‘Wehrpflicht und
Zivildienst: Bestandteile der Politischen Kultur’, and Heinrich Kreft, ‘Deutschland, Europa und der
Aufstieg der neuen Gestaltungsmächte’ (bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013), accessed 11
April 2014, http://www.bpb.de/apuz/173793/deutschland-europa-und-die-neuen-gestaltungsmaechte.
292 See, for example, Ralf Berger, ‘Regionale Sicherungs- und Unterstützungskräfte: Ein wichtiger Beitrag
der Reserve zum Heimatschutz’, Reserve Aktuell, No 1 (2012): 5-8, and Alfred Claußen, ‘Erfahrungs-
bericht eines Reservisten: Reservisten verbessern ihre kommunikativen Fähigkeiten’, Reserve Aktuell,
No 2 (2014): 14-15.
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have proven to be most resourceful for this study. In Germany, on the other hand, Spiegel
Online, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Frankfurter Rundschau were the most consulted sources.
Moreover, commentators’ opinions expressed on BBC News and Germany’s Tagesschau
complemented this set of secondary sources.293
1.4.3.4 Interviews and Surveys
Similar to newspaper articles, interviews and surveys were treated as both primary and
secondary sources, i.e., opinions on, summaries of and interpretation of interviews and
surveys were considered and processed as secondary sources.294
1.4.3.5 Moving Images and Sound Recordings
Documentaries. Consulting documentaries served two particular purposes; first, broad-
casts based on embedded journalism were watched to gain insight into an outsider’s, i.e.,
journalists’, perceptions of the armed forces.295 This also helped to contrast the images
conveyed in the clips provided by the verified armed forces’ YouTube channels. Second,
documentaries were utilised to set historical events into context. Here, broadcasts depicting
the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict and the Red Army Faction were of particular
interest.296
Podcasts. The author also considered specialised podcasts such as those provided by
RUSI, Chatham Houses or King’s College London’s War Studies Department. These were
mainly used to monitor current developments in British defence.
293 Newspapers were further sporadically used to retrieve information on other countries, e.g., Austria and
Luxembourg; here, Der Standart and Lëtzebuerg Tagblatt were cited.
294 cf., for example, Dominik Wullers, ‘Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?’, 21 November 2013, Zeit
Online, http://www.zeit.de/2013/48/soldaten-deutschland/komplettansicht, 03 July 2014.
295 See, for example, ‘Civilians to Soldiers’, documentary, YouTube video, 31:59, posted by BBC Newsbeat,
06 December 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JadrdWiinLg, accessed 08 December 2015,
and ‘Deutschland dienen: Freiwillig in der Bundeswehr’, TV documentary Vor Ort: Die Reportage,
reported by Ralph Gladitz, broadcasted by Phoenix, 14 January 2013.
296 See, for example, ‘Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF’, TV documentary,
broadcasted by ZDFinfo, 08 January 2015, and ‘Blutiger Sonntag’, TV documentary, broadcasted by
ARTE, 20 April 2016.
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1.4.4 Secondary Sources: Access and Sources Collection
1.4.4.1 Visited Libraries
In the early stages of materials’ collection, it became apparent that the author’s home
institution, British libraries and (English-speaking) online databases only provided limited
access to books and articles in German. However, to complete the chapters focusing on
Germany, exploiting sources published in German was deemed essential. Consequently,
the author decided to expand the gathering of resources beyond British institutions.
Various library network systems in three countries were, therefore, utilised in collecting
relevant secondary sources. King’s College London’s libraries, as well as other London
libraries, e.g., Senate House Library, the British Library and RUSI’s Library of Military
History, were visited to retrieve resources relevant to the study’s British sections and Anglo-
German relations. As regards information on the German examples, the author consulted
books, articles and newspaper publications in the German National Library in Frankfurt
am Main, in the University of Zurich’s Zentralbibliothek and in the Schweizerischem
Sozialarchiv in Zurich.
1.4.4.2 Digital and Broadcasted Sources
Databases. In addition to accessing hard-copies, the author made use of online databases
to collect appropriate materials. Access to these sources was either obtained via the
indicated library networks (e.g., IBSS, IHS Jane’s Defence Module, JSTOR, Wiley and
Taylor & Francis), open access pathways (e.g., SWP-Berlin and IREON) or through
subscription memberships (e.g., RUSI and Chatham House). Sources retrieved from these
databases mainly included journal articles.
Television Broadcasts and Media Platforms. Analogous to primary sources, moving
images and sound recordings that were treated as secondary sources were accessed by
watching live broadcasts, browsing media centres such as BBC iPlayer, ARD Mediathek
and ZDF Mediathek or by listening to podcasts via iTunes, SoundCloud and Spotify.
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Chapter 2
Britain’s Future Reserve 2020
We ask the military to be in a position that, if we ask them to do a task, they
are absolutely able to do it for us.297
- Philip Hammond -298
Following the elaboration on the methodological framework, this chapter is the first to
discuss one of the four selected examples. Its main focus is Britain’s FR-2020, which
is examined in the light of the reform’s implementation in the single services. However,
before delving into this topic in Section 2.2, this chapter first addresses the circumstance
that set the framing conditions for the FR-2020. It does so by exploring and examining the
proceeding defence policy publications, the contemporary defence budget and Britain’s
security environment in 2010. On the one hand, this two-step approach aims to present a
holistic investigation of the FR-2020. On the other hand, it is aspired to draw informed
conclusions on the implications of the 2008 financial crisis on the FR-2020, which are
then used in the comparative analysis in Chapter Six.
297 Oliver Wright, ‘Philip Hammond: "Games Humanised the Face of Armed Forces"’, 14 August 2012,
Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/philip-hammond-games-humanise
d-the-face-of-armed-forces-8038712.html, 15 April 2013.
298 British Defence Secretary (2011-2013).
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2.1 The Future Reserve 2020 in Context
2.1.1 The 2010 Review: Key Documents
2.1.1.1 Preceding Discussions and Publications
As a first step to evaluate the FR-2020’s framing conditions, relevant government publica-
tions were examined. Although it can be argued that the FR-2020 is the direct result of the
2010-NSS/SDSR package, this reform is also the end product of a series of defence-related
government publications and political discourse. Therefore, the thesis takes a step back
and begins its analysis in 2003.
2003-2009. This year was chosen, as it marks the publication of the last comprehensive
Defence White Paper in Britain.299 Issued by Tony Blair’s Labour government, its main
purpose can be summarised as the government’s attempt to adapt the British Armed Forces
to the challenges of a changing security environment following 9/11.300 Once Gordon
Brown assumed the office of Prime Minister in June 2007, pressures grew to finally conduct
a new and comprehensive defence review.301 However, instead of catering to this demand,
the Labour government resorted to publishing a National Security Strategy in 2008.302
Although updating the National Security Strategy in 2009, the document did not deliver the
expected outcome as it was widely regarded as a minor revision of the estimates elaborated
299 The Secretary of State for Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper,
Cm 6041-I (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2003), and Claire Taylor, Strategic Defence Review Green
Paper: Preliminary Observations, House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence
Section, SN/IA/5341 (London: House of Commons Library, 2010), 2.
300 This attempt must be understood in the context of the commenced deployments of British troops to
Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the 2003 Defence White Paper was widely regarded as unsuccessful
since insufficient allocation of needed resources hindered its implementation; cf. ibid., 3, ‘UK Troops
in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events’, BBC News, 22 December 2015, https://www.bbc.com/ne
ws/uk-35159951, 09 May 2017, ‘Timeline: British forces in Iraq’, Channel 4 News, 30 April 2009,
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/middle_east/timelinebritishforcesiniraq/3117317.html, 09
May 2017, and The Secretary of State for Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence
White Paper, 4 et seq.
301 Claire Taylor, Strategic Defence Review Green Paper: Preliminary Observations, 3.
302 The government’s reluctance to conduct a defence review was widely regarded as a symptom of Labour’s
incompetence to deliver such a review; cf. ibid., 4., and Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy
of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, Cm 7291 (Norwich: The Stationery Office,
2008).
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in the 2003 Defence White Paper.303
2010 Green Paper. In the light of growing economic ramifications following the 2008
financial crisis, however, it became apparent that the National Security Strategy was
not enough to set a new strategic and structural focus for the armed forces.304 This
recognition, in conjunction with the upcoming general election, led to a response from both
the incumbent Labour government and the Conservatives.305 While the latter promised
to deliver the demanded defence review as soon as they would assume office, the former
decided to publish a Green Paper on defence before the general elections, namely, in
February 2010.306 Its primary purpose was to raise and discuss issues that needed to be
investigated in a future defence review.307
To ensure Britain’s prosperity and safety, the Green Paper identified four key areas;308
first, international trade needed to be enabled by guaranteeing the safe and free movement
of goods and services.309 Second, the Afghanistan mission had to be concluded success-
fully.310 Third, the government and the MoD needed to better prepare the country for
the imminent shift in the international power equilibrium, which was expected to move
towards the Asia-Pacific region.311 Fourth, collaboration with partners in international
organisations and the EU were considered crucial for delivering defence on required
levels.312
Besides, the Green Paper also alluded to changing conditions in the global theatre, which
the government intended to tackle by implementing military structures that were more
303 Among other topics, the National Security Strategy referred to the need to adapt structures to fight
terrorism or the threats emerging from failed states; cf. Claire Taylor, Strategic Defence Review Green
Paper: Preliminary Observations, 4.
304 ibid., 5.
305 ibid., and Ministry of Defence, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review,
Cm 7794 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010).
306 ibid.
307 In this context, the government explicitly mentioned that they envisaged Britain to continue to play a







flexible and adaptable;313 this conclusion was drawn after reviewing Britain’s experiences
in Afghanistan and Iraq.314 Here, the authors referred to both the changing nature of
conflict and the increased public scrutiny of military deployments through the media.315
In addition to structural and operational observations, the Green Paper also frequently
addressed the issues of rising costs and declining defence budgets.316 For instance, it
was stipulated that the MoD’s funding had steadily increased by 10.00 per cent since the
implementation of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.317 However, due to the economic
ramifications of the 2008 financial crisis, authors anticipated that the MoD could not be
exempt from contributing to national consolidation efforts.318 Simultaneously, the Green
Paper alluded to ‘rising fuel and utility costs, increases in pay and pensions, and cost
growth on major equipment projects’, which were expected to further exacerbate the
MoD’s financial situation.319 As a consequence, authors highlighted that Britain would
have to prioritise how and to what threats she will respond in the future.320
Coalition Agreement. Following Labour’s defeat in the general election on 06 May
2010, the first post-war coalition government, consisting of the Conservatives and the Lib-
eral Democrats, was formed.321 Keeping their promise, the coalition partners announced in
their coalition agreement that they intended to conduct a comprehensive defence review.322
Here, the parties outlined that establishing measures to strengthen the military covenant
was central to their plans.323
Despite this well-intended aspiration, financial issues were also discussed;324 first, the
313 ibid., 26.
314 cf. ibid., 18.
315 ibid.
316 cf. ibid., 5, 12, and 15.
317 ibid., 12.
318 cf. ibid., 5.
319 ibid., 5.
320 ibid., 15.
321 cf. ‘Election 2010’, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/, 09 May 2017.
322 cf. HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 15.
323 These measures included increased support for service members and their families, extended rest
and recuperation periods, educational support for service members’ children and ex-regulars, higher
operational allowance for deployed service members and improving to mental and general health services
for veterans; cf. ibid.
324 ibid.
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coalition partners stipulated that the MoD’s running costs had to be reduced by 25.00 per
cent.325 Second, economic recovery and a fair distribution of national consolidation efforts
were deemed the most important issues for the new government.326 To tackle this problem,
the coalition agreement outlined the parties’ intention to conduct a comprehensive spending
review and to establish the Office for Budget Responsibility.327 With these steps, the new
government hoped to contain negative economic implications and develop strategies to
decrease deficits not by increasing taxes but by lowering government expenditure.328
2.1.1.2 The 2010 National Security Strategy
The promised defence review was delivered in a two-document package; the first part
published was the 2010-NSS, which was released 18 October 2010.329 In the context
of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package, the 2010-NSS set the strategic framework for Britain’s
envisaged future defence posture. Right at the beginning, the government alluded to the
dichotomy of Britain’s contemporary security situation by declaring that ‘Britain today
is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long history’.330 In the
subsequent chapters, this statement was further described and specified by referring to
Britain’s contemporary strategic context and her self-perceived distinctive role in the
world.331
As regards the former, the 2010-NSS explicitly highlighted that Britain did not face an
imminent territorial threat; however, the Afghanistan mission, terrorism, failed states and
natural catastrophes were identified as major hazards to British security.332 Described as
volatile and unpredictable, the government outlined that its response to these threats must
be highly flexible.333 Therefore, the government introduced the so-called National Security





329 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 3.
330 ibid.
331 Britain’s distinctive role in the world is defined as the result of her global interconnectedness and
London’s status as an international financial and educational centre; cf. ibid., 13, and 21.
332 ibid., 13 et seq.
333 ibid., 37.
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and degree of impact.334 A key point raised in this context was Britain’s aspiration to
mitigate dangers by actively shaping the world through political, diplomatic and military
means.335 Nevertheless, the government also emphasised that Britain was not able to
navigate and tackle the complex challenges of an ever-changing security environment on
her own. Hence, the importance of international co-operation in political and defensive
alliances such as the EU and NATO was explicitly stressed.336
Although nestled into the government’s strategic elaborations, financial pressures were
also addressed in the 2010-NSS.337 For instance, authors emphasised that ‘[returning] our
nation’s finances to a sustainable footing’ was paramount as the national deficit ‘[affected]
both national security and all other areas of public policy’.338 More explicitly, the govern-
ment judged that economic stability and Britain’s defence posture were highly intertwined
concepts as the government could not guarantee one without the other.339 Therefore, the
2010-NSS underscored that making hard and unpopular choices was inevitable to reduce
the national deficit.340 The implications for the MoD, however, were not specified; yet, it
was noted that a reform of the armed forces was believed to aid the MoD in realising the
required savings.341 Details were to be described in the 2010-SDSR.342
2.1.1.3 The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
One day after the 2010-NSS was published, the government released the 2010-SDSR on
19 October 2010.343 In contrast to its strategic counterpart, the 2010-NSS made frequent
and detailed references to financial constraints.344 Again, the government emphasised their
judgement that the economy can only flourish in a stable security environment and vice
334 ibid.
335 cf. ibid., 25 et seq.
336 ibid., 18.






343 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review.
344 cf. ibid., 3, and 31-32.
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versa.345 Therefore, it was highlighted that the MoD would have to contribute to national
consolidation efforts;346 however, due to the armed forces’ engagement in Afghanistan
and the government’s pledge to uphold NATO’s stipulated spending goal of two per cent of
GDP, the 2010-SDSR mentioned that the defence budget would not be burdened as much
as other ministries.347
At first, this statement sounds quite promising; however, a closer analysis of the 2010-SDSR
revealed that the armed forces were destined to suffer incisive restructuring measures. In
total, the government estimated that it was necessary and possible to save approximately
£4.30 billion.348 To achieve this goal, the 2010-SDSR described a combination of re-
dundancies and rationalisation, which were summarised under the umbrella of the Future
Force 2020 (FF-2020). One unexpected victim of these plans was the military covenant,
whose strengthening the coalition agreement had underscored as one of the most important
aims of the upcoming defence review.349 Although outlining specific measures such as
increasing operational allowances for deployed service members and educational support
for former soldiers and their families, authors described that the government was forced
to balance between people and equipment.350 In total, the 2010-SDSR envisaged a cut in
manpower of 17,000, the scrapping of ships and helicopters, as well as the renegotiation of
procurement contracts.351
Strategically speaking, the FF-2020 was envisaged to enable the armed forces to conduct
one of three types of mission.352 First, a one-off, short intervention.353 Second, three






349 ibid., 28, and HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 15.
350 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
28.
351 Measures are discussed in further detail in Sub-subsection 2.1.2.; cf. ibid., 31.
352 ‘Fact Sheet 5: Future Force 2020 - Summary of Size, Shape and Structure’, accessed 21 November 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Fut
ure-Force-2020.pdf.
353 Maximum troop numbers: 30,000; cf. ibid.
354 Maximum troop numbers: 2,000; cf. ibid.
355 One enduring stabilisation operation with up to 6,500 deployed service members, one non-enduring
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2.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure
The 2010-SDSR outlined specific measures, which were intended to reduce defence
expenditure by £4.30 billion as of 2010. As briefly mentioned, these aspirations did
also affect the military covenant; however, implications were much more severe for the
single services. To gain a better understanding for the impact of the aforementioned
economization plans, the following pages elaborate how the Army, the RN, and the RAF
were affected. However, to assess the government’s plans’ ramifications for the defence
budget, savings goals and defence expenditure from 2010 through 2015 are examined first.
2.1.2.1 Defence Expenditure in Context
Savings Goals and Envisaged Measures. While the 2010-NSS did not mention spe-
cific numbers, the 2010-SDSR stipulated that the MoD was required to contribute £4.30
billion to national consolidation efforts as of 2010.356 Nevertheless, the government also
emphasised that economization measures could neither jeopardise NATO’s two per cent
goal nor Britain’s operation in Afghanistan.357 Hence, the 2010-SDSR explicitly stated
that rationalisation efforts should not affect frontline operations.358
Generally speaking, the government aimed to reduce non-frontline expenditure by 25.00 per
cent through a combination of selling surplus real estate and land, savings in commodities,
renegotiation of contracts, and redundancies of non-frontline service members (17,000) and
civilian staff (25,000).359 For the Army, this strategy meant that is was about to lose 7,000
troops, 40 per cent of its tanks, and 35 per cent of its heavy artillery;360 the latter two were
mainly thought to be realised in the course of the complete withdrawal from Germany.361
complex intervention with up to 2,000 involved troops, and one non-enduring simple intervention with a
maximum of 1,000 deployed soldiers; cf. ibid.
356 ibid., 31.
357 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts: 2010-2011, HC 992 (Norwich: The Stationery
Office, 2011), 30.
358 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
31-32.
359 ibid.
360 ibid., 32, and ‘Fact Sheet 7: Future Force 2020 - British Army’, accessed 21 November 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62489/Factsheet7-British
-Army.pdf.
361 This decision also meant that 20,000 troops would return to Britain from Germany; HM Government,
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 4, and 28.
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Similar to the Army, the RN faced both a loss in personnel and equipment.362 Although the
government only planned to make 5,000 redundant, the reduction in equipment was rather
incisive as one aircraft carrier, numerous helicopters and four frigates were about to be
decommissioned.363 As regards the RAF, the 2010-SDSR highlighted that the government
intended to maintain the nuclear deterrent;364 however, submarine launch tubes and
warheads were planned to be reduced from 12 to eight and 48 to 40 respectively.365 In
doing so, the government hoped to retain the required deterrence levels but to realise £3.20
billion in savings over ten years.366 Moreover, a reduction in personnel of 5,000, not
bringing the Nimrod MRA4 patrol and attack aircraft into service, and withdrawing from
procurement contracts were believed to contributing to consolidation efforts.367
Defence Expenditure and Realised Savings. As mentioned, the MoD was supposed to
save £4.30 billion in expenditure to contribute to overall government savings.368 When
consulting Table 2.1, which outlines defence spending after the 2008 financial crisis had
hit the British economy, it appears as if the MoD had not been able to meet the stipulated
savings goal as expenditure did only decrease by £2.53 billion. However, relative numbers
paint a different picture. In the 2010 Spending Review, the government stipulated that the
defence budget was to fall by 7.5 over a five year period or 1.5 per cent annually.369 Given
the latter, Table 2.1 suggests that the MoD did almost realise the required savings in the
stipulated period as it reduced its costs by an annual average of 1.38 per cent. Moreover,
when factoring in inflation, which was 2.18 per cent on average during this period, it can
be argued that the MoD indeed exceeded the savings goal.
362 cf. ibid., 5, and ‘Fact Sheet 6: Future Force 2020 - Royal Navy’, accessed 21 November 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62488/Factsheet6-Roy
al-Navy.pdf.





367 ibid., and ‘Fact Sheet 8: Future Force 2020 - Royal Air Forces’, accessed 21 November 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62490/Factsheet8-Roy
alAirForce.pdf.
368 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
31.
369 HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, HM Treasury, Cm 7942 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010),
10, including own calculations.
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Table 2.1: Defence Expenditure (2010-2015)
2010- 2011- 2012- 2013- 2014- 2015- Â x
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
National Expenditure*
In £ billions 696.80 699.80 711.00 722.00 737.50 757.50 4285 714.17
Annual D in per cent n/a** 1.87 -3.8 5.42 1.67 1.5 n/a 1.33
Inflation Rate
In per cent 2.5 3.84 2.58 2.31 1.45 0.37 n/a 2.18
Defence Expenditure*
In £ billion 37.59 37.62 37.03 36.37 35.94 35.06 219.61 36.6
Annual D in per cent n/a** 0.07 -1.56 -1.78 -1.18 -2.46 n/a -1.38
Annual D in £ billion n/a** 0.03 -0.59 -0.66 -0.43 -0.88 -2.53 -0.51
In per cent of National Expenditure 5.39 5.38 5.21 5.04 4.87 4.63 n/a 5.09
Annual D in per cent n/a** -1.76 2.33 -6.83 -2.8 -3.91 n/a -2.59
*Financial Year.
**Baseline = 2010.
Sources: SIPRI, HM Treasury, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.
2.1.2.2 Personnel Costs and Redundancies
Keeping in mind the above mentioned factors, it can be inferred that the MoD made
satisfactory progress in reducing its costs from 2010 through 2015. To achieve this goal,
the 2010-SDSR had suggested implementing a variety of measures, including the scrapping
of existing equipment and adaptations to procurement acquisition plans;370 besides, the
government listed redundancies as a tool to generate savings.
Initially, the government planned to enforce a total reduction of 17,000 troops and 25,000
civilian employees;371 however, already in July 2011, this estimate was adjusted to 33,000
and 32,000 respectively.372 When considering personnel costs, which accounted for more
than one-third of MoD expenditure in 2010, it appears plausible that the government tried
370 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
31-32.
371 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
31-32.
372 Adjusted redundancy numbers: 19,500 (Army), 5,500 (RN), 8,000 (RAF) by 2020; Louisa Brooke-
Holland, and Dunja Thurley, Armed Forces Redundancies, House of Commons Library: International
Affairs and Defence Section, Business and Transport, SN05951 (London: House of Commons Library,
2014), 3.
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to strive for higher redundancies.373 To meet the aspired numbers, the MoD went for a
combination of natural turnover, reduced hiring and volunteer early release schemes.374
The latter turned out to be particularly popular with the armed forces, as comprehensive
resettlement packages accompanied the schemes;375 on average, more than 50 per cent of
redundancies were realised on a voluntary basis.376 Moreover, as seen in Table 2.2, the
MoD exceeded the armed forces redundancies’ goal by 2,460 as a total of 35,460 service
members retired by 2015. However, as regards civilian staff, government measures were
not as successful; during the same period, only 22,320 left the MoD by 2015.377
Nevertheless, despite falling staff numbers, personnel costs still accounted for 33.29 per
cent of MoD expenditure in 2015.378 A possible explanation for this observation is hidden
in the numbers displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. For instance, while staff numbers in the
armed forces decreased by an annual average of 3.93 per cent, the average annual costs
fell only by 0.69 per cent. Similarly, civilian staff numbers were reduced by an annual
average of 6.78 per cent, while costs decreased by an annual average of 5.07 per cent.
This direct comparison allows concluding that military personnel is more costly for the
MoD than civilian staff. Moreover, when recalling that inflation was 2.18 per cent on
average during this period, it can be argued that the overall increase in prices has partially
torpedoed government efforts. Also, Table 2.2 shows that redundancy payments, which in
total accounted for £1.07 billion between 2010 and 2015, constituted an additional burden
for the defence budget.
2.1.3 The Security Environment
2.1.3.1 Territorial and Ideological Security Environments
In addition to evaluating whether the 2008 financial crisis influenced British defence
planning, this thesis’ research design defined the contemporary security environment as a
framing factor for the FR-2020. Recalling from Chapter One, the security environment is







Table 2.2: MoD Staff and Military Staff Costs (2010-2015)
2010- 2011- 2012- 2013- 2014- 2015- Â x
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Armed Forces
Total numbers 194,690 189,650 181,470 171,540 162,800 159,230 1,059,380 176,563
Annual D in per cent n/a** -2.59 -4.31 -5.47 -5.10 -2.19 n/a -3.93
Personnel costs in £ billion* 9.89 10.12 9.62 9.17 8.64 9.47 56.90 9.48
Annual D in per cent n/a** 2.31 -4.95 -4.59 -5.83 9.64 n/a -0.69
Civilian Staff
Total numbers 74,858 69,658 60,868 56,998 54,858 52,538 369,778 61,630
Annual D in per cent n/a** -6.95 -12.62 -6.36 -3.75 -4.23 n/a -6.78
Personnel costs in £ billion* 2.88 2.72 2.32 2.31 2.31 2.20 14.75 2.46
Annual D in per cent n/a** -5.35 -14.77 -0.41 -0.06 -4.78 n/a -5.07
Total personnel costs
In £ billion* 12.77 12.84 11.94 11.49 10.95 11.67 71.65 11.94
Annual D in per cent n/a** 0.58 -7.04 -3.78 -4.67 6.60 n/a -1.66
In per cent of defence exp. 33.96 34.13 32.24 31.58 30.47 33.29 n/a 32.61
Redundancy payments
In £ billion* 0.19 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.04 1.07 0.18
Annual D in per cent n/a** 55.26 -38.45 220.96 -35.22 -68.85 n/a 26.74
*Financial Year.
**Baseline = 2010.
Source: SIPRI, and The British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations
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composed of multiple components. First, the territorial security environment was described
as the absence of an imminent threat to a given country’s territorial integrity, e.g., by an
adversarial power’s military aggression. In this context, the 2010-NSS emphasised that
Britain does not face any ‘[...] major state threat at present and no existential threat to our
security, freedom or prosperity’, which authors mainly attributed to the collapse of the
Soviet Union in the early 1990s.379 Besides, geography is key to the territorial security
environment. Due to her location close to continental Europe and her memberships in both
the EU and NATO, Britain was surrounded and shielded by allied and (or) friendly nations
in 2010.380 Combined, these factors suggest that Britain’s territorial security environment
was stable when the 2010-NSS/SDSR package was published.
Nevertheless, due to Britain’s 14 overseas territories, the geographical component appears
to be slightly more complex.381 Referring specifically to these territories, the government
emphasised that it was Britain’s responsibility to protect these regions, its citizens and
flagged vessels.382 While these statements indicate that the British overseas territories are
an integral part of British defence planning, reality paints a different picture. First, the MoD
stipulated that its engagement in the region is limited to four major responsibilities; namely,
search and rescue, disaster relief, the evacuation of British nationals, and the freedom of
navigation.383 Second, troop presence is rather small; according to the MoD, only 5’510
service members are posted in the overseas territories.384 Moreover, the majority, 3,600
troops, is not even stationed in distant regions but on two sovereign military bases that
Britain maintains in Cyprus.385 This limited engagement and low troop numbers, therefore,
suggest that the overseas territories play a minor role in British defence thinking and only
marginally influence the territorial security environment.
379 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 3, and 15.
380 Status: 2018; cf. ibid., 4.
381 The MoD lists the following territories alphabetically: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory,
British Indian Ocean Territory, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands,
Gibraltar, Montserrat, the Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension and
Tristan da Cunha (including Gough Island Dependency), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands,
Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) Akrotiri and Dhekelia (on Cyprus), the Turks and Caicos Islands; cf.
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As regards Britain’s ideological security environment, the previously mentioned member-
ships in the EU and NATO are key points to consider. Here, the 2010-NSS/SDSR package
stressed that political and military co-operation with international partners was paramount
for British defence as Britain hardly ever acted alone in the global theatre anymore.386
Despite this acknowledgement, however, the government expressed that multinational or
bilateral relations must be placed on a practical footing;387 i.e., the government intended to
concentrate and increase collaboration with partners that exhibited similar characteristics
such as a comparable sizes of the armed forces or technological standards.388 In this
context, the 2010-SDSR explicitly highlighted the United States and France.389 Especially
the former was described as Britain’s most important ally;390 both as regards economic
and military relations.391 Nonetheless, the 2010-SDSR also referred to emerging powers
and key regional states, with which the government aspired to work more closely by
establishing stronger bilateral relations.392
2.1.3.2 Perceived and Anticipated Threats
Britain’s Self-Perceived Distinctive Role. The government’s estimate that Britain was
capable of building new or strengthening existing relationships was mainly derived from the
judgement that Britain played a distinctive role in world affairs.393 Enabled by the English
language, historical links to countries on all continents and the Commonwealth, authors
were convinced that a strong network existed that would allow Britain to exercise influence
on a global scale.394 Moreover, the 2010-NSS emphasised that Britain, being a leading
economy as well as a cultural and educational hub, had a lot to offer to other countries.395
386 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 15, and









393 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 21 et seq.
394 ibid., 21-22.
395 cf. ibid., 21.
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In the government’s opinion, this combination of factors obliged and permitted Britain to
actively shape world affairs. Thus, the 2010-SDSR outlined that Britain intended not only
to benefit from international organisations but wished to reform and influence institutions
such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council.396
National Security Risk Assessment. With the aforementioned political associations
and the envisaged active role in world affairs, Britain strongly aligned herself with what
is perceived by adversaries as the ‘Western Alliance’. This, in conjunction with Britain’s
somewhat open society and markets, makes the country vulnerable to asymmetrical threats
such as terrorism.397 Aware of this problem, and noting that Britain’s security situation has
become increasingly complex, the government attempted to develop a system that would
allow preparing for threats more effectively.398 Coining this approach National Security
Risk Assessment in the 2010-NSS, the government consulted experts, who evaluated
Britain’s contemporary security environment.399 Noting that not all threats could be
anticipated, the government emphasised that this assessment was supposed to deliver
sufficient data to prioritise threats by considering the likelihood and degree of impact
on citizens, infrastructure, industries or the country in general.400 After concluding the
assessment, experts grouped anticipated threats into three tiers;401 however, as only Tier
One threats were considered imminent and were thought to cause the most significant
damage; therefore, Tiers Two and Three were not discussed in detail.402
396 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
61-62.




401 ibid., 27 et seq.
402 Tiers Two and Three listed four and five threats, respectively. Tier Two: Attacks on the mainland or
overseas territories with weapons of mass destruction, increasing political instability in non-dependent
regions, organised crime and espionage, disruption or attacks on Britain’s satellite system. Tier Three:
attacks on the mainland or overseas territories with conventional weapons, increased terrorist activity
or organised crime or illegal immigration, disruptions to oil and gas supplies, accidents in nuclear
facilities in Britain or abroad, attacks on EU or NATO members that would require Britain to contribute
to militarily; cf. ibid., 27 et seq.
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Terrorism and Cybersecurity. The first threat discussed in the context of the National
Security Risk Assessment’s Tier One was terrorism.403 Although also mentioning domestic
terrorism, which was estimated as originating from ‘the activities of residual terrorist
groups’ in Northern Ireland, the 2010-NSS concentrated more on discussing international
terrorism.404 In 2010, Al Qaeda was judged to be the principal ‘provider’ and ‘exporter’
of Islamic terrorism.405 Therefore, beating insurgents in Afghanistan was deemed crucial
and the most effective strategy to contain this threat.406 Nevertheless, the 2010-NSS also
alluded to ‘[f]ragile, failing and failed stated around the world’ as the actual origin of
terrorism as terrorists ‘look to exploit ungoverned or ill-governed space’;407 in other words,
the government estimated that power vacuums were a hazard to Britain’s security as they
enabled terrorist activities.408
Related to the terrorist threat, the 2010-NSS further referred to cybersecurity.409 Although
highlighting that the government perceived advancements in technology as an opportunity,
the authors also emphasised that increased usage of the internet had made Britain more
vulnerable;410 the reason mentioned for this judgment was that the public, the private
sector, and the government had become more reliant on the internet in everyday life and
for doing business.411 Noting that terrorists, hostile states or criminals might exploit this
vulnerability, the 2010-NSS stipulated that improving Britain’s cybersecurity posture was
crucial to delivering public safety.412
403 ibid., 28-29.
404 Although only briefly referring to terrorism in Northern Ireland, the government highlighted that terror
attacks were still a persisting problem. Nevertheless, the threat was deemed not as severe as international
terrorism since Northern Irish terrorists were not as organised and not joint by a common agenda or
supported by the public; cf. ibid., and 14.
405 ibid. 28.
406 ibid., 13.
407 Here, the 2010-NSS explicitly mentioned Yemen and Somalia. Moreover, the government briefly
addressed the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In this context, the
authors specifically referred to Iran, whose acquisition of nuclear weapons Britain intended to prevent;
cf. ibid., and 13-14.
408 From the 2018 perspective, the government’s estimates are missing references to the Arab Spring or
the Syrian civil war, which commenced after the 2010-NSS/SDSR package was released. Noting that
experts cannot anticipate all prospective threats accurately, the 2010-NSS stipulated that the National






Military Interventions and Civil Emergencies. Even though emphasising that ‘[n]o
state currently has the combination of capability and intent needed to pose a conventional
military threat to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom’, the 2010-NSS further
mentioned that preparing for such an attack was a priority for Britain’s military planners.413
Nevertheless, this estimate was not expressed in conjunction with her neighbouring states
but rather referred to Britain’s obligation to intervene globally.414 While also no specific
examples are mentioned in this context, the government underscored that circumstances
might change rapidly, why Britain needed to be prepared to encounter any unfavourable
developments.415
The last threat classified as a Tier One threat was accidents and natural hazards.416 Refer-
ring back to historical events such as the Spanish Flu or the 2009 Cumbria flood, pandemics
and natural catastrophes were cited as a likely threat to British security.417 Moreover,
industrial accidents, as well as disruptions to water and energy supplies, were mentioned
in this context.
2.1.3.3 Major Military Commitments
At the time when pressures increased to conduct a new and comprehensive defence review,
Britain was involved in two major overseas deployments, namely, in Afghanistan and
Iraq; however, before the 2010-NSS/SDSR package was published, Operation Telic in Iraq
officially concluded on 30 April 2009.418 Hence, references to Iraq were sparse in the
2010 defence review, which mainly mentioned Britain’s responsibilities in Afghanistan.419
Besides the fact that operations in Afghanistan were ongoing in 2010, this mission con-







418 ‘UK Combat Operations End in Iraq’, BBC News, 30 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
8026136.stm, 10 April 2014.
419 See, for instance, ibid., 4, and HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, 9.
420 ibid, 13, and ‘UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events’.
81
Commencing in 2001 with Operation Enduring Freedom, Britain’s engagement in the
country was bound to last for more than 13 years.421 Starting with a rather small troop
commitment to support the United States’ and her allies’ efforts to fight the architects of
9/11, the Taliban, Britain had assumed a leading role by 2006 when Camp Bastion was
installed in Helmand province.422 In this environment, British troops were not passive
bystanders but actively involved in tactical operations and subject to frequent attacks,
which were met by appropriate counterstrikes.423 During the peak of the mission, namely,
in 2009, about 9,500 troops were stationed in Afghanistan, of which 456 had lost their
lives by 2014.424 In addition to this loss of life, the Afghanistan mission had cost Britain
about £3.07 billion annually.425 Nevertheless, in 2015, Britain, alongside her partners, had
to withdraw from their 2014 withdrawal and again had to sent troops to further stabilise
Afghanistan.426
2.2 The Future Reserve 2020
2.2.1 Identified Issues and Proposed Solutions
In the 2010-SDSR the government stipulated that the MoD needed to conduct a separate
and detailed review of the reserve force.427 Following an evaluation by independent experts
and the consultation of key stakeholders, the MoD completed its evaluation of the reserve
forces in 2013. On the following pages, the identified problems and envisaged measures to
eradicate them are discussed mainly at the example of volunteer reserves.
421 ibid., and The UK’s Work in Afghanistan: Timeline (London: Cabinet Office, Department for Interna-
tional Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Ministry of Defence, 2014), accessed 18
January 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uks-work-in-afghanistan/the-uks-work-in
-afghanistan-timeline.
422 ‘UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events’.
423 The UK’s Work in Afghanistan: Timeline.
424 ‘UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events’.
425 ibid.
426 ibid.
427 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,
5.
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2.2.1.1 The Independent Commission’s Recommendations
Identified Issues. In July 2011, the Independent Commission submitted its report on the
reserve forces.428 Here, experts had evaluated the current state of the latter and identified
four major problems, which, in their opinion, hindered the successful employment of the
reserve to tackle contemporary security challenges.429 First, it was stipulated that the
reserve have been in decline since the early 1990s, which the experts mainly attributed to
low applications and retainment numbers.430 These, in turn, were deemed the result of
having offered insufficient incentives.431 Second, the Independent Commission judged
that the MoD had neglected to modernise the reserve’s structures as those were still geared
toward Cold War requirements, namely, deterring and countering the Soviet threat.432
Consequently, and due to existing legislation, the bulk of reservists, namely, non-specialists,
were not used in standard operations such as overseas deployment but cost the taxpayer
money without a discernible contribution to Britain’s defence posture.433 Third, it was
stipulated that the reserve did not reflect the same scope of talent that society as a whole
had to offer;434 i.e., reservists did not possess the same range or depth of skills as the
public at a sufficient level.435 Fourth, due to the previous three points, the MoD was not
able to employ the reserve as needed.436 This, according to the Independent Commission’s
calculations was particularly unwise, as reserve units were thought to deliver the same
capabilities at 80 to 90 per cent of a regular unit’s costs.437
Proposed Solutions and Aspired Numbers. In light of the contemporary financial
pressures and the envisaged reductions in regulars, the reserve’s ability to deliver a cost-





433 cf. ibid., 7, and 9.
434 cf. ibid., 6.
435 cf. ibid.
436 cf. ibid.
437 The Independent Commission calculated that costs were 20 per cent lower when not mobilised and ten
to 15 per cent lower when mobilised; cf. ibid., 11.
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efficient contribution to defence was key to the Independent Commission’s report.438
Therefore, the experts recommended increasing the ratio of mobilised reserves to regulars
to 1:8.439 To recruit more individuals for the reserve, the Independent Commissioned
deemed formalising and revising reservists’ roles and responsibilities paramount for the
success of a reform.440 Here, the experts explicitly mentioned that serving must become
more attractive by expanding opportunities to serve in leadership positions and specialists
roles, e.g., in cybersecurity.441 Moreover, responsibilities in homeland defence should
increase.442
For these expanded responsibilities, and to meet the intended ratio, the report judged that
all three services needed to recruit and train more individuals for their respective reserve
forces.443 For the Army, the experts estimated that 30,000 troops were required to support
Britain’s defence posture;444 for the RN and the RAF it was assumed that 3,100 and 1,500
troops respectively were needed.445 Unfortunately, available government publications are
somewhat incomplete; hence, consecutive and reliable reserve numbers are only available
for the volunteer reserve.446 Nevertheless, Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 intend to give a
broad overview of the post-FR-2020 reserve forces’ strength by highlighting volunteer
reserve numbers in total and in the single services in comparison to the previous decade.
Beginning with Table 2.3, which alludes to total numbers, it becomes apparent that the
MoD was able to limit the shrinking of the reserve following the FR-2020. While total
numbers decreased by an annual average of 4.11 per cent from 2000 through 2005, Table
2.3 shows that this trend was reduced to an annual average of -0.76 per cent ten years
later. Moreover, only 426 reservists, on average, and not 1,886, left service annually from
2010 through 2015. Interestingly, however, following the Independent Commission’s








446 Ministry of Defence, UK Reserve Forces Strengths at 1 April 2010 (National Statistics, 2010), accessed
09 February 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/280389/2010-revised.pdf, 1.
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report in 2011, all three services show a sharp decrease in reservists’ numbers.447 While
both the RN and the RAF were able to reverse this trend in the following year, the Army
experienced yet another incisive decline 2014.448
Table 2.3: Total Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Â x
Total Volunteer Reserves 33,390 37,070 30,570 30,650 28,860 31,260 191800 31967
Annual D in numbers n/a* 3,680 -6,500 80 -1,790 2,400 -2,130 -426
Annual D in per cent n/a* 11.02 -17.53 0.26 -5.84 8.32 n/a -0.76
Annual D (10 yrs) in numbers -13,670 -12,230 -17,900 -9,770 -10,090 -6,370 -70,030 -11,672
Annual D (10 yrs) in per cent -40.94 -24.81 -36.93 -24.17 -25.91 -16.93 n/a -33.94
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Â x
Total Volunteer Reserves 47,060 49,300 48,470 40,420 38,950 37,630 26,1830 43,638
Annual D in numbers n/a** 2,240 -830 -8,050 -1,470 -1,320 -9,430 -1,886




2.2.1.2 Recruitment, Retainment and Incentives
The Consultation Paper. The aforementioned negative trend in Army reservists’ num-
bers suggests that the Independent Commission’s proposed measures were insufficient for
retaining enough reservists. Aware of this issue, the MoD decided to expand the review
of the reserve forces and provide room for key stakeholders such as reservists and their
employers to raise concerns.449 Building on the Independent Commission’s report, the
MoD, therefore, released a Green Paper in 2012.450 This consultation paper chiefly focused
on subjects such as reservists’ retainment, the need to redefine legislation and reservists’
employers and their relationships to reservists and the MoD.451
447 Please refer to Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6.
448 cf. ibid.
449 cf. Ministry of Defence, Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation’s Security Together, 12.
450 ibid.
451 The 2012 Green Paper further focused on defining the reserve’s relationship with society and the support
of their families; cf. ibid.
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Table 2.4: Army Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Â x
Total Army Volunteer Reserves 28,960 31,400 26,640 26,500 24,290 25,880 163,670 27,278
Annual D in numbers n/a* 2,440 -4,760 -140 -2,210 1,590 -3,080 -616
Annual D in per cent n/a* 8.43 -15.16 -0.53 -8.34 6.55 n/a -1.81
Annual D (10 yrs) in numbers -10,540 -10,500 -14,260 -8,230 -9,330 -6,660 -59,520 -9,920
Annual D (10 yrs) in per cent -36.40 -25.06 -34.87 -23.70 -27.75 -20.47 n/a -33.65
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Â x
Total Army Volunteer Reserves 39,500 41,900 40,900 34,730 33,620 32,540 223,190 37,198
Annual D in numbers n/a** 2,400 -1,000 -6,170 -1,110 -1,080 -6,960 -1,392




Table 2.5: Maritime Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Â x
Total Maritime Volunteer Reserves 2930 3230 2570 2620 2850 3160 17360 2893
Annual D in numbers n/a* 300 -660 50 230 310 230 46
Annual D in per cent n/a* 10.24 -20.43 1.95 8.78 10.88 n/a 2.28
Annual D (10 yrs) in numbers -1890 -1600 -2410 -1480 -920 -450 -8750 -1458
Annual D (10 yrs) in per cent -64.51 -33.13 -48.39 -36.10 -24.40 -12.47 n/a -43.80
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Â x
Total Maritime Volunteer Reserves 4820 4830 4980 4100 3770 3610 26110 4352
Annual D in numbers n/a** 10 150 -880 -330 -160 -1210 -242





Table 2.6: RAF Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Â x
Total RAF Volunteer Reserves 1,560 2,450 1,360 1,540 1,720 2,220 10,850 1,808
Annual D in numbers n/a* 890 -1,090 180 180 500 660 132
Annual D in per cent n/a* 57.05 -44.49 13.24 11.69 29.07 n/a 13.31
Annual D (10 yrs) in numbers -1,180 -120 -1,230 -60 170 740 -1,680 -280
Annual D (10 yrs) in per cent -75.64 -4.67 -47.49 -3.75 10.97 50.00 n/a -14.12
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Â x
Total RAF Volunteer Reserves 2,740 2,570 2,590 1,600 1,550 1,480 12,530 2,088
Annual D in numbers n/a** -170 20 -990 -50 -70 -1260 -252




Training. Based on the stakeholders’ input, the MoD developed a wide range of instru-
ments that were thought to cater to the needs of all parties involved, namely, reservists, their
families and employers, as well as Britain’s defence posture. Presented in 2013 in a White
Paper on reservists, the MoD, for instance, pointed out that reservists’ training needed
to be reformed to make serving more attractive.452 Furthermore, for defence purposes,
training had to be structured more efficiently and effectively.453 To achieve both goals,
the MoD aspired to make training more challenging and rewarding for reservists by also
pledging to make modern equipment and vehicles more accessible to reservists.454 For
this, training structures should be reformed;455 here, the MoD intended to allocate £240.00
million of additional funds to training and £200.00 million to reserve units’ equipment.456
Besides these somewhat general measures, the MoD hoped to increase the degree of
integration of reservists in regular units by pairing reserve units with their regular coun-








terpart.457 By doing so, it was hoped to acquaint reservists with the use of the same
equipment and strategies.458 Moreover, readiness cycles were thought to be synced more
effectively through pairing, which, in turn, would allow the MoD to deploy reservists
alongside regulars at the same time if needed.459
Incentives for Reservists. While reservists had cited unchallenging training as a reason
to leave service, the MoD also noted that there was a significant discrepancy as regards pay
and benefits between regulars and reservists.460 In order to decrease this disparity, the MoD
decided to adjust pay and benefits packages to levels similar to those of regulars.461 This
included expanding the accessibility of health care, including mental, dental, occupational,
general practitioner and rehabilitation.462 Moreover, reservists and their families were
thought to be supported by making welfare benefits promptly available through assigning
designated welfare officers to reserve units.463
In order to decrease the number of reservists skipping annual training requirements, the
MoD agreed to pay a training bounty.464 Moreover, reviewing the Reservist Award was
believed to aid in making training and mobilisation fairer.465 The Reservist Award had
been paid to compensate any financial losses that a reservist might suffer if her/his civilian
salary was higher then her/his military salary.466 While this conduct presumably motivated
highly paid individuals to serve in any capacity, it did not take into account the scope
of responsibilities s/he fulfilled while on duty.467 Therefore, reservists with lower-paid
civilian jobs, who, for instance, performed specialised tasks in the armed forces were














to introduce a payment cap for the Reservist Award.469
While these measures served both retainment and recruitment, the MoD also intended
to introduce a signing bonus to increase application numbers.470 For recruits without
prior military experience, the MoD was prepared to pay an initial bonus of £2,000 and an
additional bounty of £3,000, which was to be paid in three instalments over three years.471
In order to recruit more ex-regulars directly after having processed out of service, a transfer
bonus of £5,000 was to be paid.472
Incentives for Employers. In the 2012 Green Paper, both employers and reservists had
voiced concerns that military duties were somewhat of a burden to both parties.473 For
instance, while reservists obtained valuable skills during their service, these were not
transferable to civilian jobs as they were not officially accredited.474 The government,
therefore, intended to work closely with civilian accreditation boards, higher education
institutes and trade organisations to enable an official transfer.475
While this issue mostly affected reservists’ civilian career progress, employers pointed out
that absent staff had to be replaced, which involved costly hiring and training processes.476
Moreover, upon reservists return, these often had to be retrained for their civilian job,
which meant that companies suffered additional financial burdens.477 Even though the
financial implications were worse for small and medium-sized companies, the government
acknowledged that larger corporations needed to be compensated for reservists’ absences
as well to make sure that employing military personnel was an asset rather than a burden.478
As regards small and medium-sized companies, the MoD proposed to pay £500.00 per





473 cf. ibid., 9 et seq.
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475 Specifically, the MoD wanted reservists to earn Standard Learning Credits during their service, which






the government intended to establish a corporate covenant, which also allowed larger
corporations to publicly announce their support of the armed forces on websites and
business letterheads.480
In addition to these incentives, the government intended to build better and stronger
relationships with reservists’ employers by intensifying communication and providing
more detailed information on the reserve.481 For employers, the most crucial component
of this strategy was the increased notification period of reservists’ mobilisation orders.482
For enduring operations, the MoD, therefore, depending on the service, aimed for three to
nine months notification notices, while short mobilisations should be announced at least
28 days prior to deployment.483
2.2.1.3 Changing Responsibilities
Reservists in Regular Units. Before the FR-2020 commenced, the government’s leeway
to mobilise reservists was somewhat limited.484 Primarily, reservists were planned to
be used in national emergencies;485 most notably, when Britain’s territorial integrity
was threatened or to combat the ramifications of natural catastrophes such as floods.486
Moreover, the reserve was called to protect the lives of British nationals at home and
abroad.487 In the course of the FR-2020, however, reservists’ scope of duties was enlarged
and entailed the same responsibilities regular troops would fulfil.488 This change in policy
specifically included operations outside of Britain;489 for instance, the MoD was now
able to mobilise reservists for support in the evacuation of Britons in foreign countries
and stabilisation operations overseas.490 Moreover, the government explicitly wanted to
increasingly use reservists in standing commitments abroad as well as in peacekeeping
480 ibid.











missions, conflict prevention and security sector reforms.491
While selected reservists, namely, specialist, had already contributed to these kinds of
missions before the FR-2020, the MoD aimed to integrate the reserve better into regular
units by not deploying individual reservists but reserve units;492 preferably, the MoD
intended to deploy the latter with the regular unit that reservists had been paired with in
training.493
Homeland Defence. Besides expanding responsibilities in overseas deployments, where
reservists were supposed to work equally alongside their regular counterparts, the Inde-
pendent Commission already recommended making further use of the reserve in homeland
defence and British resilience.494 In this context, the experts referred explicitly to the
militia-like ethos, which increasingly manifested in the American public following 9/11.495
According to their judgement, this mentality was also present in Britain, why the MoD
should try to harvest talent for British homeland resilience.496 Building on the Independent
Commission’s suggestions, the MoD stipulated in the 2013 White Paper that it intended to
use reservists more for general and supporting homeland defence task such as safeguarding
major public events (e.g, Olympics), crisis management as well as coastal and airspace
surveillance.497
Mobilisation. To fulfil their expanded responsibilities, the government decided that
reservists could be mobilised for an extended period.498 For Army duties, reservists
could now be mobilised for up to 12 months once every five years.499 The serving period
was divided into three phases, namely, a specific pre-deployment training, a six-month
deployment and post-deployment duties.500 Rather than to call up individual reservists,
491 ibid.
492 ibid., 22 et seq.
493 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts, 5.
494 The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserves 2020,
7, 27, and 62.
495 ibid., 7.
496 ibid.
497 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, 17.




deployments were to be undertaken by reserve units.501 As regards the RN and the RAF,
the MoD decided to adhere to their individual or small team deployment strategy.502
2.2.1.4 Changing Legislation
As seen above, a major component of the FR-2020 was to expand the reserve’s roles and to
improve reservists’ integration in the British Armed Forces’ regular structures.503 While
this undertaking appears plausible from a financial, structural and strategical standpoint, the
government noted that implementing these aspirations required expanding and amending
existing legislation.504
This process was concluded in 2014, when the Defence Reform Act (DRA) was enacted;505
it consisted of three parts, of which the last one was concerned with the reserve forces.506
A crucial point was addressed right at the beginning in Art. 44, which changed the Army
Reserve’s name to Regular Reserve and the Territorial Army’s name to Army Reserve.507
Although this provision might appear insignificant at first, the MoD stressed that renaming
the Territorial Army was thought to reflect reservists changing roles and to remove the
negative image attached to the name ‘Territorial Army’.508
On balance, a large percentage of the DRA discussed amendments to the 1996 Reserve
Forces Act (1996-RFA); especially as regards reservists’ obligation to serve after mobilisa-
tion, which, for most operations, was expended from nine to twelve months.509 After being
called for duty, the DRA explicitly stated that reservists must fulfil any duties a regular
service member would be asked to do, including overseas deployments.510
501 ibid.
502 ibid.
503 cf. Louisa Brooke-Holland. In Brief: Future Reserves 2020, House of Commons Library: International
Affairs and Defence Section, SN06635 (London: House of Commons Library, 2013).
504 The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserves 2020,
31.
505 cf. GOV.UK, Collection: Defence Reform Act 2014’, accessed 02 December 2015, https://www.gov.uk
/government/collections/defence-reform-act-2014.
506 The first one outlines regulations to improve equipment acquisition and logistics’ supply. The second
discussed the establishment of a new framework for single source procurements; cf. ibid.
507 See also Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts, 4.
508 ibid.
509 cf. DRA Art. 45., and RFA Art. 28, 56, and 57.
510 ibid.
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2.2.2 The Future Reserve 2020 in the Single Services
Although the FR-2020 concerned all three services, it was the Army that underwent the
most severe restructuring. Therefore, the Army Reserve was also most affected by this
reform. In order to provide a comprehensive discussion on the FR-2020, however, the
following pages briefly allude to envisaged changes that specifically concerned the Army,
RN, and the RAF. Moreover, to complete the picture, the different categories of the British
reserve are introduced first.
2.2.2.1 Categories of Reservists
Regular Reserves. As previously stated, elaborations on the reserve in this Chapter, and
in the government’s publications for that matter, mainly focused on volunteer reserves.511
The main reason for this choice was that the MoD usually mobilises only a small percentage
of regular reserves for routine operations.512
Regular reserves are former regular service members;513 for a limited time following the
completion of their term, ex-regulars are liable for recall.514 If mobilised during this period,
reservists serve in either the Army’s Regular Reserve, the Royal Air Force Reserve or
the Fleet Reserve, depending on their previous affiliation.515 Moreover, regular reserves
may enter a Additional Duties Commitment, where reservists work on a part-time basis
for regular or reserve units.516 Moreover, they can serve in the High Readiness Reserves,
which, however, requires additional training commitments.517 After the recall liability has
passed, regular reservists become members of the long-term reserve, which may be called
up in the event of serious emergencies or attacks on Britain.518 Reservists obligation to
serve under these circumstances end when turning 55 or after having served for a total of
511 cf. Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, 16.
512 ibid.
513 ibid.
514 Louisa Brooke-Holland, Future Reserves 2020, House of Commons Library: International Affairs and
Defence Section, SN06733 (London: House of Commons Library, 2013), 6.
515 ibid.
516 ibid., and Shima D. Keene, The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from
the United Kingdom Reserve Model, 7-8.
517 ibid., 8.
518 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, 16.
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18 years.519
Volunteer Reserves. Ordinary citizens, who have voluntarily signed up for reserve duty
are called volunteer reserves.520 By entering this commitment, individuals accept that
they are liable for annual training and mobilisation for routine operations.521 Training
is conducted on a part-time basis and is complemented with an annual training camp,
which lasts approximately two weeks.522 Volunteers may choose to be part of the Army
Reserve, the RNR, the Royal Marine Volunteer Reserve (RMVR) or the Royal Auxiliary
Air Force (RAuxAF).523
Due to the annual training cycle, the MoD has detailed knowledge of the volunteer reserves’
readiness levels and capabilities.524 Hence, they are mobilised more frequently than regular
reserves.525 Similar to the ex-regulars, volunteer reserves can also be part of the High
Readiness Reserves or accept an Additional Duties Commitment.526
Full-Time Reservists and Sponsored Reserves. Besides being mobilised for duty, re-
servists may opt to work full-time in the armed forces.527 When doing so, individuals are
neither considered regulars nor mobilised reservists and usually work in jobs that require a
high degree of specialisation.528 Sponsored reserves, on the other hand, are quasi-volunteer
reservists.529 They become members of the reserve due to their employers’ contract with
the MoD, which requires the company to nominate staff for reserve duty.530
519 Shima D. Keene, The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United
Kingdom Reserve Model, 8.
520 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, 16.
521 Shima D. Keene, The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United
Kingdom Reserve Model, 7.
522 ibid.
523 Louisa Brooke-Holland, Future Reserves 2020, 5-6.
524 cf. Shima D. Keene, The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the
United Kingdom Reserve Model, 7.
525 cf. ibid.







Of all the three services, the Army’s reserve was most affected by the 2010-NSS/SDSR
package and the FR-2020. Reasons for this were fourfold; first, in the course of the
2010-SDSR, it was decided to make 19,500 regular service members redundant.531 At the
same time, the Army’s overall troop strength was to be retained at 120,000.532 To make
up for these redundancies and natural turnover, the MoD stipulated that 30,000 trained
reservists should fill vacant posts;533 moreover, 8,000 additional reservists should be in
training.534
Second, instead of merely substituting for regulars, the MoD envisaged that reservists
would become an integral part of the Army.535 In their opinion, changing the reserve’s
name from Territorial Army to Army Reserve would aid in underscoring this step.536
Moreover, integration was believed to be facilitated by adapting training, which was now
conducted in firm units that trained alongside a paired regular unit.537
Third, amending the 1996-RFA and introducing the DRA in 2014 not only enabled the
renaming process but also allowed the MoD to expand the Army Reserve’s scope of
responsibilities.538 Following the passing of the DRA, the government was now able to
allocate any kinds of duties to reservists, which, in turn, meant that reservists could be
sent overseas in any kind of operations.539 However, reservists’ roles were still thought to
remain complementary in nature and limited to lower readiness missions;540 high readiness
capabilities remained in the hands of regular troops.541
Fourth, the MoD attempted to develop better homeland defence capabilities by increasingly
using the Army Reserve for this task.542 Simultaneously, however, the MoD decided to
531 Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, Armed Forces Redundancies, 3.












consolidate smaller units and close approximately 40 bases, which limited the Army
Reserve’s presence throughout Britain.543
2.2.2.3 The Maritime Reserve and Royal Auxiliary Air Force
The Maritime Reserve. Even though the FR-2020 mostly impacted the Army Reserve,
both the Maritime Reserve (RNR and RMVR) and the RAuxAF faced some changes;544
mostly as regards their troop strengths.545 Similar to the Army Reserve, the Maritime
Reserve had to compensate for redundancies in the RN, which accounted for 5,500 in
total.546 For the Maritime Reserve to make a meaningful contribution, the MoD aspired
to hold 3,100 trained reservists at its disposal.547 In contrast to their Army counterparts,
however, RNR and RMVR reservists were not thought to be trained and deployed in units
alongside regulars but were supposed to support and augment the RN if needed and serve
in specialist roles on an individual basis.548 Moreover, due to proven expertise in the
matter, the MoD decided that media operations would remain in the hands of reservists.549
Notwithstanding the limited adaptations to the Maritime Reserve following the FR-2020,
the MoD presumed that the Maritime Reserve could make a more significant contribution
to the High Readiness Reserve in the near future.550
Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Similar to the Maritime Reserve, the MoD envisaged the
RAuxAF’s post-FR-2020 structures, roles and deployment characteristics to remain largely
unchanged.551 Moreover, redundancies were also to be implemented; in total, the MoD
aimed to reduce the RAF by 8,000 troops but simultaneously strived to augment the
RAuxAF to 1,800.552 Also, the RAuxAF’s potential for increased employment in the High
Readiness Reserve was discussed, as it was expected that Air Force capabilities would
543 ibid.
544 ibid., 22, and 24.
545 cf. ibid.
546 Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, Armed Forces Redundancies, 3.
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assume a more prominent role in future conflicts.553
2.2.2.4 Additional Recruitment Strategies
Target Groups and Strategies. Due to the implemented manpower cuts in the regular
force and the intent to substantially augment the reserve’s troop strength, the MoD needed
to recruit more volunteers for and retain more ex-regulars in the reserve.554 As discussed
above, the MoD tried to achieve this goal by making training more attractive, offering
greater financial incentives, and support reservists in obtaining civilian accredited skills.555
In addition to these measures, the single services use quite similar recruitment strategies,
which consist of a combination of dynamic web presences, social media, as well as
television and radio advertisements.
Although it has been stipulated that reservists should also assume greater responsibilities in
specialised roles, these tools suggest that the the single services are increasingly targeting
youngsters rather than mature specialists.556 Today’s go-to medium further underscores
this judgement, namely, the services’ reserve recruitment websites.557 Here, all services
present themselves in a colourful and dynamic manner by favouring visual aids, e.g.,
pictures and videos, over detailed content.558 Especially the Army uses pictures to relate
to prospective applicants as all portrayed reservists are about 20 years of age and from
diverse ethnic backgrounds.559
Videos, on the other hand, are employed by all three services.560 Again, featured reservists
553 ibid.
554 Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, Armed Forces Redundancies, 4.
555 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts, 8 et seq.
556 The Independent Commission’s 2011 report further supports this reasoning; here, experts outlined that
reservists, on average, were ten years older than their regular counterparts; see Independent Commission
to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserves 2020, 7, and 12.
557 Army: Be the Best, ‘Army Reserve Soldier’, Crown Copyright, accessed 21 September 2016,
https://apply.army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/reserve-soldier?c3apidt=20340251588&gclid=Cj0KCQjw6r
XeBRD3ARIsAD9ni9DFZeXxLQhDQJzCoG-Ib0EJx71YShlxfpnh58UR-9PFNe-hkWY96FIaAtxrE
ALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds, Royal Air Force: Regular and Reserve, ‘Life as a Reserve’, Crown Copyright,
accessed 19 September 2018, https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/lifestyle-benefits/life-as-a-reserve/,
and Royal Navy, ‘Royal Naval Reserve’, Crown Copyright, accessed 19 September 2018,
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/maritime-reserves/royal-naval-reserve.
558 ibid.
559 cf. Army: Be the Best, ‘Army Reserve Soldier’.
560 ibid., Royal Air Force: Regular and Reserve, ‘Life as a Reserve’, and Royal Navy, ‘Royal Naval
Reserve’.
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are rather young and elaborate that reserve service was an opportunity to break free from
their regular lives.561 Furthermore, the messages portrayed in the videos are embedded in
a dynamic environment and highlight subjects such as adventures, sports, travelling the
world, and patriotism.562
Besides these marketing strategies, the websites also provide information on how to join
the reserve, prerequisite and what the service may entail.563 Moreover, applications can
be submitted electronically, and the RN even offers a live chat option to prospective
applicants.564
2.3 Key Findings
1. The examination of government publications suggests that finances assumed a central
role in composing the 2010-NSS/SDSR package. This, in turn, indicates that the
2008 financial crisis and its implications on government finances exercised a palpable
influence on British defence planning in 2010.
2. Additional support for the empirical conclusions was discovered by evaluating British
defence budgets after the 2008 financial crisis. Here, the analysis demonstrated
that the government planned to reduce defence spending by a total of £4.30 billion.
These economies were primarily to be realised through redundancies, scrapping of
equipment, renegotiations of contracts and the selling of surplus land and real estate.
3. Due to Britain’s location in Europe and her memberships in the EU and NATO,
both her territorial and ideological security environment was judged to be stable.
However, the examination of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package also revealed that the
British government acknowledged that threats such as (cyber) terrorism, failed states
and civil emergencies needed to be addressed by national defence policies. Moreover,
the Afghanistan mission was a prevailing issue, which was perceived as a way to






4. The discussion on the FR-2020 revealed that the army was mostly affected by
envisaged restructuring efforts. However, the FR-2020 forced all three services to
reduce the number of regular service members. It was stipulated that regular forces
are ten to twenty per cent more expensive than the reserve; this suggests that the
MoD aspired to secure large economies through redundancies in the regular force.
5. The analysis also showed that the MoD attempted to keep capability levels stable
despite the overall reduction of regular troops. The simultaneous manpower cuts
in the regular force and expansion of roles of responsibilities of the reserve force,
therefore, suggests that the MoD aspired to fill the capability gap with reservists.
In addition to being entrusted with ‘classical’ homeland defence, e.g., increasing
resilience in case of an attack on Britain, reservists’ responsibilities also were to
include the safeguarding of large public events, crisis management as well as coastal
and aerial surveillance. Moreover, reservists were to be deployed in overseas and
peacekeeping missions.
6. To enable reserve forces’ units to assume these new responsibilities, the MoD
needed to recruit more reservists. However, the analysis of personnel statistics has
revealed that only the RAF and RN were able to increase recruitment and retainment,
while the Army fell short of aspired numbers as of 2011. Moreover, due to the
consolidation and closing of reservists’ bases, the presence of reservists in Britain
was weakened. This conduct suggests that reservists recruitment and fulfilling of
their duties became more difficult in the course of the FR-2020.
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Chapter 3
Britain’s Post-Mason Review Reserve
Force
The main essentials of a successful prime minister are sleep and a sense of
history.565
- Harold Wilson -566
In Chapter Two, the contemporary British example was discussed by examining the im-
plications of financial constraints on defence planning. In particular, the FR-2020 was
analysed in general and in the context of the single services. This chapter constitutes the
historical counterpart to Chapter Two and investigates the ramifications of the 1975 Mason
Review. It does so by evaluating the reform’s significance for the reserve forces. Following
a similar structure as the previous chapter, both empirical and statistical evidence for the
influence of economic turmoil on British defence planning is sought first. Again, gov-
ernment publications, the defence budget and personnel statistics are used in this context.
Furthermore, Britain’s Cold War security environment is investigated to asses in what
circumstances reservists operated and how the government envisaged their contribution
to Britain’s defence. In this context, the Soviet threat and the Northern Ireland Conflict
are specifically addressed. Reservists’ roles and responsibilities are examined in detail by
exploring at the TAVR’s reform and the RN’s Mitchell Committee’s suggestions.
565 Kate Proctor, ‘Harold Wilson’s Greatest Moments’, 28 October 2015, Yorkshire Post, https://www.york
shirepost.co.uk/news/harold-wilson-s-greatest-moments-1-7540437, 17 April 2016.
566 British Prime Minister (1964-1970/1974-1976).
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3.1 The Post-Mason Reserve Force in Context
3.1.1 The 1975 Mason Review: Key Issues and Envisaged Measures
In order to investigate the impact of the 1975 Mason Review on the reserve forces, the
review itself is examined first. On the following pages, the discussion begins by taking a
closer look at the preceding defence-related political discourse and elaborate on the 1975
Mason Review’s key findings and the envisaged savings goals.
3.1.1.1 The Review Process and Strategic Considerations
Preceding Political and Defence-Related Developments. Except for a one-term Con-
servative interlude between 1970 and 1974, Britain’s defence policy has largely been
defined by Labour from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s.567 Already in 1964, the Labour
government engaged in a defence review, which was concluded in 1966 and complemented
by additional reports in 1967 and 1967.569 Known as the Healey Review, this reform was
believed to have been chiefly driven by the sterling crisis and the government’s subsequent
plans to ask the MoD to contribute to national consolidation efforts.570 To deliver the
required savings, the MoD, therefore, planned to implement a combination of measures,
namely, equipment purchase cancellations, reorganisations, and by cutting the TAVR’s,
then still called the Territorial Army, manpower by almost 50 per cent.571 Moreover, to
reduce the armed forces’ overstretch, the government further decided to withdraw from
most of Britain’s overseas commitments and to shift her defence focus to Europe;572 this
567 cf. 568
569 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965’, Secretary of State for Defence, Cmnd. 2592 (London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1965), and ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966: Part I The Defence
Review’, Secretary of State for Defence, Cmnd. 2901 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966).
570 cf. Claire Mills, Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Nigel Walker, A Brief Guide to Previous British Defence








included the withdrawal from East of Suez as of 1968.573
On 8 June 1970, the Labour government was replaced by a Conservative administration.574
By the time the Conservatives assumed office again, Britain’s strategical environment
had substantially changed.575 First, based on the previous government’s withdrawal
from foreign commitments, Britain had moved from a global to a regional power and
concentrated most of her efforts on European security.576 Second, Britain’s defence posture
had completely shifted towards NATO’s demands, which almost entirely eradicated options
to act unilaterally in the international theatre.577 Third, the ‘special relationship’ with
the United States had gradually been weakened and merely consisted of collaboration in
intelligence gathering and nuclear research by 1974.578
Although having promised their constituency to restore most of Britain’s international
engagements, the Conservatives only partially kept their promise.579 One implemented
measure was contributing troops from all three services to the so-called ANZUK defence
coalition, which Britain formed with Australian and New Zealand to protect their interests
in Malaysia and Singapore.580 Moreover, the reduction of the Territorial Army was
reversed, and defence expenditure increased from 5.00 per cent of GNP in 1968 to 5.75 per
cent of GNP in 1973.581 Nevertheless, the Conservatives, under pro-European then-Prime
Minister Edward Heath, moved even further towards European integration.582 First, the
government’s December 1970 pledge entailed to further bolster Britain’s contribution
to European defence as it decided to spend an additional £400.00 billion on the British
Army of the Rhine (BAOR) from 1971 to 1974.583 Second, the government completed
negotiations to join the EEC in 1972, which was followed by her entry on 01 January
573 The term ‘East of Suez’ is used by British military planners to refer to British commitments in South-East
Asia; in particular to Britain’s military base in Singapore; ibid., 82.







581 ibid., 104, and Claire Mills, Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Nigel Walker, A Brief Guide to Previous British
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The Review Process and Financial Objectives. After yet another change in govern-
ment in 1974, which put Labour back in office, the government again engaged in a
comprehensive defence review.585 Commencing in March 1974, the so-called Mason
Review was conducted in 12 months and was published on 19 March 1975 as Part One of
the 1975 Defence Estimates.586 It was the second Labour defence review in one decade
and was intended to set Britain’s structural and strategic goals for the next ten years.587
Generally speaking, the 1975 Mason Review largely mirrored the Healey Review’s char-
acteristics; again, the 1975 Defence Estimates addressed issues such as the armed forces’
overstretch, e.g., their disproportional contribution to NATO, and financial constraints.588
As regards the latter, the government had first proclaimed that it had not to set ‘arbitrary
financial limits’ for the defence review;589 nevertheless, the 1975 Defence Estimates
outlined large savings goals that were to be realised within a decade.590 In total, the
government aspired to gradually reduce defence expenditure to 4.5 per cent of GNP over
ten years, which accounted for total economies of £4.70 billion.591 Due to these incisive
financial plans, the government, therefore, not only informed the British parliament prior to
the 1975 Mason Review’s publication but also entered consultations with Britain’s NATO
partners in December 1974.592 Although most allies expressed sympathies for Britain’s
economic situation and the resulting defence budget cuts, they admonished the government
to ensure that envisaged measures should not to jeopardise the alliance’s combined combat
strength.593 In particular, the United States reminded governments that Europe had to
584 ibid., and ‘Brexit: A Timeline of Britain’s EU Membership in Guardian Reporting’, The Guardian, 25
June 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/a-timeline-of-britains-eu-membership-in
-guardian-reporting, 09 April 2017.
585 Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945, 104.
586 Michael Cary, ‘Britain’s Armed Forces after the Defence Cuts (Lecture)’, 1, and ‘British Defense
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invest more in her own safety as the administration in Washington, D.C. was busy with
their engagement in Vietnam and in the détente negotiations with the Soviet Unions.594
3.1.1.2 Implications of the 1975 Mason Review
Strategic Considerations. As previously mentioned, the MoD was confronted with sub-
stantial savings goals, which were to be realised between 1974 and 1983/84. 595 Moreover,
due to the Conservative government’s restored engagements in ANZUK operations, the
1975 Mason Review attested that Britain’s Armed Forces were overstretched.596 In order
to reduce the latter and to fulfil the financial directive, the MoD, therefore, listed numerous
measures, including strategical adaptations, in the 1975 Mason Review.597 First, it was
stipulated that British defence expenditure needed to be brought to the same levels her
allies spend on defence.598 According to the government’s estimated, this could only be
achieved by shifting Britain’s defence focus even more to the regional scale.599 To de-
termine the prospective defence scope, the government referred to three specific points;600
first, Britain’s defence had to concentrate on areas directly connected to the British Isles’
security.601 Second, British deployment to the identified regions should be to the benefit of
NATO’s collective defence.602 Third, the defence posture was supposed to be reorganised
by taking the imminent threat origination from the Warsaw Pact into account.603
594 ibid.
595 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 4.
596 ibid., 7.
597 ibid., 7 et seq.
598 In this context, the 1975 Defence Estimates explicitly referred to France and Germany, who only spend
3.8 per cent and 4.1 per cent of GNP on defence respectively in 1974. Britain’s defence expenditure
accounted for approximately 5.8 per cent of GNP in the same year; ibid., 2.
599 In the 1976 Defence Estimates, the government pointed out that most non-NATO overseas commitments
had ended or where about to end. These included the removal of all troops from Brunei, Gan, Mauritius,
Singapore, Oman and the West Indies. Moreover, the Simonstown Agreement was dissolved based on
an agreement between Britain and South Africa. Hence, the British Armed Forces also withdrew from
their base in South Africa. Besides, personnel and equipment in Hong Kong were substantially reduced.
Here, an agreement with the government of Hong Kong could be reached where the local administration
pledged to increase its share of the cost burden; cf. ibid., 7-8, and ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates
1976’, Secretary of State for Defence, Cmnd. 6432 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976), 20.





The latter was observed quite closely by the government;604 in particular, Britain anxiously
monitored the Soviet Union’s investment in her Navy and other conventional weapons.605
Therefore, the government concluded that Britain needed to increasingly contribute mari-
time forces to NATO’s Eastern Atlantic and Channel Area.606 By again taking financial
constraints into account, the government believed that this step could only be facilitated by
completely withdrawing all warships from the Mediterranean by 1976.607 Moreover, the
government noted that Britain should continue to provide tactical and strategical nuclear
weapons to NATO.608 Hence, it was decided to maintain Polaris.609
General Reductions. Besides, the 1975 Defence Estimates further elaborated measures
to balance defence budgets.610 One was the reduction in the Specialist Reinforcement
Forces.611 According to the government, the latter had primarily been earmarked for
operations in Britain’s overseas territories.612 Arguing that this responsibility had become
obsolete, the government decided to implement reductions here.613 Nevertheless, those
Specialist Reinforcement Forces pledged to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) were not supposed to be affected by this step.614 Yet, the government aspired
to implement cuts in three other non-NATO forces;615 first, the British Mobile Force’s
air-portable brigades were supposed to be reduced from three to one.616 Second, the
government decided to disband the UK Joint Airborne Task Force, while only maintaining
small parachute capabilities.617 Third, in the Amphibious Forces, the Royal Marine Bridge
Headquarters were reduced by one from four to three and the RN’s squadrons were cut
604 ibid.
605 ibid.













back from two to one.618
Personnel Reductions. In addition to strategical considerations and general reductions,
the MoD was to reduce both its military and civilian personnel.619 In total, MoD estimated
that 38,000 service members and 30,000 civilian employees needed to leave service to
ensure that financial goals could be met.620 Planned to be implemented over a five year
period, most reductions in personnel were envisaged to be imposed on non-frontline
staff.621 Here, civilian personnel employed on Britain’s overseas bases were to experience
the most incisive reductions; namely, 15,000 jobs were about to be lost, which equalled
a cutback of 25 per cent.622 Moreover, an additional 15,000 civilians in Britain, which
constituted about 6 per cent of the MoD’s civilian workforce, were required to leave their
employer.623 Although the government estimated that the majority of reductions could be
implemented through natural turnover and reduced hiring, the 1975 Mason Review also
insinuated that some employees would have to be made redundant.624
Army. As regards the armed forces, envisaged personnel reductions meant that eleven
per cent of service members would lose their jobs.625 Although describing the Army as
‘manpower-intensive’, this service was only moderately affected;626 in total, the Army’s
troop strength was to be reduced by 8 per cent or by 15,000 service members.627 Of the
latter, 6,000 troops, including 1,500 officers were to be made redundant while the remainder
was planned to be cut by natural turnover and reduced recruitment.628 Again, it was







624 In this context, the government emphasised that a redundancy scheme would protect former employees’
interests; cf. ibid., 22.
625 ibid., 20.
626 ibid., 16.
627 At the same time, MoD emphasised that recruitment had to continue to ensure that the Army would still
be staffed with the most talented recruits; cf. ibid., 20.
628 ibid., 21.
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in the supporting services and by disbanding numerous Army units’ headquarters.629
When consulting the Army’s regular numbers from 1970 through 1979, it becomes apparent
that, strictly speaking, the MoD did not achieve the envisaged manpower cut; at least, not
in the stipulated time-frame.630 As illustrated in Table 3.1, a total of 8,100 troops already
left in 1974, namely, shortly before the 1975 Mason Review was published.631 Considering
that the government used the 1974’s troop numbers as a basis for calculations, only the
decrease between 1975 and 1979 should be consulted to estimate the MoD’s success.632
Although Table 3.1 shows that the negative trend of 1974 continued throughout the second
half of the 1970s, only 10,200 troops left service during the relevant period. Hence, the
MoD fell 4,800 short of the stipulated goal.
Table 3.1: Army Regulars in Numbers (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Regulars 170,400 173,400 178,300 179,800 171,700 873,600 174,720
Annual D in numbers n/a* 3,000 4,900 1,500 -8,100 1,300 325
Annual D in per cent n/a* 1.76 2.83 0.84 -4.51 n/a 0.23
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Regulars 167,100 169,800 167,300 161,800 161,500 827,500 165,500
Annual D in numbers -4,600 2,700 -2,500 -5,500 -300 -10,200 -2,040
Annual D in per cent -2.68 1.62 -1.47 -3.29 -0.19 n/a -1.20
*Baseline = 1970.
Source: British Ministry of Defence.
Besides the cost-saving effects of manpower cuts, the 1975 Mason Review further alluded
to restructuring efforts and adaptations to the Army’s equipment.633 Here, it was outlined
that, despite the intension to strengthen BAOR, structures had to be streamlined and
simplified by consolidating units and headquarters.634 Moreover, even though underscoring
that the Army’s equipment mainly consisted of low-cost items, the government planned
629 ibid., 16-17.
630 See Table 3.1.
631 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975.




to realise savings by reducing existing equipment as well as by postponing or cancelling
purchases.635 This conduct was believed to deliver a better ‘men-to-weapons ration’.636
Royal Navy. In comparison to the Army, the RN was less affected by envisaged man-
power cuts. In total, the government calculated that only 5,000 service members, namely,
six per cent of overall RN troops needed to leave service by 1979.637 The reason for this
benign treatment was that the RN was already slightly understaffed in 1974.638 Therefore,
only 1,000 troops were planned to be made redundant, while 4,000 were supposed to leave
through natural turnover and reduced recruitment.639 Similar to the development in the
Army’s regular numbers, however, the RN also did not meet the set goal by 1979. As
highlighted in Table 3.2, only 3,000 left service in the relevant period.
Table 3.2: Royal Navy Regulars in Numbers (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Regulars 86,000 82,500 82,400 81,200 78,300 410,400 82,080
Annual D in numbers n/a* -3,500 -100 -1,200 -2,900 -7,700 -1,925
Annual D in per cent n/a* -4.07 -0.12 -1.46 -3.57 n/a -2.30
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Regulars 76,200 76,100 76,200 75,500 75,300 379,300 75,860
Annual D in numbers -2,100 -100 100 -700 -200 -3,000 -600
Annual D in per cent -2.68 -0.13 0.13 -0.92 -0.26 n/a -0.77
*Baseline = 1970.
Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.
Nevertheless, the RN heavily contributed to national consolidation efforts by losing a
large percentage of its equipment.640 Due to the Britain’s shifting strategical focus and
the planned withdrawals from the Mediterranean, Singapore, and the West Indies, the









Royal Air Force. As regards both personnel and equipment cuts, the 1975 Mason
Review affected the RAF the most. In total, 18 per cent or 18,000 troops were to leave
service by 1979;642 of these, 4,000, including 800 officers, were put on the shortlist for
redundancies.643 As highlighted in Table 3.3, however, the MoD was not able to meet
the required reductions in the stipulated period and only managed to reduce the RAF by
13,500. This constitutes a surplus of 4,500 troops by 1979.
Table 3.3: Royal Air Force Regulars (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Regulars 113,000 112,100 110,700 105,900 99,200 540,900 108,180
Annual D in numbers n/a* -900 -1,400 -4,800 -6,700 -13,800 -3,450
Annual D in per cent n/a* -0.80 -1.25 -4.34 -6.33 n/a -3.18
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Regulars 95,000 90,700 86,900 84,700 85,700 443,000 88,600
Annual D in numbers -4,200 -4,300 -3,800 -2,200 1,000 -13,500 -2,700
Annual D in per cent -4.23 -4.53 -4.19 -2.53 1.18 n/a -2.86
*Baseline = 1970.
Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.
Similar to the RN, the RAF also experienced incisive cuts to its equipment.644 Again,
this conduct needs to be understood in the context of shifting strategies.645 Although
underscoring that frontline aircraft combat levels for NATO purposes and those stationed
in Germany would be maintained, the government used its strategical decisions to justify
a significant reduction in the RAF’s aircraft and helicopters.646 In total, the government
641 In the course of the 1975 Mason Review, the government concentrated the RN’s efforts in NATO
operations in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel Areas as of 1976. It was thought that British ships, during
peacetime, would only occasionally leave these areas for patrol purposes. Moreover, the government
planned to focus on nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, why conventional-powered submarines







decided to reduce the ‘fixed-wing element of the Royal Ari Force transport fleet’ by 50
per cent, the ‘helicopter tactical transport fleet’ by 25 per cent, the ‘Nimrod maritime
patrol force’ by 25 per cent, and the ‘VC10 and Hercules aircraft’ by approximately 30 per
cent.647 This undertaking was supposed to be supported by cutting equipment in Cyprus,
by disbanding the helicopter squadron in Singapore, and by cancelling placed orders.648
3.1.2 Defence Spending in Context
The discussion on the previous pages has revealed that the government aspired to realise
£4.70 billion in savings until 1983/84.649 In order to estimate whether the envisaged
measures have helped in achieving this goal, defence expenditure during this period was
consulted. As highlighted in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, absolute spending did not decrease but
rose by 16.96 per cent and 16.83 per cent on average between 1975 through 1978 and 1979
through 1983 respectively.
Table 3.4: Defence Expenditure (1974-1978)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Â x
National Expenditure*
In £ billions 43.70 55.70 63.60 69.50 78.60 311.10 62.22
Annual D in per cent n/a** 27.46 14.18 9.28 13.09 n/a 16.00
Inflation Rate
In per cent 15.99 24.11 16.77 15.89 8.28 n/a 16.21
Defence Expenditure*
In £ billion 4.00 5.22 5.99 6.64 7.41 29.26 5.85
Annual D in per cent n/a** 30.52 14.82 10.83 11.66 n/a 16.96
In per cent of National Expenditure 9.15 9.37 9.42 9.55 9.43 n/a 9.39
Annual D in per cent n/a** 2.40 0.56 1.42 -1.27 n/a 0.78
*Financial Year.
**Baseline = 1974.
Sources: SIPRI, HM Treasury, including own calculations, and OECD.





inflation rate between 1974 and 1978 was almost as high as the increase in defence
expenditure. Hence, a rise in defence spending in real terms can only slightly be confirmed.
Between 1979 and 1983, on the other hand, defence expenditure did indeed increase,
as inflation was lower than the additional annual funding for the MoD.650 Therefore,
declining finances cannot be confirmed for this period.
Combined, these calculations suggest that the MoD was not able to realise the required
economies. Nevertheless, both tables also show that relative MoD expenditure, namely,
the MoD’s share of overall national spending decreased in 1978, 1979 and 1981.
Table 3.5: Defence Expenditure (1979-1983)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Â x
National Expenditure*
In £ billions 93.60 112.40 125.50 138.30 149.70 619.50 123.90
Annual D in per cent 19.08 20.09 11.65 10.20 8.24 n/a 13.85
Inflation Rate
In per cent 13.35 18.00 11.90 8.60 4.6 n/a 11.29
Defence Expenditure*
In £ billion 8.68 11.54 12.14 14.87 15.83 63.06 12.61
Annual D in per cent 17.01 33.01 5.20 22.49 6.46 n/a 16.83
In per cent of National Expenditure 9.27 10.27 9.67 10.75 10.57 n/a 10.11
Annual D in per cent -1.74 10.77 -5.78 11.15 -1.65 n/a 2.55
*Financial Year.
Sources: SIPRI, HM Treasury, including own calculations, and OECD.
3.1.3 The Security Environment
As stipulated in Chapter One, this thesis should evaluate countries’ security environments
from the territorial and ideological angle. Primarily, the analysis focuses on the govern-
ment’s estimates of Britain’s security situation in the mid-1970s. References to relevant
international agreements are made; however, the treaties are discussed in more detail in
Chapter Five, as these have been deemed more significant to evaluate Germany’s 1970s
650 See Table 3.5.
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security environment.
3.1.3.1 Territorial and Ideological Security Environment
Parameters. During the 1970s, the territorial and ideological security environments
were highly intertwined concepts as a country’s political allegiance not only determined
nation’s potential adversaries in an armed conflict, but also because the enemy was located
right at Western Europe’s doorstep; i.e., the Soviet Union and her satellite states, which
combined were known as the Warsaw Pact. Being a member of NATO and the EEC (as
of 1973), this constellation meant that Britain was part of the ‘Western Alliance’ why the
government specifically had to consider the Soviet threat in their defence planning.651
The Soviet Threat. In the Defence Estimates of 1975 and 1976, the latter was, therefore,
discussed in great detail.652 By examining the MoD’s assessment of the contemporary
situation, it becomes apparent that the government anxiously observed developments in
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in general.653 Here, the government stipulated that
the Eastern Alliance rapidly advanced the augmentation of its defence posture from 1970
through 1975, despite simultaneously engaging in détente negotiations.654 In particular,
the government was worried about the imbalance of combat strength, which started to
shift in favour of the Warsaw Pact.655 According to experts’ analysis, the East’s troop
strength outnumbered NATO’s by approximately 20 per cent;656 the same was stipulated
for conventional weapons.657 Moreover, the Soviet Union had reached parity with the
United States in nuclear weapons.658 As regards surface fleets and submarine capabilities,
estimates were not as grim, because NATO had approximately the same amount of vessels
at its disposal.659 Nevertheless, the government emphasised that NATO’s fleet was older
651 Brexit: A Timeline of Britain’s EU Membership in Guardian Reporting’, and Statement on the Defence
Estimates 1975, 26 et seq.
652 ibid., and Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976’, 179 et seq.
653 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 26.
654 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976’, 179.






and was equipped with fewer defensive and offensive missile systems.660 Therefore, the
MoD advocated not to use mere numbers in defence planning but to consider actual combat
strength.661
Détente. Due to the Warsaw Pact’s conduct to increase its capabilities, the government
was not convinced that détente would serve any purpose but to improve interstate relations
between East and West.662 Nevertheless, Britain also engaged in international talks aiming
to mutually reduce troop numbers and to improve the Blocs’ relationship in general.663
Known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, the government aspired to used negotiations
to bring the relationship on a practical footing.664 However, Britain also admonished her
allies to stay vigilant to ensure that the Eastern Alliance could not use the talks as an
instrument to divide the West.665 Even after the Helsinki Accords’ Final Act was signed
on 01 August 1975, the government adhered to its estimate of the situation and reminded
Britain’s partners that the security situation itself had not changed because of this agreement
as the underlying attitudes and agendas had not changed.666
3.1.3.2 Northern Irland NATO Commitments
NATO Commitments. Despite having proposed severe cuts to equipment and manpower
in the 1975 Mason Review, the government strongly affirmed British commitments to
NATO.667 Moreover, by adjusting Britain’s strategical focus to the regional level, the
government argued that Britain was capable of delivering the best possible contribution
to the alliance.668 When considering Britain’s engagement in NATO in the mid-1970s,
the government’s estimates were confirmed.669 By the time the 1975 Mason Review
660 ibid.
661 ibid.
662 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976’, 179.
663 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 30-31.
664 ibid., 31.
665 ibid.





was concluded and implemented, Britain had assigned most of her military efforts to
NATO.670 This became most pronounced in the RN’s scope of duties;671 here, Britain
provided approximately 70 per cent of the alliances’ immediate available naval strength.672
Concentrated mainly in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel Areas, Britain’s contribution,
therefore, safeguarded the sea-born reinforcement and supply from the United States and
Canada to Europe.673 Moreover, by maintaining Polaris, the government provided the only
European based nuclear deterrence.674 Nevertheless, Britain’s engagement did not end
there; with the stationing of 55,000 troops in Germany, Britain significantly contributed
to the defence of NATO’s central front and provided a large percentage of the alliances’
forward defence.675
Northern Ireland. Besides its contribution to NATO operations, the government also
needed to consider terrorism within Britain’s borders.676 Despite making progress to
contain terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, the security situation in this part of Britain
was still somewhat volatile.677 Bombing, shootings and rocket attacks were described as
frequent occasions, why the government affirmed its commitment to maintaining troops
in Northern Ireland.678 According to the government, this estimate was further supported
by the success of the armed forces’ 1974 anti-terrorism campaign, which lead to 1,367
arrests in connection with terrorist activities and murder.679 Moreover, the government
was convince that troop presence, surveillance and intelligence gathering would ultimately













3.2 The Post-Mason Reserve Force
3.2.1 Army
In March 1974, a separate review of the TAVR had been concluded.681 Named after Major
General Majury, the so-called Majury Review highlighted numerous recommendations on
improving the TAVR.682 Although findings of the Majury Review were already available
when the review process of the Mason Review began, the government did not fully integrate
its results in the 1975 Defence Estimates.683 Therefore, the following pages address the
post-Mason Review Army reserve forces in two steps; first, reservists’ obligations and
reserve forces’ structures as envisaged by the 1975 Mason Review are outlined. Second,
the Majury Review’s key aspects, as well as government statements on the TAVR in 1976
and 1977, are elaborated to identify whether and which adaptations to the TAVR were
implemented.684
3.2.1.1 Reserve Numbers
Development in Reserve Numbers. As previously described, the 1975 Mason Review
envisaged cutting the Army’s regular force by 15,000 until 1979. For the Army’s reserve,
on the other hand, the government had different plans as it was stated that the TAVR was
to be largely exempt from redundancies and that its troop strength should remain stable or
increase marginally.685
To confirm whether the government’s promise was upheld, the development of the Army’s
reservists’ numbers from 1970 through 1979 was examined. As seen in Table 3.6, reserve
numbers dropped by 189,400 in 1975. Although significant, this sharp decline must be
disregarded in this evaluation; before 1975, total reserve numbers included troops assigned
681 Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review).
682 ibid.
683 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 16.
684 Cadet Forces were deliberately committed in this analysis in order to focus the discussion on the main
reserve components.
685 Despite this statement, the government mentioned that some TAVR employees would lose their jobs
by 1979. However, reductions should be limited to TAVR-related MoD, training and logistics staff; cf.
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 16-17.
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Table 3.6: Army Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Regular Reserve 287,200 292,600 296,300 293,100 293,500 14,62,700 292,540
Annual D in numbers n/a* 5,400 3,700 -3,200 400 6,300 1575
Annual D in per cent n/a* 1.88 1.26 -1.08 0.14 n/a 0.55
TAVR and Ulster Defence 47,100 51,400 64,600 64,600 65,900 293,600 58,720
Annual D in numbers n/a* 4,300 13,200 0 1,300 18,800 4,700
Annual D in per cent n/a* 9.13 25.68 0.00 2.01 n/a 9.21
Total Reserves 334,300 344,000 360,900 357,700 359,400 1,756,300 351,260
Annual D in numbers n/a* 9,700 16,900 -3,200 1,700 25,100 6,275
Annual D in per cent n/a* 2.90 4.91 -0.89 0.48 n/a 1.85
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Regular Reserve 108,200 107,200 111,200 116,800 ns. 443,400 110,850
Annual D in numbers -185,300 -1,000 4,000 5,600 n/a -176,700 -44,175
Annual D in per cent -63.13 -0.92 3.73 5.04 n/a n/a -13.82
TAVR and Ulster Defence 61,800 63,500 67,900 68,500 n.s 261,700 65,425
Annual D in numbers -4,100 1,700 4,400 600 n/a 2,600 650
Annual D in per cent -6.22 2.75 6.93 0.88 n/a n/a 1.09
Total Reserves 170,000 170,700 179,100 185,300 n/a 705,100 176,275
Annual D in numbers -189,400 700 8,400 6,200 n/a -174,100 -43,525
Annual D in per cent -52.70 0.41 4.92 3.46 n/a n/a -10.98
*Baseline = 1970.
Source: British Ministry of Defence.
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to the General Reserve.686 Yet, with the latter’s disbandment on 30 June 1974, the General
Reserve disappeared from the statistics, which lead to the mentioned overall decline.687
When factoring out this one-time impact, Table 3.6 shows that total reserve numbers,
continuously increased between 1974 and 1979, namely, by 2.32 per cent on average
annually.688 As regards the TAVR’s and the Ulster Defence Regiment’s troop levels, a
similar conclusion can be drawn; i.e., numbers increased by an annual average of 3.14 per
cent when factoring out 1975.689 Hence, the aspired marginal increase in reservists can be
confirmed for the stipulated period.
3.2.1.2 Categories and Obligations of Army Reservists Post-1975
Regular Reserve. Similar to the situation in 2010, the British Army maintained two
categories of reservists in the 1970s, namely, a mandatory and a volunteer element.690 The
former was comprised of ex-regulars and was called the Individual Reserve.691 Its primary
purpose was to augment regular structures in the event of an imminent territorial threat
or during severe emergencies.692 Moreover, reservists were liable for recall in warlike
operations and, following the Queen’s orders, required to serve in Britain and abroad.693
The Individual Reserve was further subdivided into five sections labelled from A to G.694
Depending on the date someone joined the regular force, s/he was assigned to either section
upon completion of her/his term.695 Generally, all ex-regulars were first grouped in Section
A;696 however, only those individuals who had joined after 01 April 1967 remained in this
section until their liability to serve expired when turning 45.697 Service members who had
signed up for duty in the regular forces before 28 February 1964 or between 28 February
686 ibid., 58.
687 ibid.
688 Table 3.6, including additional calculations.
689 ibid.







697 ibid., 58, and 114.
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1964 and 31 March 1967 were obliged to serve in the Individual Reserve’s Section A for
one and two years respectively following the completion of their term.698 Under Section B,
the MoD listed all reservists who were not obliged to serve in Section A.699 Furthermore,
Sections D, F, and G grouped all reservists who did not have any obligation to serve, as
well as all female ex-regulars from the Queen Alexandra’s Royal Nursing Corps and the
Women’s Royal Army Corps respectively.700
TAVR. The largest volunteer element of the Army was the TAVR, which, in contrast
to the Individual Reserve, was organised in two kinds of units.701 One was referred to
as Independent Units, which, on average consisted of combat troops, as well as engineer,
signal and logistics units;702 here, the ration was approximately 1:2.703 Besides, civilian
staff and regular troops were assigned to the Independent Units.704 Stationed in several
national training centres, recruitment for the Independent Units was done locally.705
Training obligations accounted for 15 and 12 days annually in camp and out-of-camp
settings respectively.706
The second category of TAVR units was the Sponsored Units, which were chiefly comprised
of specialists.707 In order to find the best talent for these units, recruitment was conducted
on a nationwide basis, while training and the administration was centralised in the Central
Volunteer Headquarters.708 Noting that specialists needed less training than combat forces,
the Sponsored Units’ reservists were only required to dedicate 15 and four days annually
698 Upon completion of their liability to serve in Section A, these reservists were transferred to the Long
Term Reserve. Established in 1964, this service required reservists to deliver unpaid reserve duties
when mobilised until turning 45. However, reservists in the Long Term Reserve were not required to
participate in annual training and could only be mobilised by the Queen’s orders; cf. ibid.
699 ibid.
700 Please note that no Section C was listed in the 1975 Defence Estimates; cf. ibid., 115.
701 ibid., 58, and Irving Heymont, Analysis of the Army Reserve Systems of Israel, Canada, United Kingdom,
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands, Office of the Director for Planning and Evaluation,
and Department of Defense, 1977, accessed 15 April 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a0426
54.pdf, 23.
702 ibid.
703 ibid., including own calculations.
704 ibid.
705 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 115.
706 ibid.
707 Irving Heymont, Analysis of the Army Reserve Systems of Israel, Canada, United Kingdom, Federal
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to camp and out-of-camp exercises respectively.709
The TAVR’s main areas of employment were in the BAOR and the United Kingdom
Land Forces (UKLF), where reservists assumed critical and specialised duties in a sup-
plementary role to the regular forces;710 therefore, a reservist could be stationed either at
home or abroad, while the latter usually meant a transfer to the European continent, e.g.,
Germany.711 Moreover, TAVR reservists were also sent to support NATO headquarters in
Brussels or assigned to NATO commitments.712 In general, the TAVR could be mobilised
worldwide by the Queen’s order to combat an imminent threat to Britain or during national
emergencies.713 For warlike operations, on the other hand, the MoD planned to call up the
TAVR only if Section A of the Individual Reserve was fighting at full capacity.714
Ulster Defence Regiment. Besides the TAVR, the MoD maintained an additional vo-
lunteer reserve element, namely, the Ulster Defence Regiment.715 Stationed in Northern
Ireland, these reservists assumed great responsibilities in anti-terrorism operations, where
they supported their regular counterparts by safeguarding key infrastructures, serving at
checkpoints and participating in mobile patrols.716 As of August 1973, the Ulster Defence
Regiment also accepted applications from women.717 In line with the pre-#metoo senti-
ments, the government stipulated that women should be employed in two capacities;718
first, women were supposed to search other women for explosives.719 Second, they were
thought to relief men from administrative work to ensure that more men could be used for
operational duties.720
Reservists of the Ulster Defence Regiment were required to engage in training exercises
709 ibid.












on 12 days per year and to participate in twelve two hour training courses annually.721
Moreover, voluntary training opportunities were provided.722 Reservists could be mo-
bilised by the Queen’s order to serve in Northern Ireland or for defending the British
mainland in the event of an imminent territorial threat or severe emergencies.723 Whether
these training and mobilisation obligations included female reservists was not specified.724
3.2.1.3 Majury Review Recommendations
The so-called Majury Review commenced in March 1973 and was concluded exactly one
year later.725 Its primary purpose was to ‘tidy up’ the TAVR’s organisation following
its ‘rapid expansion’ in 1971 by determining if and where structural adjustments were
necessary.726 In this context, experts highlighted that especially the TAVR’s infantry
units needed reorganisation, which was thought to be best achieved through disbandment
and consolidation of units.727 Besides, the Majury Review recommended to improve the
TAVR’s integration with the regular force by adjusting training and recruitment.728 The
latter two were supposed to be synced with the regular units to ensure that the TAVR would
truly become a complementary force.729 Moreover, the experts recommended increasing
the TAVR’s training obligations from 27 days to 40 annually.730
Besides, the Majury Review also alluded to potential strategical adaptations.731 Experts,
for example, suggested that the TAVR’s reservists could be increasingly used in operations
in BAOR or Gibraltar to support and (or) relief regular forces.732 Generally speaking,
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Although these findings were already put together in a final report in March 1974, they were
not announced until 03 December 1974, namely, the same day the government informed
the parliament of the key findings of the Mason Review.734 Moreover, numerous Majury
Review suggestions were disregarded in the 1975 Mason Review.735 In retrospect, one can
only speculate as to why the incumbent Labour government proceeded in this manner. Yet,
when recalling that the Majury Review already commenced under the previous Conser-
vative administration, it is somewhat safe to conclude that Labour deliberately refrained
from using the Majury Review’s results as those might have resembled the Conservative’s
defence strategy. Although speculative, this reasoning is somewhat supported by a letter
written by Major General Strawson to District Commanders on 31 October 1974.736 Here,
Strawson insinuated that the government planned to keep a lid on the results until the
Mason Review’s key measures were announced in parliament.737
In the final version of the 1975 Mason Review, however, the government did mention
one crucial Majury Review point;738 namely, their intention to advance the TAVR’s
integration in regular units.739 Nevertheless, specific measures to facilitate this step were
not elaborated.740 In the 1976 Defence Estimates, the government again alluded to the
issue of integration and further claimed that the TAVR’s morale had to be reviewed.741 As
regards the latter, the Majury Review had attested that reservists were highly dedicated
and that the morale among the troops was good.742 Nevertheless, experts recommended
to introduce a training bounty in the TAVR to keep motivation high.743 Finally, the
1977 Defence Estimates discussed the implementation of some of the Majury Review’s
recommendations a bit more in detail.744 Here, the government stated that each TAVR
734 ibid., and Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 4.
735 cf. ibid.
736 Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review).
737 ibid.
738 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 16.
739 ibid.
740 ibid.
741 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976’, Secretary of State for Defence, 60.
742 Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review).
743 ibid.
744 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1977’, Secretary of State for Defence, 47.
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unit had been examined and some adjustments to their commitments had been made.745
One example mentioned in this context was the disbandment of the ‘44 Parachute Brigade
(V)’, whose attached service members had been assigned new roles.746 Moreover, it was
decided to assign two TAVR battalions and numerous subunits to regular counterparts.747
As regards the TAVR’s strategical focus, the Majury Review’s suggestion to increase
reservists’ commitments in BAOR was implemented by earmarking three TAVR battalions
to this operation.748
3.2.2 Royal Navy
Similar to the TAVR, the RN’s RNR underwent separate scrutiny, which was conducted at
the same time the government prepared the 1975 Mason Review.749 Coined the ‘Mitchell
Committee’, the Royal Naval Review Committee was instructed to examine the RNR’s
current roles and submit suggestions on how the RNR could be used in peacetime and
war;750 these estimates were supposed to deliver the basis for RNR planning for the next
20 years.751 On the following pages, the Mitchell Committee’s key findings are discussed
alongside the examination of reserve numbers. Moreover, the 1975 Mason Review and
subsequent Defence Estimates are processed to determine whether the government accepted
the Mitchell Committee’s recommendations.
3.2.2.1 Reserve Numbers
Development in Reserve Numbers. Previously, it was stated that the government as-
pired to let go of 5,000 RN troops until 1979.752 As seen Table 3.7, this conduct again
resulted in an increase of reservist numbers in the RN’s regular reserve, whose troop levels
slightly grew on average from 1975 through 1979. Coinciding with the mentioned troop





749 Stephan Howarth, The Royal Navy’s Reserves in War and Peace: 1903-2003, 137.
750 The Committee was named ‘after its chairman Rear Admiral G.C. Mitchell; ibid., 137-138.
751 ibid., 138.
752 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 16.
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reserve in this period.753
The volunteer reserve element, on the other hand, shows a moderate and steady decline as
of 1975.754 A reason to explain this observation can be inferred from the government’s
statement that RN’s overall troop levels were too low.755 Based on this information, it can
be concluded that recruitment and (or) retaining strategies were insufficient, which, in turn,
suggests that fewer numbers of civilians could be motivated to serve voluntarily.756
Table 3.7: Royal Navy Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Regular Reserve 23,400 25,000 26,800 27,700 28,000 130,900 26,180
Annual D in numbers n/a* 1,600 1,800 900 300 4,600 1,150
Annual D in per cent n/a* 6.84 7.20 3.36 1.08 n/a 4.62
Volunteer Reserve 7,700 7,500 7,100 7,200 7,400 36,900 7,380
Annual D in numbers n/a* -200 -400 100 200 -300 -75
Annual D in per cent n/a* -2.60 -5.33 1.41 2.78 n/a -0.94
Total Reserves 31,100 32,500 33,900 34,900 35,400 167,800 33,560
Annual D in numbers n/a* 1,400 1,400 1,000 500 4,300 1,075
Annual D in per cent n/a* 4.50 4.31 2.95 1.43 n/a 3.30
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Regular Reserve 30,100 29,700 30,300 29,100 ns. 119,200 29,800
Annual D in numbers 2,100 -400 600 -1,200 n/a 1,100 275
Annual D in per cent 7.50 -1.33 2.02 -3.96 n/a n/a 1.06
Volunteer Reserve 7,000 6,800 6,300 6,500 n.s 26,600 6,650
Annual D in numbers -400 -200 -500 200 n/a -900 -225
Annual D in per cent -5.41 -2.86 -7.35 3.17 n/a n/a -3.11
Total Reserves 37,100 36,500 36,600 35,600 n/a 14,5800 36,450
Annual D in numbers 1,700 -600 100 -1,000 n/a 200 50
Annual D in per cent 4.80 -1.62 0.27 -2.73 n/a n/a 0.18
*Baseline = 1970.
Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.
753 ibid.
754 cf. Table 3.7.
755 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 21.
756 Again, the Cadet Forces were deliberately committed in this analysis in order to focus the discussion on
the main reserve components.
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3.2.2.2 The Mitchell Committee’s Recommendations
Simultaneously to the overall defence review, the Mitchell Committee began its work on 01
March 1974.757 Consisting of two representatives from the RN and two from the RNR, the
committee was supposed to conduct a balanced review, which respected both the regulars’
and the volunteers’ demands.758 Based on the directive to realise the highest levels of
savings possible, dissolving the RNR was treated as a viable option.759 For two reasons,
however, the experts refrained from undertaking this step.760 First, the review revealed
that the RNR’s costs were lower than expected why a disbandment would not have created
significant economies.761 Second, the RNR’s value for the RN was believed to outweigh
the small cost-advantage dissolving the RNR would have delivered.762
It was, therefore, recommended to increase the employability of reservists in the regular
structures by strengthening reservists’ standing in the RN as a part-time component of
the force.763 To achieve this, the committee suggested three points; first, the RN was
supposed to assume direct command of the RNR by abolishing the post of the Second Sea
Lord.764 Second, reservists’ training needed to be adapted to ensure that the reserve was
prepared to support its regular counterpart both in peacetime and warlike operations.765
Third, reservists were supposed to occasionally substitute in regular units;766 preferably
in specialised roles such as medical care.767 Moreover, cost-advantages were thought to
be realised as of 1977 by hull-sharing of ships with the RN.768 This decision meant that
the RNR was about to lose some of its own ships, as they were transferred to the RN or
simply scrapped.769














Considering the Mitchell Committee submitted its recommendations on 01 December
1974, it is not surprising that the 1975 Mason Review, whose results were presented
only two days later, did not reference the Mitchell Committee’s conclusions in detail.770
Nevertheless, it was stated that a thorough review of the RNR was underway, which aimed
to ensure that the RN had sufficient numbers of reservists at its disposal for supporting and
specialised tasks.771
In the 1976 Defence Estimates, the government again briefly alluded to the RNR reform
by announcing that the RNR ‘will continue to have a sea-going role, primarily for mine-
countermeasures, but its size will be reduced [...]’.772 In the subsequent 1977 Defence
Estimates, the latter was marked as largely completed.773 Besides, the government an-
nounced that the transfer of command to the RN had been fully implemented and that
training had been adapted by 1977.774 The latter was described as having been redesigned
‘to provide support for commando forces including reinforcement of NATO’s northern
flank in mountain and arctic warfare’.775
3.2.2.3 Categories and Obligations of RN Reservists Post-1975
The RN’s regular reserve component was the Royal Fleet Reserve.776 It was about 5,000
troops strong in 1975 and consisted of individuals that had not reached age 45 and met
either of three characteristic;777 i.e., ex-regulars, who were transferred to the reserve upon
completion of their term, former regular troops who left service prematurely, and a limited
number of volunteers.778 Although the government did not stipulate a fixed liability,
reservists usually remained members of the reserve for three years.779 Moreover, if an
attack in Britain was imminent or happening, reservists could be mobilised for permanent
770 ibid, 138, and cf. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, 59, and 109 et seq.
771 Areas of employment listed by the 1975 Mason Review included support in minesweeping activities,
supplementing in maritime headquarters and specialist roles such as in linguistics; ibid., 110.
772 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976’, Secretary of State for Defence, 60.
773 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1977’, 46.
774 ibid., and 47.
775 ibid.





duty by the Queen’s or the Secretary of Defence’s orders respectively.780
The RN’s volunteer reserve element was composed of two main categories;781 namely, the
RNR and the Royal Marine Reserve (RMR).782 The former consisted of formed units as-
signed to selected NATO headquarters and eleven divisions that were stationed throughout
Britain and Northern Ireland.783 There was no minimum period of service required, but
the maximum serving period was limited to five years.784 In order to prepare reservists for
both peacetime and warlike operations, training was conducted on 14 consecutive days
annually.785 In addition to land-based exercises in the Sea Training Centres, reservists
received practical lessons on coastal minesweepers that were specifically attached to the
divisions’ centres.786 Reservists could be mobilised under two circumstances;787 either by
the Queen’s order in case of an imminent threat to Britain or by the Secretary of Defence
when an actual attack was underway.788
The RMR, on the other hand, was subdivided into five units, which recruited their staff
from ex-regular and civilian volunteers.789 Hence, in contrast to the RNR, the RMR was
only a semi-volunteer force. Again, no general fixed term commitment was required, but
reservists initially signed up for four years with an optional extension.790 The RMR offered
two options to fulfil training obligations;791 therefore, reservists could either participate in
evening and weekend classes or meet requirements in a two week long training course.792
Mobilisation followed the same procedures as the RNR’s.793
780 ibid.
781 In addition, there were non-seagoing volunteers of the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service and the Marchant
Navy. The latter consisted of civilian volunteers and civilian vessels; their training obligation was 28
per year. Moreover, the female counterpart of the RN was the Women’s Royal Naval Reserve; although
non-statutory in nature, characteristics mainly mirrored those of the RNR. Furthermore, civilian nurses
were recruited for the Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service Reserve; ibid., 59, and 111-112.
782 ibid.
783 The eleven divisions are (in alphabetical order): Clyde, Forth, London, Mersey, Severn, Solent, Sussex,












3.2.3 Royal Air Force
In contrast to the TAVR and the RNR, the RAF’s reservists were not subject to restructuring
efforts. However, for the sake of completeness, the RAF’s 1975 reservists are also discussed
briefly in the following pages.794
3.2.3.1 Reserve Numbers, Categories and Obligations
To get a better overview of the RAF’s reserve forces, Table 3.8 again highlights the
development of resists’ numbers between 1970 and 1979. Here, the figures show that
total troop strength decreased significantly in 1973 and again in 1978. However, when
considering that the government stipulated that the RAF had run a slight manpower surplus
for many years, it can be concluded that these two decreases did not hurt the RAF’s combat
strength.795
This estimate is further supported when taking a closer look at the RAF’s regular reserve,
whose obligations to serve, according to the government, were ‘exceptionally low’ in
1975.796 Hence, only a small number of ex-regulars, namely, 450 on average, were
mobilised for duty.797 Generally speaking, the MoD grouped regular reservists in three
categories;798 these were, the Royal Air Force Reserve of Officers (which included the
Women’s Royal Air Force Reserve of Officers), the Princess Mary’s Royal Air Force
Nursing Service Reserve, and retired RAF service members.799 Except for the latter, all of
the above were exempt from annual training obligations.800 Ex-regulars, on the other hand,
were supposed to participate in training for more than 15 days per year.801
As regards reservists’ liability to serve, all categories were earmarked for homeland defence
and worldwide deployments by the Queen’s order or in warlike operations if they had
794 Again, the Cadet Forces were deliberately committed in this analysis in order to focus the discussion on
the main reserve components.








Table 3.8: Royal Air Force Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Regular and Volunteer Reserve 32,600 31,600 32,400 30,700 30,800 158,100 31,620
Annual D in numbers n/a* -1,000 800 -1,700 100 -1,800 -450
Annual D in per cent n/a* -3.07 2.53 -5.25 0.33 n/a -1.36
RAuxAF 300 300 200 200 200 1,200 240
Annual D in numbers n/a* 0 -100 0 0 -100 -25
Annual D in per cent n/a* 0.00 -33.33 0.00 0.00 n/a -8.33
Total Reserves 32,900 31,900 32,600 3,0900 31,000 159,300 31,860
Annual D in numbers n/a* -1,000 700 -1700 100 -1,900 -475
Annual D in per cent n/a* -3.04 2.19 -5.21 0.32 n/a -1.43
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Regular and Volunteer Reserve 31,700 33,100 33,400 30,300 ns. 128,500 32,125
Annual D in numbers 900 1,400 300 -3,100 n/a -500 -125
Annual D in per cent 2.92 4.42 0.91 -9.28 n/a n/a -0.26
RAuxAF 300 300 300 300 n.s 1,200 300
Annual D in numbers 100 0 0 0 n/a 100 25
Annual D in per cent 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n/a n/a 12.50
Total Reserves 32,000 33,400 33,700 30,600 n/a 129,700 32,425
Annual D in numbers 1,000 1,400 300 -3,100 n/a -400 -100
Annual D in per cent 3.23 4.38 0.90 -9.20 n/a n/a -0.17
*Baseline = 1970.
Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.
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joined service before 01 April 1967.802
The RAF’s volunteer reserve elements, consisted of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve,
the Women’s Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, and the RAuxAF.803 Moreover, volunteer
reservists also served as officers in the training branch.804 Generally speaking, the majority
of RAF volunteer reservists worked as specialists and were supposed to support their
regular counterparts in emergencies.805 However, in the event of an attack on Britain
or in warlike operations, reservists were liable for permanent service both at home and
abroad.806 Therefore, similar to the regular reserve, allotted annual training periods were
supposed to last more than 15 days.807
3.3 Key Findings
1. The analysis of the 1975 Mason Review and the subsequent Defence Estimates
confirmed that the 1970s economic turmoil exercised significant influence on British
defence planning. In total, the MoD was burdened with economies that accounted
for £4.70 billion or 4.5 per cent of GNP.
2. Although empirical evidence was found for the impact of economic turmoil on Brit-
ish defence planning, the estimation of Britain’s 1970s defence budgets is somewhat
more complicated. On the one hand, the analysis demonstrated that defence expendit-
ure rose throughout the decade. On the other hand, most of the additional funding
was consumed by soaring inflation rates. Therefore, despite rising expenditure in
real terms, defence expenditure can be considered falling or stagnating on relative
terms.
3. The chapter demonstrated that Britain’s security environment was somewhat complex
in the 1970s. Although Britain was fully engaged in the détente negotiations, the
802 ibid.







government did not trust Soviet promises. Therefore, military planners were not
prepared to let down Britain’s guard and anxiously monitored developments in the
Soviet Union and her satellite states. Moreover, the chapter’s discussion showed that
Britain’s defence posture was overstretched as Britain was the major contributor to
European defence in the naval sphere and needed to address domestic terrorism in
Northern Ireland.
4. Although the TAVR (Majury Review) and the RNR (Mitchell Committee) were
subject to a reviewing process, neither these reviews nor the 1975 Mason Review
and subsequent Defence Estimates entailed plans to substantially change reservists’
roles and responsibilities. The only recommendation expressed was improving the
integration of the reserve components with their regular counterparts. As regards the
RAF, no reform attempts could be found in relevant government publications.
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Chapter 4
Germany’s 2012 Conception of Reserve
Die Bundeswehr versteht sich als Teil der Friedensbewegung.808
- Thomas de Maizière -809
The previous two chapters presented an evaluation of two British examples of reserve forces
reform in times of economic turmoil. In Chapter Two, the contemporary British example
was examined by considering the implications of the FR-2020 in the single services. In
this chapter, the FR-2020 German counterpart is evaluated. Here, the exploration is not
focused on the individual branches of the Bundeswehr but investigates the 2012-COR in
light of the suspension of conscription. Similar to the previous two chapters, this part of
the thesis also refers to government publications, defence budgets and personnel statistics
to evaluate whether the 2008 financial crisis exercised any influence on German defence
planning. Furthermore, Germany’s 2010 security environment is examined to highlight the
circumstance under which reservists operated and defence planning was conducted.
808 ‘The Bundeswehr considers itself to be a part of the peace movement’. Translated by the author;




809 German Defence Minister (2011-2013).
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4.1 The 2012 Conception of Reserve in Context
4.1.1 Envisaged Measures and Financial Considerations
4.1.1.1 The Review Process and Initial Recommendations
As of late 2010, the Bundeswehr entered a transformation process that would later become
known as the 2010 Bundeswehrreform.810 In the course of the review process, the MoD,
the 2010-CSR and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr articulated recommendations
that would aid in making the Bundeswehr both more proficient in military terms and more
efficient financially.
The 2009 General Election. The decision to embark on a new military reform was first
specified following the 2009 general election. After completing negotiations, the Conser-
vatives and the Liberals signed a coalition agreement in October 2009, which included the
intention to appoint an independent commission to review the Bundeswehr’s organisational
and administrative structures as regards their streamlining potential.811 Following these
initial demands, the cabinet further substantiated their plans in June 2010 by instructing
then-Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg to have the implications for Germany’s
operational capabilities evaluated if the total number of Zeit- and Berufssoldaten was to be
reduced by 40.000.812 To cater to both the coalition agreement’s mandate and the cabinet’s
decision, zu Guttenberg commissioned two independent reviewing boards to examine the
Bundeswehr.
The Commission on Structural Reform. The first commission he appointed was the
so-called 2010-CSR, which began their review in April 2010.813 Initially, the MoD did
810 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Chronologie der Neuausrichtung’, Bundesministerium der Vertei-
digung, accessed 04 March 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/poc/bmvg?uri=ci%3Abw.bmvg.sicherhei
tspolitik.bundeswehr.neuausrichtung.chronologie.
811 Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 17. Legislatur-
periode, Christlich Demokratische Union-Christlich Soziale Union-Freie Demokratische Partei, 2009,
124.
812 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (Bundes-
ministerium der Verteidigung, 2013), accessed 18 December 2013, http://www.ag-friedensforschung.d
e/themen/Bundeswehr/neuausrichtung-bericht.pdf, 6.
813 Jürgen Weise et al., Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010, 3.
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not provide detailed instructions as regards the review’s aims other than stating that the
Bundeswehr’s structures needed to be adapted to fit the demands of overseas deployments
better while taking into account that financial resources were limited.814 Moreover, based
on the coalition agreement, the 2010-CSR was indirectly informed that the government
wished to adhere to conscription.815 Later in the review, the cabinet’s June 2010 decision
to aim for reducing the number of Zeit- and Berufssoldaten by 40,000 was also added to
the analysis.816
The review was conducted between April and October 2010 and included recommend-
ations on how to streamline both the Bundeswehr’s structures as well as the MoD’s
organisation.817 By suggesting these measures, the 2010-CSR hoped that resources and re-
sponsibilities would eventually be allocated more efficiently.818 In addition, the 2010-CSR
focused on analysing the changing demands imposed on the Bundeswehr and its relation-
ship with society.819 By establishing a voluntary Wehrdienst and Zivildienst in lieu of
forcing young people into serving, the 2010-CSR expressed the hope to create a more
proficient force and to attract motivated volunteers.820 As regard reservists, the 2010-CSR
recommended conducting a separate review, which should focus on shifting responsibilities
to regional commands.821
The Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. Although the 2010-CSR had already begun
conducting their review in April 2010, the government decided to instruct the Inspector
General to develop further recommendations for reforming the Bundeswehr.822 In contrast
to the 2010-CSR, the given orders were rather specific. Based on the cabinet’s June 2010
decision, he was instructed to investigate if it was possible to reduce the total number of
814 cf. ibid., 3, 22, and 26.
815 ibid., and Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 124.
816 Jürgen Weise et al., Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010, 22.




821 Other areas reviewed included procurement and IT; however, as these areas are less relevant to this study,
the detailed mentioning has been omitted; cf. ibid., 43.
822 Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni
2010.
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Zeit- and Berufssoldaten by 40,000 without jeopardising the Bundeswehr’s capabilities.823
In his final report, the Inspector General emphasised that the intentions behind this number
were motivated by financial constraints.824 Although elaborating that Germany’s security
environment, international responsibilities and the Bundeswehr’s constitutional duty to
protect the citizens of Germany first and foremost determined the scope of the Bundes-
wehr’s capabilities, he specifically pointed out that ‘[t]he implications of the economic and
financial crisis will not be without consequences for the Bundeswehr’.825 He explained
this statement by highlighting that the defence budget was tied to the federal budget, which
had come under severe pressure following the 2008 financial crisis.826 Consequently, so
he argued, it was also the Bundeswehr’s responsibility to contribute federal economization
measures by realising economies and to remain affordable in the long term.827
To promote the demanded reduction of troops, and, therefore, to achieve the aspired
savings contributions, the Inspector General suggested five different strategy models.828
The starting number for each was 250,000, which represented the total number of troops
in 2010.829 This number included 195,000 Zeit- and Berufssoldaten, 25,000 voluntary
conscripts and 30,000 draftees;830 reservists were deliberately omitted in this analysis as the
Inspector General intended to leave the number of 2,500 mobilised reservist unchanged.831
From the proposed models, the Inspector General only recommended two, namely, the
fourth and the fifth.832 Both aimed at reducing the total number of troops, however, by
different means.833 Model Four, for instance, advocated the suspension of conscription
and constituted the more radical choice as it aspired to cut manpower by 86,500 in total.834
Model Five, on the other hand, suggested to adhere to the 40,000 reductions goal and
823 ibid., 4.
824 ibid., 16.
825 ibid., emphasis added. Translated by the author.
826 ibid.
827 ibid.




832 While the Inspector General discussed all five models, he did not recommend the other three as he was
convinced that implementation was not feasible and (or) productive; ibid., 33 et seq.
833 cf. ibid., 29.
834 ibid.
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proposed to adhere to the Wehrpflicht while abolishing the opportunity to serve as voluntary
conscripts.835
With these two recommendations, the Inspector General gave the government the chance
to choose between two strategies that would serve the desired outcome. More importantly,
however, by proposing two viable models, he abstained from advocating the suspension of
conscription and, therefore, left this decision to elected members of parliament.
4.1.1.2 Envisaged and Implemented Measures
The Suspension of Conscription. Although the coalition partners had agreed to adhere
to the Wehrpflicht and the Inspector General had provided the government with a viable
alternative, the Bundestag decided on 24 March 2011 to officially suspend conscription
as of 01 June 2011;836 effectively, draft had already been discontinued as of 01 March
2011.837
Even though it seems that it took little effort to end the Wehrpflicht, this decision stood
at the end of a fierce debate spanning several decades.838 Since reunification, and shortly
before 24 March 2011, the Conservatives, as well as the Social Democrats, affirmed their
commitment to draft.839 The Greens’ stances, on the other hand, were usually on the other
end of the political spectrum; in the early 1990s, they even demanded the disbandment of
the Bundeswehr.840 Finally, the Liberals traditionally demanded to stick to the Wehrpflicht
835 ibid.
836 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Aussetzung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht beschlossen’, Deutscher Bundestag,
accessed 29 January 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/33831649_kw12_de
_wehrdienst/.
837 Although parties from all political camps generally welcomed the suspension of conscription, opposition
parties regarded discontinuing of the draft as an arbitrary violation of GG Art. 12a(1) and accused
the cabinet accordingly; cf. ibid., and Ulf von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher
Aussenpolitik (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013), 331.
838 This debate has been analysed by consulting the election manifestos of all governing parties from 1990
through 2009.
839 For instance, in 1998, the Conservatives even proclaimed that a mixed force structure composed of
draftees, Zeit- and Berufssoldaten was the most suitable structure for the Bundeswehr in the years
to come; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1998-2002 Wahlplattform, Christlich Demokratische Union
Deutschlands (Bonn: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1998, 31.
840 Although remaining critical of the Bundeswehr, since 1998 demands were limited to terminating
conscription and the downsizing of manpower. Interestingly, after being elected as a junior coalition
partner into government in 1998, the party even dropped the conviction that the Bundeswehr should
not participate in collective military missions and eventually supported transformation efforts in the
early 2000s; see, for example, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Grün wirkt! Unser Wahlprogramm 2002-2006,
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Berlin: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2002).
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until they suddenly sided with The Greens in 2002.841
Considering this controversy, two opposing opinions on conscription had to be balanced
during the coalition negotiations of 2009. Keeping the upper hand, the Conservatives
successfully made their opinion prevail, and it was agreed to adhere to draft for the
simple reason that conscription had been useful in past decades.842 It is, therefore, hardly
surprising that this weak argument did not survive the 2010-CSR’s and the Inspector
General’s suggestions to terminate draft. However, presumably because of the political
controversies surrounding the subject, the government managed to end conscription without
genuinely eliminating the Wehrpflicht from the constitution. Instead of abolishing GG Art.
12a, it has merely been limited by Art. 2 of the German Compulsory Military Service Act,
which states that the Wehrpflicht is suspended but may be reinstated.843
The 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines. Based on the experts’ reports, and the following
suspension of conscription, the newly appointed Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière
published the 2011-DPG in May 2011.844 This document was intended to set the level
of ambition for the Bundeswehr and was, therefore, thought to also determine the Bun-
deswehr’s new structures and size.845 However, despite outlining that all of the above
were defined by Germany’s security environment and her responsibilities in defensive
alliances, finances again assumed a pivotal role here.846 For instance, it was stated that ‘[...]
[d]efence expenditure must be in keeping with the mission of the Bundeswehr and with all
other government commitments’;847 a statement, which was immediately relativised in
841 Even at times when the FDP did not oppose draft, they were the only party to explicitly acknowledged that
conscription represented the state’s intervention on the decision-making freedom of the individual; cf.,
F.D.P. Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Es ist Ihre Wahl: Das Programm der Liberalen zur Bundestagswahl 1998,
Freie Demokratische Partei (Sankt Augustin: liberal-Verlag, 1998), Archiv des Liberalismus, Electronic
Archive Signature IN5-40, 101, and FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bürgerprogramm 2002: Programm der
FDP zur Bundestagswahl 2002, Freie Demokratische Partei (2002), Archiv des Liberalismus, Electronic
Archive Signature IN5-110, 87.
842 cf. Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 124, and
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr,10.
843 In the government’s opinion, eliminating conscription from the legislature was not justifiable, as
politicians still considered draft an indispensable instrument to augment the force’s size on-short notice;
see, for example, Der Bundesminister, Eckpunkte für die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (Berlin:
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2011), 1.
844 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines.
845 ibid., 1.
846 ibid.
847 ibid., 9, emphasis added.
136
the same paragraph as authors continued to point out that ‘[...] the defence budget also
contributes to the national task of consolidating the federal budget, thus reducing the debt
burden of future generations’.848
Planned Redundancies. Other than merely stating its willingness to contribute to con-
solidation efforts of the federal budget, the MoD did not specify how it intended to uphold
this promise. However, when examining the proposed structural changes, one can infer
that economizations were supposed to be achieved primarily through redundancies.849 As
illustrated in Table 4.1, both service members as well as civilian staff were subject to these
plans. As regards the former, the Bundeswehr was given some leeway as envisaged reduc-
tions varied between 65,000 and 90,000. Here, the MoD hoped to achieve the majority of
cuts by ceasing draft and by recruiting fewer voluntary conscripts. This measure alone was
believed to reduce the total number of troops by 42,500. Moreover, in contrast to civilian
staff, which is usually laid-off in costly redundancy schemes, the reduction in troops was
planned to be achieved at lower costs by merely terminating draft.
Table 4.1: Total Numbers of MoD Personnel (2010 and Aspired)
Status Aspired Numbers Aspired Numbers
(2010) (Maximum) (Preferred)
Total Number of Troops 250,000 185,000 160,000
Total Number of Civilian Employees 104,000 55,000 55,000
Zeit- & Berufssoldaten 195,000 170,000 145,000
Conscripts 30,000 0 0
Volunteer Conscripts 25,000 15,500 12,500
Mobilised Reservists* 2,500 2,500 2,500
*Not included in total.
Sources: The German Ministry of Defence and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr.
848 ibid., 9.
849 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr, 47-48.
137
4.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure in Context
4.1.2.1 Personnel Costs
On the previous pages, it was demonstrated that the MoD intended to realise required
economies by implementing redundancies. Considering that personnel costs accounted for
approximately 30 per cent of the defence budget, it should be expected that the envisaged
cuts in troops and civilian staff would serve the purpose of reducing defence expenditure.850
As highlighted in Table 4.2, expenditure on salaries fluctuated between 2007 and 2010;
however, the general trend shows that these costs tended to increase rather than decrease
during this period. At this time, inflation was 1.5 per cent, which partially explains the
rise in costs.851 However, as illustrated in Table 4.3, salaries rose exponentially by 8.8 per
cent in 2012 ; a development, which cannot be blamed on inflation. Interestingly, the year
after, costs dropped by the same percentage and further declined by a stunning 35.6 per
cent in 2014. Thereafter, the increase in salary expenditure stabilised at the contemporary
inflation rate.852
Table 4.2: Annual Service Members Salaries in Million Euros (2006-2010)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Conscripts & Volunteer Conscripts 427.80 420.50 466.80 466.80 473.70
Reservists 18.40 16.50 18.10 20.30 22.0
Zeit- & Berufssoldaten 5,353.10 5,492.70 5,616.70 5,835.30 5,818.6
Civilian Employees 4,038.00 3,837.00 3,978.20 3,942.50 3,831.00
Â 9,837.20 9,766.70 10,079.80 10,264.90 10,145.30
Annual D in per cent n/a* -0.70 3.20 1.80 -1.20
*Baseline = 2006.
Source: The German Federal Ministry of Finance, including own calculations.
Although this sudden increase and subsequent substantial decrease appear profound, these
developments can be explained by the implementation of the envisaged redundancies.
850 cf. Stefan Bayer, ‘Der Einzelplan 14: Theoretische Bestimmungsgründe und praktische Ausgestaltung
des Verteidigungshaushaltes’, ed. Ina Wiesner (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 253 et seq.
851 OECD, Inflation (CPI) (Indicator).
852 ibid.
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Table 4.3: Annual Service Members Salaries in Million Euros (2011-2015)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Volunteer Conscripts 326.60 215.90 128.10 119.30 124.60
Reservists 22.60 22.30 21.10 20.20 21.60
Zeit- & Berufssoldaten 5,910.40 6,084.40 6,147.20 6,201.30 6,297.80
Civilian Employees 3,800.50 4,626.20 3,693.30 95.10 89.90
Â 10,060.00 10,948.80 9,989.80 6,435.90 6,533.80
Annual D in per cent -0.80 8.80 -8.80 -35.60 1.50
Source: The German Federal Ministry of Finance, including own calculations.
For instance, civilian staff was reduced from 104,000 to 96,600 in 2013; 853 here, the
accompanying redundancy scheme first drove up costs, while it subsequently resulted in
lower overall costs. Furthermore, salaries for draftees and volunteer conscripts fell by 70
per cent between 2006 and 2015; a development, which must mainly be attributed to the
suspension of conscription and the lower hiring numbers of volunteer conscripts.
4.1.2.2 Defence Spending in Real Terms
As part of the post-2008 federal austerity package, the defence budget was to be cut by
C8.40 billion.854 These economies were planned to be realised over the course of four
years and consisted of C4.00 billion in savings in the Bundeswehr, as well as of cuts worth
C4.4 billion in the MoD.855 Assuming that economies were to be spread equally over this
period, the defence budget would have needed to decrease by approximately C2.10 billion
annually.
When considering the absolute numbers summarised in Table 4.4, the MoD seemed to
have failed this goal in 2011 and 2012 and even increased spending by C0.30 billion and
853 Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni
2010, 43.
854 Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ‘Tableau der Sparmaßnahmen’. Bundesministerium der Finanzen,
accessed 31 March 2014, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Theme
n/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/2010-06-07-solide-finanzen-Anlage.pdf?__blob=publicatio
nFile&v=3.
855 Interestingly, the Ministry of Finance did not demand C4.00 billion to be cut in the Bundeswehr per se,
e.g., by merely decreasing procurement costs, but labelled this measure ‘Reform of the Armed Forces’,
thus implying that the 2010 Bundeswehrreform create aspired savings; cf. ibid.
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C1.50 billion respectively. Nonetheless, these numbers must be treated with caution as
hidden costs have contributed to distorting the defence budget. One factor was the decision
to sell off MoD realty to the Institute for Federal Real Estate as of 2011.856 Although
this attempt aimed to concentrate resources and expertise in the appropriate hands within
the state apparatus, it consequently meant that the MoD had to pay rent for property it
previously owned;857 therefore, inflating defence expenditure artificially.
Table 4.4: Federal Defence Expenditure (2010-2014)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Â x
Federal Expenditure
In C billions 316.90 313.80 319.40 310.00 296.50 1,277.60 255.50
Inflation Rate
In per cent 1.10 2.10 2.00 1.50 0.90 n/a 1.50
Defence Expenditure
In C billions 31.70 32.00 33.50 33.30 32.40 162.90 32.60
Annual D in per cent n/a* 0.90 4.80 -0.60 -2.70 n/a 0.60
In per cent of Federal Expenditure 10.00 10.20 10.50 10.70 10.90 n/a 10.30
Planned MoD Expenditure
As planned, in C billions 31.70 29.10 27.00 24.90 22.80 103.90 27.10
*Baseline = 2010.
Sources: The German Ministry of Finance, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.
While realty is necessary for the MoD and the Bundeswehr to carry out their duties, other
hidden costs distorting were defence budget is pensions. These account for more than 14.00
per cent of defence expenditure on average.858 When considering that these payments
merely constitute a cost factor without contributing to defence per se, this number is quite
a burden for the defence budget.859 The government even shared this reasoning until
2005, when pensions had traditionally been summarised in Budget Section 33, Versorgung,
856 Bundesrechnungshof, Bemerkungen 2013: Zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes (Bonn:
Bundesrechnungshof, 2013), 5-6.
857 cf. ibid.
858 Based on expenditure between 2007 and 2017; cf. Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ‘Die Struktur des
Bundeshaushaltes’, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 15 January 2016, https://www.bundesha
ushalt-info.de, and Stefan Bayer, ‘Der Einzelplan 14: Theoretische Bestimmungsgründe und praktische
Ausgestaltung des Verteidigungshaushaltes’, 253-255.
859 cf. ibid.
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which included pensions for all branches of government.860 This, however, changed as
of 2006, when the individual branches of government were suddenly required to finance
pension payments for their former staff from their budgets. Again, a reallocation of funds
and responsibilities worked as a disadvantage for the MoD.
To compensate for these distortions, Bayer has argued to deduct pension payments from
defence spending.861 Although the author basically agreed with Bayer’s argument, she
decided not to deduct these costs as they have to be paid by some branch of government
anyhow. Nevertheless, to get a better understanding of expenditure in real terms, MoD
spending was examined in the light of inflation. As illustrated in Table 4.4, total defence
spending was C32.6 billion on average between 2010 and 2015. When factoring in inflation
and the aspired economies of C2.10 billion annually, defence expenditure should not have
exceeded C27.5 billion on average per annum. This suggests that the MoD, on average,
fell C5.10 billion short of the stipulated savings goal. Moreover, this also implies that the
achieved economies described in Table 4.2 were only of marginal effect as regards overall
defence spending.
4.1.3 The Security Environment
4.1.3.1 Territorial and Ideological Security Environment
In addition to examining financial aspects, evaluating the contemporary security envir-
onment was deemed vital for assessing reserve forces reforms. Therefore, Germany’s
territorial and ideological security environments in 2010 are explored on the following
pages.As previously mentioned, a country’s geographical location and political allegiance
are essential in determining its territorial security environment. As regards geography,
Germany is a semi-landlocked country with access to the North and Baltic Sea in the
north.862 Both land and sea border are with allied or friendly countries. Moreover, except
for neutral Switzerland in the south, all neighbouring countries are EU members and
860 cf. Pre-2006 federal budgets: Sections 14, and 33.
861 Stefan Bayer, ‘Der Einzelplan 14: Theoretische Bestimmungsgründe und praktische Ausgestaltung des
Verteidigungshaushaltes’, 253-255.
862 cf. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Fact Book: Germany’.
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four of the six are even in NATO.863 In contrast to the Cold War, when countries of
the Warsaw Pact were directly bordering Germany, this post-2008 constellation suggests
that an imminent attack with conventional means is improbable. In contrast to Britain,
where the government perceived defensive alliances as a tool to shape the world, these
international organisations assume a dominant role in Germany’s strategic thinking.864
In the 2011-DPG, Germany defined her national security strategy based on her member-
ship in these alliances and deemed them crucial for her national security.865 Moreover,
the government seemed to be convinced that in today’s complex security environment,
individual countries cannot provide sufficient levels of security for their citizens alone but
are depended on international military co-operation.866
In addition to the government’s stance, national legislation makes memberships imperative.
As stated in GG Art. 87a(2), Bundeswehr troops can merely be deployed for national
defence, e.g., when German territory is under attack from a foreign aggressor. Until 1994,
the government strictly adhered to this notion, why administrations largely abstained from
engaging in international conflicts;867 even when missions were conducted collectively
under NATO command.868 This strict interpretation of GG Art. 87a(2) was only discarded
in 1994 when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the GG Art. 24(2) permits the
deployment of Bundeswehr troops under the umbrella of defensive alliances when the
majority of the Bundestag consents;869 however, unilateral overseas deployments remained
illegal.870 It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the MoD has emphasised that Germany’s
engagement in international conflicts be limited to defensive alliances’ missions.871
While this approach makes sense as regards national legislation, it also poses a threat
as Germany is perceived as a part of defensive alliances whose members also engage in
overseas deployments without the UN’s consent, e.g., the United States’ missions in Iraq.
863 European Union, ‘Countries’, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO Member Countries’.
864 cf. German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 6-8.
865 ibid.
866 ibid.




871 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 5-8.
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Therefore, although not participating, Germany is also a potential target for the adversaries
fought by her international partners.
4.1.3.2 Major Military Commitments
In general, military commitments are a highly controversial topic in Germany; even the
ones fought in the context of joint deployments. This controversy mainly came to light
in the campaign for the general election of 2002.872 At the time, the United States was
trying to convince her allies to join her in the attempt to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq.873
During the campaign, both the Conservatives and Liberals expressed their dismay as
regards military intervention in Iraq;874 however, they affirmed their full support of the
United States in case a mission was to be conducted based on a United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) resolution.875 The Social Democrats and The Greens, on the other hand,
went as far as to state that they would reject sending Bundeswehr troops to Iraq in any case,
even if the United States requested support based on a UNSC resolution.876
Afghanistan. Despite these political disputes and the public’s aversion to war, Germany
was engaged in one major armed conflict at the time the 2010 Bundeswehrreform was
planned, namely, in Afghanistan.877 Coinciding with the review process, the mission
reached its peak as regards Germany’s contribution of troops and costs between 2010
and 2012. Then, 5,350 service members, including approximately 535 reservists, served
in Afghanistan and expenditure reached an annual average of C1.20 billion.878 In total,





877 Based on this anti-war ticket, which apparently struck a nerve with the general public, and due to the
conservative candidate’s lack of empathy for the victims of a major flood Gerhard Schröder (Social Demo-
crats) won the 2002 general election.; ibid, 96-97, and Citha D. Maaß, ‘Die Afghanistan-Mission der
Bundeswehr’, SWP-Studie S 27, (2007): 78-87, accessed 07 March 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fil
eadmin/contents/products/studien/2007_S27_mrs_ks.pdf, 78, ‘Nach dem Wahlsieg: Bush hat Schröders
Entschuldigung nicht akzeptiert’, Spiegel Online, 23 September 2002, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/a
usland/nach-dem-wahlsieg-bush-hat-schroeders-entschuldigung-nicht-akzeptiert-a-215312.html, 23
December 2017, and Michael Stürmer, ‘Als Schröder Stoiber im Hochwasser versenkte’, Welt,
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article108607179/Als-Schroeder-Stoiber-im-Hochwasser-ve
rsenkte.html, 23 December 2017.
878 ‘Aus der aktuellen "Loyal": Profis der Reserve’, Reservistenverband, 2014, accessed 05 January 2015,
https://www.reservistenverband.de/Archiv?menu=0299&newsid=28691, including own calculations,
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the engagement in NATO’s ISAF mission lasted from 2002 through 2014 and was sub-
sequently replaced in 2015 by NATO’s Operation Resolute Support.879 To this mission,
the Bundeswehr currently contributes 1,136 troops including 66 reservists;880 a number,
which constitutes a decline in reservists’ deployment from ten per cent to nearly six per
cent.881
The Nature of the Commitment. Being stationed in Afghanistan’s north, the Bundes-
wehr, at first, operated in a slightly more stable environment than her NATO partners
in the south.882 However, conditions gradually worsened, why the contingent of troops
was more than doubled from the initial 1,200 to 3,000 in 2006.883 In addition to the
increasing tension, the operation’s de facto leader, the United States, but also other al-
lies, began to vehemently express their demands for the Bundeswehr to shift its focus
from mere supportive contributions to actively engaging in combat.884 While this request
was certainly warranted, it posed quite a challenge to the government as certain German
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) had announced that they would withdraw from
Afghanistan if the advertised humanitarian character of the mission should change to
emphasising combat.885 Therefore, complete compliance with allies’ demands would
potentially have jeopardised the success of ongoing civil and developmental projects.886
To cater to both allied and domestic expectations, the MoD went for the middle ground
and started focusing on developing and conducting a sophisticated training course for local
Afghan police forces in addition to increasing Germany’s contribution to fighting Afghan
and ‘15 Jahre Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan’, bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016,
accessed 19 December 2016, https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verteidigungspolitik/2
38332/15-jahre-afghanistan-einsatz, including own calculations.
879 ibid., and cf. Citha D. Maaß, ‘Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr’.
880 Status: 02 July 2018; Bundeswehr, ‘Einsatzzahlen - die Stärke der deutschen Kontingente’, Bundeswehr,






881 ibid., including own calculations.
882 Citha D. Maaß, ‘Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr’, 81.
883 ‘15 Jahre Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan’, bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
884 Citha D. Maaß, ‘Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr’, 81, and 83.




Influence on the 2010 Bundeswehrreform. Constituting the first major overseas deploy-
ments of Bundeswehr troops in postwar Germany, the Afghanistan mission has truly been
a turning point for the parliament, the public and the Bundeswehr alike. However, while
politicians and civil society quarrelled at home over the necessity of the mission and the
scope of contribution, service members in the theatre had to fulfil their duties based on
outdated structures and strategies.
As argued by Wiesner, such a constellation can be an impetus for adapting structures and
training as overseas deployments tend to uncover the shortcomings in defence postures.888
In the case of the 2010 Bundeswehrreform, this reasoning holds true when revisiting Table
4.1. Here, it was highlighted that emphasis shifted from a conscription-based Bundeswehr
to an all-volunteer force which was eventually supposed to be comprised of 90 per cent Zeit-
and Berufssoldaten. Moreover, by suspending conscription and hiring significantly less
voluntary conscripts, resources and training can be used almost exclusively on experienced
service members; an approach, which has the potential to increase proficiency and the
likelihood of successful engagements in global theatres.
Notwithstanding the structural adaptations, these cannot solely be attributed to the Afgh-
anistan mission. These shortcomings have already been acknowledged in 2004 when
then-Defence Minister Peter Struck advocated a Bundeswehrreform aiming to increase
capabilities for the ongoing ISAF operation.889 Only after the occurrence of the 2008
financial crisis and subsequent financial constraints, the government seemed to have had
the courage to profoundly change the Bundeswehr’s structures to finally cater to a mission
that had been going on for more than eight years.
4.1.3.3 Anticipated Threats
Globalisation and New Technologies. While the Afghanistan mission played a minor
role in envisaging the new Bundeswehr structures, the MoD pointed out that Germany’s
887 ibid., 83.
888 cf. Ina Wiesner, ‘Die Transformation der Bundeswehr in Deutschland’, eds. Thomas Jäger, and Ralph
Thiele, (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 100-101.
889 Peter Struck, Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr, 12.
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security environment consisted of additional threats that needed to be taken into account.
For instance, when consulting the 2011-DPG, it appears that globalisation was a central
security concern for the German government.890 Although this development was originally
judged to be favourable as is has the potential to spread progress and prosperity around
the globe, negative implications were anxiously observed.891 One factor mentioned in this
context is organised crime, which is believed to have risen significantly by piggybacking
on the increased flow of goods, capital and people.892 Moreover, globalisation is attributed
with the accelerated development and distribution of new technologies, which, in turn, has
also lead to a great public dependency on the former.893 Therefore, cyber attacks were
specifically mentioned as a novel threat to Germany.894
Globalisation and Emerging Powers. In addition to these developments, globalisation
accompanying shifts in the political equilibrium were rated as particularly worrying.895
Here, it is believed that the behaviour and attitudes of newly emerging regional and global
powers cannot be anticipated as they do not have a long-standing history of involvement in
the international community.896 Moreover, it was argued that with the rise of economic
power, e.g., in China, far-reaching political decisions are made that are outside the sphere
of European influence;897 therefore, creating a high degree of uncertainty for national
security strategists.
Failed States and Climate Change. While globalisation is described in somewhat ab-
stract terms, threats emerging from the increasing number of failing states and climate
890 cf. German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines,1.
891 ibid.
892 cf. Patrick Ernst Sensburg, ‘Die neue Sicherheitslage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Fließende
Grenzen von innerer und äußerer Sicherheit’, ed. Patrick Ernst Sensburg (Frankfurt Main: Verlag für
Polizeiwissenschaft, 2010), 7 et seq.
893 ibid., 2-3, and SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and GMF The German Marshall Fund of the
United States, ‘Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung: Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheit-
spolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch’, accessed 26 April 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/con
tents/products/projekt_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhpol_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf, 2.
894 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 2.
895 Heinrich Kreft, ‘Deutschland, Europa und der Aufstieg der neuen Gestaltungsmächte’ (bpb Bundeszen-





change are already at Germany’s doorstep.898 Starting in 2015, Germany has experienced
a substantial influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and North African countries.
In total, 1.3 million asylum seekers have crossed the border between 2015 and 2017, which
represents an increase of 292 per cent in comparison to 2012 through 2014.899 Although
this development seems surprising at first, the MoD had already anticipated this situation
in 2011 by pointing out that war and climate change may cause mass migration towards
Europe.900
Besides, the potential rise of terrorism has been attributed to failed states. For instance,
the MoD has argued in the 2011-DPG that political instability and (or) power vacuums
may enable terrorist organisations to foster their networks and to plan future attacks in the
West.901 As predicted by the government, both scenarios have become a reality. As of
2013, the so-called Islamic State has taken root in numbers Arab countries, including Syria
and Iraq.902 Moreover, between 2015 and 2017, the number of terror attacks in Europe has
surged to 26, with Germany being a target in four.903
Political Challenges. Even though the government was able to predict specific develop-
ments, the ability to tackle them is more complicated. As seen above, these relatively novel
threats make distinguishing between external and internal threats merely impossible.904
While one can argue that this distinction is of secondary importance when it comes to
protecting civilians, it is quite important in the legal context. As stated in GG Art. 73(1),
the federal government in Berlin is responsible for defence on the national level; however,
it has only limited jurisdiction when it comes to domestic security. Here, the Grundgesetz
898 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 1.
899 bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, ‘Zahlen zu Asyl in Deutschland’, bpb Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, accessed 08 June 2018, https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/218788/z
ahlen-zu-asyl-in-deutschland#Antraege, including own calculations.
900 cf. German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 2-3, and SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, and GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung:
Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch’, 33.
901 German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 2-3.
902 ‘Chronologie: Der syrische Bürgerkrieg im Überblick’, Zeit Online, 12 April 2018, http://www.suedde
utsche.de/politik/chronologie-der-syrische-buergerkrieg-im-ueberblick-1.2652348, 12 April 2018.
903 ‘Terroranschläge in Europa seit 2015’.
904 cf. Herfried Münkler, ‘Die neue Sicherheitslage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, ed. Patrick Ernst
Sensburg (Frankfurt Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2010), 99-105, and Ingo Wolf, ‘Die Grenzen
innerer und äußerer Sicherheit im föderalen System Deutschlands’, ed. Patrick Ernst Sensburg (Frankfurt
Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2010), 19.
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specifically emphasises that the federal government, and, therefore, the Bundeswehr cannot
unilaterally take action but must closely collaborate with and work under the leadership
of the individual Bundesland’s civilian forces, e.g., the policy. While this article was
thought to aid in preventing a military coupe and avoiding the concentration of power in
the hands of the parliament in Berlin, it makes dealing with the threats as mentioned earlier
somewhat more challenging.
4.2 The 2012 Conception of Reserve
4.2.1 Revised Structures for Homeland Defence
4.2.1.1 Commitments and Responsibilities
In October 2010, authors of the 2010-CSR had recommended to complement the 2010
Bundeswehrreform with a separate review of the Bundeswehr’s reserve force.905 In
response to this suggestions, the 2012-COR was published less than two years later
in February 2012.906 Primarily building on the organisational foundation of the 2003
Conception for Reservists (2003-CFR), which was implemented between 2003 and 2009,
the MoD decided to expand reservists’ responsibilities in both the military and the societal
sphere.907
Definition and Term of Commitment. Before delving into the specifics of the 2012-COR,
however, the term reservist should be defined first. In Germany, the Legal Status of Re-
servists Act (LSRA), as well as the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act (LSMPA) Art.
59 et seq., are concerned with matters of the reserve. For instance, in LSRA Art. 1(1) and
LSMPA Art 59(2) the law defines which group of people are considered reservists: upon
completion of their term (Zeitsoldaten) or retirement (Berufssoldaten), former service
members automatically enter the reserve if they had served for a minimum of two years.
In peacetime, a reservist may be called for duty until s/he turns 45;908 however, former
905 Jürgen Weise et al., Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010, 43.
906 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve.
907 cf. ibid.
908 LSRA Art. 1(1), and LSMPA Art 59(2).
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service members may request in writing to be considered for duty until they reach 65
years of age.909 In the case of national defence, e.g., war or rising tensions at the borders,
reservists are required to be ready to serve until they are 60.910
Training and Military Commitments. Depending on the rank one held as a Zeit- or
Berufssoldat, training commitments vary between a maximum of six months (all ranks),
nine months (non-commissioned officers) and 12 months (commissioned officers).911
Beyond training, which is not necessarily held periodically, reservists may be called for
duty in regular Bundeswehr units.912 Here, they serve in any role within the Bundeswehr’s
organisation;913 in total, 2,500 posts in regular units are assigned to reservists annually.914
In general, the MoD can only mobilise reservists to carry out military duties in Bundeswehr
departments that are based in Germany.915 If a reservist wants to serve abroad, e.g., in
Afghanistan, s/he has to request this assignment specifically;916 these kinds of deployments
are not supposed to exceed seven months.917
Non-Military Responsibilities. Outside military structures, reservists may be mobil-
ised to help in domestic emergencies such as natural disasters for a maximum of three
consecutive months.918 However, in this case, neither the Bundestag nor the MoD can
unilaterally decide to deploy troops.919 Due to Germany’s federalist structure, the handling
of regional crises are in the jurisdiction of the Bundesländer;920 only when specifically re-
quested by the Bundesland’s government, reservists may support local crisis relief units.921
Besides domestic crisis aid, reservists may also be mobilised and deployed to lend sup-
909 ibid.
910 ibid.
911 ibid., Art. 61.
912 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 3.
913 ibid.
914 Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, ‘Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangele-
genheiten der Bundeswehr’, Reserve Aktuell, No 5 (2013): 6.
915 ibid., Art. 60.
916 LSMPA Art. 62(2).
917 ibid.
918 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 3, and LSMPA Art. 63(2).
919 LSMPA Art. 63(1).
920 GG Art. 35.
921 ibid.
149
port in humanitarian crises abroad;922 again, deployment is limited to three consecutive
months.923
Further to carrying out military and humanitarian duties when mobilised, non-mobilised
reservists are also required to volunteer for the Bundeswehr. Here, the 2012-COR explicitly
highlights their role of agents of the Bundeswehr.924 In this role, they are supposed to
continually try to foster the ties between the armed forces and civil society.925 They may
be entitled to compensation for their efforts, e.g. when giving speeches or participating in
official Bundeswehr events; 926 this includes monthly payments of up to C160.00 and the
supply of service clothing, as well as the provision of relevant materials, free of charge.927
Ungediente in the Reserve. Besides former service members, LSRA Art. 1(2) states
that Ungediente may become reservists; however, they specifically have to enlist for reserve
duty.928 This article supports the MoD’s intention to increasingly recruit Ungediente for
the Bundeswehr’s reserve.929 As emphasised in the 2012-COR, the MoD aims to motivate
Ungediente to join the reserve in specialists’ roles to broaden the Bundeswehr’s scope of
capabilities without having to invest in intensive and costly training.930
Nevertheless, even unskilled Ungediente are being targeted by the Bundeswehr’s recruit-
ment team. A pilot course called Allgemeine Grundausbildung is being held in Bavaria
since 2017, which provides modular basic military training on weekends for interested
Ungediente;931 reservists teach this course.
922 LSMPA Art. 63a.
923 ibid.
924 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 3.
925 ibid.
926 LSRA Art. 7.
927 ibid.
928 cf. LSRA Art. 1(2).
929 cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 3.
930 ibid.
931 cf. Bundeswehr. ‘Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr’, Die Dienststellen der







4.2.1.2 Reservists in Regular Bundeswehr Units
In total, the 2012-COR requires 58,580 reservists to be trained for duty.932 Training is
conducted to qualify reservists to serve in two different roles within regular Bundeswehr
units.933 First, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, a total of 26,700 reservists is prepared to fill
positions that are normally held by Zeit- or Berufssoldaten.934 These posts include those
that are vacant due to service members’ deployments or mere shortage in manpower.935
These positions are filled from a pool of reservists called the personnel reserve.936 These
posts have not specifically been created for reservists;937 therefore, the personnel reserve
has somewhat of a supplemental character as reservists mirror regular troops’ responsibilit-
ies.938 Nevertheless, serving in these positions is indispensable as reservists contribute to
the Bundeswehr’s ability to maintain current levels of operation.939
In addition to their supplementary roles, reservists also hold posts that have been designed
for reservists only;940 this pillar of the reserve is called the reinforcement reserve.941 As
seen in Figure 4.1, a total of 31,880 reservists comprise this personnel pool.942 These
posts are usually filled with reservists that have acquired skills that the Bundeswehr does
not possess at all or only to insufficient levels.943 Employing reservists in these roles,
therefore, expands the Bundeswehr’s abilities and allows to cover the full required spectrum
of capabilities.944
Both the personnel and reinforcement reserve are designed to ensure prompt support for
regular units and posts are allocated depending on the individual reservist’s skills and
932 Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, ‘Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangele-




936 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 11.
937 ibid.
938 cf. Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, ‘Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservisten-




942 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 11.
943 Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, ‘Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangele-
genheiten der Bundeswehr’, 6.
944 cf. ibid.
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knowledge.945 On average, the federal budget assigns 2,500 posts annually to reservists,
who then serve alongside Zeit- and Berufssoldaten.946 As the obligation to serve is limited,
one post is held by several reservists throughout the year.
Figure 4.1: Reservists in Regular Bundeswehr Units
Personnel Reserve &




4.2.1.3 The Three Pillars of the Reserve
Reservists carrying out their duties in the personnel or the reinforcement reserve are usually
categorised as members of the troop reserve.947 Moreover, they are commonly linked to
a specific regular unit.948 As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the troop reserve is one of three
pillars that together comprise the Bundeswehr reserve. The second pillar is the so-called
general reserve.949 It constitutes a pool of reservists, who have not been mobilised.950 Its
purpose is to ensure that the Bundeswehr has a sufficient number of troops at its disposal
in the long term.951 Members of this category usually carry out the duty of serving as
agents of the Bundeswehr in society or other volunteer work.952 The third pillar is the
territorial reserve;953 reservists in this category usually have a strong connection to a
specific region and are employed to foster civil-military co-operation.954 The territorial
reserve is further seen to enable medium term augmentation of the Bundeswehr. Moreover,
945 cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 27-28.
946 cf. Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ‘Haushaltsrechnung und Vermögensrechnung des Bundes’,
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 28 September 2014, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.d
e/Web/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/Haushalts_und_Vermoegensrechnungen
_des_Bundes/haushalts_vermoegensrechnungen_des_bundes.html.









since the implementation of the 2012-COR, the territorial reserve is also home to the newly
created RSSU; therefore, the territorial reserve is discussed in greater detail later in this
chapter.







4.2.1.4 Filling the Gap: Reservists and Homeland Defence
The Conscription Gap. Still in 2011, the government has emphasises that the Bun-
deswehr’s primary duty is homeland defence, namely, the protection of German citizens
during an armed conflict aiming to harm the nation’s territorial integrity.955 While this is
undoubtedly the most important responsibility for national armed forces, reality shows
a different de facto responsibilities focus. As previously discussed, the Bundeswehr has
been more actively engaged in overseas deployments, namely, in Afghanistan since 2002.
In doing so, resources, especially those of Zeit- and Berufssoldaten, became bound in
international commitments. When draft was still enforced, the MoD could rely on a vast
pool of former conscripts to ensure territorial defence in case of emergencies;956 however,
with the suspension of conscription in 2011, the MoD lost this valuable instrument.
To prevent the emergence of a capabilities gap, the 2012-COR, therefore, specifically
assigned the responsibility for homeland defence to the territorial reserve; 957 here, the
establishment of the RSSU concept was believed to aid this responsibility.958
955 cf. German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines, 8.
956 Thomas Wollney, ‘Enge Integration der Reserve in aktive Strukturen’, ed. Hans Frank (Hamburg: Mittler,
2005), 80.
957 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 3 and 10.
958 ibid.
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What is Homeland Defence? Before explaining the RSSU in detail, it is necessary
to explore how the MoD defined homeland defence. Traditionally, particularly until
2012, the government referred to homeland defence as Landesverteidung. As of the
2012-COR, however, this term was replaced by the word Heimatschutz.959 Although these
expressions are generally interchangeable, authors of the 2012-COR have specified that
the latter entails duties beyond the protection of the national territory.960 In particular, the
2012-COR mentions military obligations that can be carried out on German soil. These
include aerial and naval surveillance, securing critical infrastructure in case of terror or
cyber attacks, as well as assistance to civilian forces, e.g., the police.961 According to the
MoD, assigning these duties to the reserve takes pressure off regular troops, who then do
not have to cater to both Heimatschutz and foreign commitments.962
Civil-Military Co-Operation. In addition to these purely military assignments, the
2012-COR emphasises reservists’ increasing role in civil-military co-operation.963 Here,
reservists closely collaborate with civilian organisations such as the police, the fire depart-
ment and other crisis relief units.964 Co-operation is not limited to crisis situations but
already begins at the planning stage and may include consulting activities and training.965
While carrying out these tasks, reservists are mobilised for duty and are integrated into the
state, county or district commands.966
Joint Support Service and the Territorial Reserve. On the domestic level, the Bun-
deswehr is organised in 16 state, 33 county and 337 district commands.967 As seen in
Figure 4.3, the state commands are instructed by the Bundeswehr Command for Territorial
Tasks (BCTT), which is part of the Joint Support Service.968 The BCTT is located in Berlin
959 cf., for example, ibid., 6.
960 ibid.
961 ibid.




966 cf. Bundeswehr. ‘Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr’.
967 cf. ibid, including own calculations.
968 ibid.
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from where all activities are coordinated.969 The reservists serving in these commands
are mobilised from the territorial reserve and may be assigned to either a state, county or
district command.970











Source: Joint Support Service.
Due to these structures, the Bundeswehr is present in every region of Germany. This
approach is believed to have three significant advantages; first, if needed, Bundeswehr
support can be provided promptly and anywhere in Germany.971 Second, reservists who
have the opportunity to serve close to home are more inclined to volunteer beyond their
obligations as they do not have to travel a long distance to fulfil their duties.972 Third, by
recruiting locals, civilian-military co-operation is more efficient as reservists often both
know their civilian counterparts personally and have a profound knowledge of their area of
operation.973
4.2.1.5 Regional Security and Support Units
Purpose, Benefits and Obligations. Building on this local character, the 2012-COR
did strengthen not only reservists’ work in the state, county and district commands but
969 ibid.
970 ibid.




also introduced a new unit concerned with homeland defence, namely, the RSSU. While
reservists working under the mentioned commands have to be mobilised and are assigned
to specific posts, the RSSU are composed of non-mobilised reservists who volunteer
for military duties.974 By being attached to a regular parent unit, they complement and
strengthen their regular counterparts’ activities in the respective regions.975 On the other
hand, RSSU reservists also benefit from their service as they receive extra military training
where they acquire additional skills.976 Moreover, with about ten to 15 days of annual
mandatory training and (or) service and the opportunity to serve close to home, the MoD
hopes to motivate more reservists to get involved in the a RSSU.977
Structures and Obligations. In general, by establishing the RSSU, the MoD has created
an additional tool to strengthen homeland defence and, therefore, to compensate for the
lack of conscripts. The latter was particularly believed to be achieved through the RSSU’
presence in all 16 Bundesländer.978 Originally, the 2012-COR envisaged the establishment
of one RSSU with 100 troops per Bundesland, which would have added up to 1,600
troops.979 As illustrated in Table 4.5, this number was exceeded by more than a 1,000 by
2017 already. However, not all Bundesländer have established a RSSU yet.
For instance, Hamburg is still working on recruiting reservists and building the relevant
structures.980 Moreover, especially in the East, namely, in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania and Thuringia, recruitment is less successful.981
4.2.2 Societal Roles and Recruitment
4.2.2.1 Replacing Conscripts in the Societal Sphere
Conscripts and Democratic Control. The previous segment focused on examining the
changing military roles and structures of Germany’s reserve force after the introduction of
974 cf. Bundeswehr. ‘Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr’.
975 ibid.




980 cf. Table 4.5.
981 Bundeswehr. ‘Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr’.
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Table 4.5: Commands and RSSU Reservists Numbers (Status: 12/2017)









Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0/8 100
Lower Saxony 6/59 300








Source: Joint Support Service.
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the 2012-COR. By evaluating these aspects, it has been demonstrated how the government
intended to use reservists to close structural gaps left by the termination of draft. However,
according to prevailing political and public opinion, conscripts did not fulfil only military
duties but also assumed critical societal roles.982 These responsibilities were mostly
twofold; namely, conscripts acted as agents of the Bundeswehr in an intermediary role
to society while they also imported non-military values to the armed forces.983 In theory,
the concept of mutual influence of the military and civilian sphere was thought to foster
democratic control over the Bundeswehr while creating understanding for defence related
issues within society. To a certain extent, this reasoning holds true in practice as all
citizens were directly or indirectly connected to the armed forces until 2011. Former or
current conscripts, as well as Zivildienstleistende, were involved in the Bundeswehr.984
Their families and colleagues, on the other hand, passively experienced the Bundeswehr
through the stories conscripts shared at home. However, for the majority of people, these
points of contact had ceased alongside draft. Moreover, without an annual turnover of
recruits, fewer citizens with a military background will make the transition to civilian life
in the future. Conversely, without conscripts, who the MoD theoretically drafted from all
social, educational and political backgrounds, the Bundeswehr will not be composed of a
cross-section of society anymore. Therefore, it can be argued that the Bundeswehr’s future
structures do not reflect society as a whole, which, in turn, somewhat bears the risk of
segregating the Bundeswehr even further from society.985
Legislation and Democratic Control. While this reasoning and attached worries can
be understood in the light of the country’s 20th-century history, Buch pointed out that
982 cf., for example, Detlef Buch, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, 168.
983 ibid.
984 Even when objecting to serving in the military, all young men deemed fit for service were connected
to the Bundeswehr. First, they had to undergo the same official medical examinations by Bundeswehr
physicians. Second, they had to contribute to the compulsory community service, which was administered
through the MoD, which also paid their allowance. When conscription was suspended, the compulsory
community service was terminated as well. With the federal volunteer service, the government created a
substitute to benefit the compulsory community service’s primary beneficiaries, namely, social services
and charities; cf., for example, Helmut K. Anheier et al., Ein Jahr Bundesfreiwilligendienst: Erste
Erkenntnisse einer begleitenden Untersuchung, 1. edn., (Heidelberg, and Berlin: Centrum für soziale
Investitionen und Innovationen (CSI) Rubrecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, and Hertie School of
Governance GmbH, 2012).
985 cf. Hans Frank, ‘Von der innerdeutschen Grenze zum Hindukusch’, ed. Hans Frank (Hamburg: Mittler),
17.
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existing research does not suggest a causal relationship between the suspension of con-
scription and the loss of democratic control.986 Nonetheless, administrations in Germany
were always keen to respond to Bundeswehr related concerns with appropriate measures.
National legislation, including the Grundgesetz, as well as complementary laws such as the
Parliamentary Participation Act, reflect this conduct. Here, politicians purposely limited
both military leaders’ and the government’s leeway to control the Bundeswehr unilaterally
by explicitly placing monitoring and governance, as well as the decision to declare the
state of emergency or to send troops abroad in joint military missions, in the hands of the
Bundestag.987 Establishing this legislation suggests that politicians in postwar Germany
were eager to ensure the highest degree of public governance and civilian influence over
the armed forces.
Reservists and Democratic Control. Nonetheless, again taking the country’s 20th-
century history into account, it is somewhat understandable that civil society expects
governance beyond this top-down political approach; especially when considering that
political control or legislation does not necessarily prevent the expected detachment process.
Traditionally, conscription, and, therefore, the average ‘citizen in uniform’, was perceived
as the most efficient instrument to maintain a bottom-up control system to anchor the
Bundeswehr in society.988 By consulting the 2012-COR, it becomes apparent that the MoD
aspired to keep this control mechanism by establishing the reserve force as a substitute
for conscripts in the societal sphere.989 In this context, the MoD particularly highlighted
reservists’ potential to act as agents of the Bundeswehr within civil society. In practice,
the MoD expects reservists to be ready to answer any question their environment might
have about Germany’s defence policy or the Bundeswehr’s structures, responsibilities and
missions.990 Moreover, they are required to talk about their military duties proactively and
986 cf. Detlef Buch, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, 169.
987 cf. GG Art. 87a, Art. 115a, and 115b.
988 cf. Hans Frank, ‘Von der innerdeutschen Grenze zum Hindukusch’, 17, and Detlef Buch, ‘Das Ende der
Wehrpflicht’, 168-169.
989 cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve.






convey a realistic but positive image of their service.991
Training. To prepare reservists for this role, the MoD has commissioned the Reservists’
Association to administer appropriate training courses.992 In these lectures, participants
not only obtain expertise in defence related subjects but are taught communication skills,
presentation techniques and strategies on how to present themselves better to the public.993
Training takes five days and is, in principle, available to all reservists.994 Still, in order to
test the success of this program, the MoD decided to limit participation to a maximum of
72 reservists per annum.995 Therefore, the MoD has determined that it will give preference
to applicants who, due to their social, political or academic engagements, are disseminators
of information.996
Impartiality. Despite the focus on formal training, the MoD further acknowledged that
it is not the reservists’ theoretical knowledge that will aid in establishing a strong link
between the Bundeswehr and society but rather their ability to convey authenticity.997
Similar to conscripts, reservists are somewhat more impartial than Zeit- and Berufssoldaten
as they are not economically dependent on their Bundeswehr salaries. Moreover, reservists
are not integrated into the Bundeswehr hierarchical structures on a full-time basis but
rather move between civilian and military life regularly. Hence, opinions expressed by
BbqdI3C-lnFtpr2qPnqy6moydutn6u/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TDM80AIE
DTJTR10N5, 1.
991 cf. Schelzig, Weisung für die Reservistenarbeit in den Jahren 2015/2016 (Bundesministerium der






992 Ausbildung zum Mittler, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01, 1.
993 ibid. and Alfred Claußen, ‘Erfahrungsbericht eines Reservisten: Reservisten verbessern ihre kom-
munikativen Fähigkeiten’, Reserve Aktuell, No 2 (2014): 14-15, 14.
994 Ausbildung zum Mittler, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01, 1.
995 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Spezifische Anforderungen an das Training „Mittler mit






996 Ausbildung zum Mittler, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01, 1.
997 cf. Schelzig, Weisung für die Reservistenarbeit in den Jahren 2015/2016, 5.
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reservists are, in theory, more balanced, which, in turn, has the potential to lead to greater
acceptance in public. Conversely, reservists observe civilian debates actively and, like
conscripts before, bring these attitudes and values with them when reporting for duty.
Potential Range of Influence. Considering the aforementioned factors, it can be inferred
that reservists have the potential of bringing together the best of both worlds. However,
when recalling that the MoD only aimed to recruit and train approximately 60,000 reserv-
ists, one could argue that this number is too small to fulfil the described societal duties.998
Even though this argument appears compelling at first glance, it neglects to consider that
when conscription was still in place, citizens were often drafted against their will;999
therefore, not only positive but also negative attitudes toward the Bundeswehr spread
faster. In contrast, the new generation of reservists is either volunteering for service or has
previously served as a Zeit- or Berufssoldat. This suggests that they are more committed
to their roles in the reserve force and, therefore, are more inclined to express favourable
opinions about their duties.
The Media and Democratic Control. Based on these factors, it can be argued that
reservists are a more efficient instrument to foster a positive image of the Bundeswehr
in society than conscripts. Furthermore, with the suspension of conscription, the MoD
involuntarily established an additional tool of civilian control over the armed forces,
namely, by triggering increased media interest in the Bundeswehr. For instance, Buch
stipulated that the suspension of conscription has resulted in resurgent media interest in
the Bundeswehr.1000 In the beginning, coverage primarily focused on the progress and
potential shortcomings of the 2010 Bundeswehrreform.1001 However, over time, reporting
started to shift, and journalists seemed to develop a keen interest in service members’
998 cf. Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, ‘Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservisten-
angelegenheiten der Bundeswehr’, Reserve Aktuell, No 5 (2013): 5-8, 6.
999 Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni
2010.
1000 Detlef Buch, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, 169.
1001 cf., for example, ‘Rüstungsskandal: Bundeswehr sieht "erhebliche Mängel" beim Sturmgewehr G36’,
Spiegel Online, 14 September 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-sieht-erhebl
iche-maengel-beim-sturmgewehr-g36-a-922280.html, 9 May 2015.
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and reservists’ personal experiences in the armed forces.1002 Here, documentaries and
(or) articles often made use of embedded journalism, where reporters chiefly tried to
understand the motivation for enlisting voluntarily.1003 In doing so, reporters did not just
add a good story to their portfolios, but also served as an instrument of democratic control
of the Bundeswehr as they provided timely and regular coverage of the Bundeswehr and
its troops.
4.2.2.2 Anti-War Sentiments and Recruitment
The Influence of Mainstream Satire. While the discussed embedded journalism offered
the MoD a unique tool to highlight positive aspects of the Bundeswehr, the increased
media coverage also triggered another guild’s interest in defence, namely, that of political
satirists.1004 In contrast to traditional journalism, which often grants airtime to both
Bundeswehr critics and military personnel, mainstream comedy is beyond the reach of
the Bundeswehr’s public relations team. Before the 2010 Bundeswehrreform, defence
policy has been widely underrepresented in the comedy arena; however, as of 2011,
numerous artists have started to target the Bundeswehr. Marc-Uwe Kling, for instance,
referred to conscription as a ‘sick’ concept, which permitted the government to ‘snatch
all young men’ to teach them ‘[...] how to shoot people without hesitating, pausing or
asking questions’.1005 As regards the recruitment of young adults after the suspension of
conscription, Nico Semsrott, ‘on behalf of consumer protection’, even felt inclined to issue
a warning that the Bundeswehr’s slogan ‘Career with a Future’ may ‘sometimes [result] in
1002 See, for example, Deutschland dienen: Freiwillig in der Bundeswehr’, TV documentary Vor Ort: Die
Reportage, ‘Reservisten: Lückenbüßer für die Bundeswehr?’, documentary, YouTube video, 04:49,
posted by DW Deutsch, 25 April 2014, ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3cpY5XyZfY, accessed 06
March 2017, and Vicky Braunholz, ‘Meine Schwester, die Soldatin’, Bento, 15 June 2017, http://www.
bento.de/gefuehle/bundeswehr-wenn-die-kleine-schwester-nach-dem-abi-soldatin-wird-1418978/, 29
June 2017.
1003 See, for example, ‘7 Tage...beim Bund’, TV documentary 7 Tage..., reported by Julian Amershi, and
Willem Konrad, broadcasted by NDR, 23 October 2016.
1004 cf. Thomas Buhlmahn, and Meike Wanner, Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image
der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“:
Forschungsbericht (Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr,
2013), 6.
1005 Marc-Uwe Kling, Das Känguru-Manifest: Live und ungekürzt (Hamburg: Hörbuch Hamburg Verlag,
2011), chap. 44. Translated by the author.
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a short [future] for the recruit’.1006
Similar mechanisms are apparent as regards satirists’ attitude toward patriotism. Marc-Uwe
Kling, for instance, has described the latter as a ‘benign tumour, which, if not monitored
carefully, may develop [...] into a malignant one’.1007 Moreover, he referred to patriots
as people with a distorted view of history, who ‘exhibit signs of idiocy’.1008 Max Uthoff,
even resorted to more explicit stylistic means when stating that ‘[t]here is no positive
[approach to] patriotism. The fixation on one’s own country always promotes the rejection
of [everything] foreign. Nationalism is [like] a whore. [This concept] may be used by
virtually anyone, and, if one is not careful, one can catch something nasty’.1009
Anti-War Sentiments in the Public. The mainstream success of these artists suggests
that they do not express minority views but rather reflect the prevailing public opinion.
Especially Mr Uthoff’s statement seems to echo the inclination of citizens to equalise
patriotism with nationalism, which carries a strong negative connotation in Germany. To
some extent, this adverse public perception of patriotism/nationalism is also projected
on the armed forces and soldiers are often suspected to be ‘fascist, racist [and] to glorify
war’.1010 For instance, during the Bundeswehr’s first open day in Leipzig on 13 June 2015
fierce protests ignited opposing the MoD’s alleged intention to advertise ‘the profession of
killing and death’ as a common occupational choice.1011
Pacifistic Tendencies in the Socialisation Process. To explore the roots of these atti-
tudes, one must take a closer look at Germany’s 20th-century history and the postwar
socialisation processes, which exhibited strong pacifistic characteristics.1012 This becomes
explicitly apparent when examining school curricula.1013 Here, teachers and administrat-
1006 ‘Nico Semsrott: Freude ist nur ein Mangel an Information’, live performance at 3satfestival 2013,
performed by Nico Semsrott, broadcasted by 3Sat, 23 May 2015. Translated by the author.
1007 Marc-Uwe Kling, Die Känguru-Chroniken: Live und ungekürzt (Hamburg: Hörbuch Hamburg Verlag,
2012), chap. 66. Translated by the author.
1008 ibid.
1009 Live Performance at Die Anstalt, performed by Max Uthoff, broadcasted by ZDF, 03 February 2015.
1010 Dominik Wullers, ‘Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?’, 21 November 2013, Zeit Online, http:
//www.zeit.de/2013/48/soldaten-deutschland/komplettansicht, 03 July 2014.
1011 cf. ‘Zu Besuch bei den Streitkräften’, news broadcast, reported by Gerd Haunert, broadcasted by ARD,
13 June 2015.
1012 cf. Dominik Wullers, ‘Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?’.
1013 cf. ibid.
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ors, who were socialised during or after the ‘68 peace movement, still coin the academic
environment, which, in turn, lead to the creation of a somewhat Bundeswehr hostile and
anti-war doctrine.1014 These attitudes even extend to school athletics. During the Third
Reich, the Nazis politicised sports with the intent to prepare the youth for their assigned
roles as ‘resilient soldiers and healthy mothers’.1015 It is, therefore, quite comprehensible
that postwar politicians stressed the separation of sports and politics and that schools still
tend to favour the acquisition of academic knowledge over school athletics.1016 Combined
with the rejection of the military by families and peers due to their pacifist upbringing, there
are neither significant motivational factors to join the armed forces nor is there any form of
formal preparation in place that would prepare young adults for military service.1017
2013 Bundeswehr Survey. While the factors mentioned above already suggest that
German citizens are somewhat sceptical of the Bundeswehr, a 2013 Bundeswehr does
not come to much more flattering conclusions.1018 For instance, only 32 per cent of
Germans hold the Bundeswehr in high regards when they are asked to rate the Bundeswehr
in comparison to other state institutions such as the policy.1019 Moreover, the majority
of respondents spontaneously associated the word ‘Bundeswehr’ with terms such as
‘war’, ‘weapons’, and ‘soldiers’ rather than with ‘security’ or ‘safety’.1020 As regards
the latter two, the survey even attests a declining trend, which suggests that citizens are
not inclined to perceive the Bundeswehr as a stabilizing political instrument.1021 Besides
these rather negative findings, however, the survey also identified a positive trend;1022
while the majority of citizens older than 70 are rather critical of the Bundeswehr and
its responsibilities, young adults seemed to have come to accept the Bundeswehr as a
1014 cf. ibid.
1015 ‘Fitness, Sport und Körperkult: Die Moden der Bewegung!’, TV science magazine Quarks & Co.,
presented by Ranga Yogeshwar, broadcasted by WDR, 04 April 2017.
1016 cf. ibid.
1017 cf. ‘Dominik Wullers, ‘Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?’.
1018 cf. Thomas Buhlmahn, and Meike Wanner, Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image
der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“:
Forschungsbericht.
1019 ibid., 7.
1020 ibid., 5, and 12.
1021 cf. ibid., 5.
1022 ibid., 14.
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potential employer.1023 Nevertheless, the survey also acknowledges that young adults
usually have not yet acquired the necessary knowledge about a career in the Bundeswehr
as their spontaneous association responses were ‘uniforms’ and ’barracks’.1024
4.2.2.3 Recruitment Strategies
The Recruitment Pool. Provocatively phrased, the above-discussed arguments suggest
that the Bundeswehr is forced to recruit its prospective service members from a pool
of inveterate pacifists or uninformed youngsters.1025 This judgement is particularly bad
news for the reserve, as it must already compete with the Bundeswehr’s regular units as
well as the private sector for the best suitable candidates.1026 Consequently, it is hardly
surprising that the 2012-COR identified retiring Zeit- or Berufssoldaten as the reserve’s
main recruitment targets for volunteer reserve duties.1027
Simultaneously though, the MoD acknowledged that the suspension of conscription, as well
as the overall downsizing of troops, had substantially diminished this recruitment pool.1028
Therefore, the MoD also stated that, despite the aforementioned societal obstacles, re-
cruitment efforts must also include Ungediente;1029 here, the government has identified
university graduates as the most valuable candidates since the MoD expects them to be
1023 ibid.
1024 cf. ibid.
1025 It should be noted that since the peak of the 2015 refugee crisis, the right-wing populist party Alternative
für Deutschland has gained significant traction and even received 12.6 per cent of votes in the general
election of 2017. These results suggest that Germany’s political landscape has shifted significantly.
Moreover, as attested by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency,
violent crimes committed by right-wing extremists have risen by 18 per cent between 2014 and 2016 from
1,408 registered offences to 1,600. Although this development has to be carefully observed, it would be
wrong to jump to the conclusion that right-wing populism is a mainstream trend. Quite the contrary, the
majority of the population has shown a great motivation to confront right-wingers in protests and other
grassroots movements. Although no reliable data on the impact on Bundeswehr recruitment was available
when this study was completed in late 2018, the author surmised that the majority’s attitudes towards the
Bundeswehr had not improved significantly; cf. Presseschau: Pegida’, bpb Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/198115/presseschau-pegida, 03 July 2017 and ‘Alternative für
Deutschland’, bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parte
ien-in-deutschland/211108/afd, 03 July 2017, Der Bundeswahlleiter, ‘Bundestagswahl 2017’, accessed
01 November 2017, https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html, and
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, ‘Rechtsextremistische Straf- und Gewalttaten’, accessed 03 October
2018, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-rechtsextremismus/zahlen-und-fakten-recht
sextremismus/rechtsextremistische-straf-und-gewalttaten-2016.
1026 cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Konzeption der Reserve, 17.
1027 ibid., 15.
1028 cf. ibid., 17.
1029 ibid., 15.
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better prepared for leadership roles.1030 Moreover, by recruiting civilian specialists, the
MoD hopes to utilise skill sets obtained by reservists in their civilian occupations without
the need for the Bundeswehr to provide further training.1031
Awareness Gap. While this strategy is undoubtedly warranted from the MoD’s point of
view, circumstances suggest that not only societal obstacles might hinder the recruitment
of Ungediente, namely, an awareness gap. In its 2013 survey, the Bundeswehr already
admitted to the said gap among young adults;1032 i.e., probably the most important group of
people when it comes to recruitment for the armed forces. Moreover, as regards specialists’
recruitment, a knowledge gap among employers in the private sector seems to prevail.1033
According to the Reservists’ Association, this lack of information among business owners
is currently preventing more successful co-operation between the MoD and employers of
reservists.1034
4.2.2.4 Communication Strategies
The MoD Website(s). Considering the above-described knowledge gap among average
citizens and business owners, it can be inferred that MoD’s current communication strategy
appears insufficient for recruiting civilians for the reserve; an assumption, which is further
substantiated when consulting today’s go-to medium, namely, the Bundeswehr’s website.
Although interested civilians can find an entire section specifically dedicated to the reserve,
navigating the site is rather difficult for people not familiar with military jargon or the
Bundeswehr’s organisational structures.1035 For instance, the website is overloaded with
unintelligible information, PDF files outlining rules and regulations and related links to
other branches of the Bundeswehr, which again present themselves incomprehensible to
1030 cf. ibid.
1031 ibid., 5.
1032 cf. Thomas Buhlmahn, and Meike Wanner, Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image
der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“:
Forschungsbericht, 14.
1033 cf. Inga-Christien Dittmar, ‘Auftaktsymposium "Die Reservisten der Bundeswehr und ihre Arbeitgeber"’,
Reserve Aktuell, No. 3 (2014): 4-5.
1034 ibid.
1035 cf. Bundeswehr, ‘Herzlich Willkommen auf der Website für Reservisten der Bundeswehr’, Bundeswehr,
accessed 02 July 2017, http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de.
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the layperson.1036
Consulting the section on careers in the reserve forces can also be somewhat disappoint-
ing;1037 instead of providing useful information on how to join the reserve and what
duties the service entails, potential candidates are advised to either contact a Bundeswehr
career centre or to consult the Bundeswehr’s career portal for further information.1038
Objectively, both options are legitimate options to communicate with a potential future
employer. However, with the demand to get in touch with the Bundeswehr directly, the
MoD has created a psychological barrier, as contacting the Bundeswehr in person might
have a discouraging effect on the average citizen. The career portal, on the other hand,
only presents information on serving in the Bundeswehr’s regular units.1039
Reserve Aktuell. In addition to the website, the MoD advertises the Reservists’ Asso-
ciation’s quarterly magazine Reserve Aktuell as a valuable source of information on the
reserve.1040 However, initially designed as a periodical for trained reservists and not for
civilian candidates, authors writing for Reserve Aktuell also predominantly use military
jargon and technocratic language. Therefore, in its current state, the magazine, is rather
unsuitable for recruiting civilians.
Brochures. A similar conclusion must be drawn after assessing a glossy 24-pages bro-
chure, which the MoD has published alongside various other PDF files on its website.1041
Albeit authors have made an effort to use a more comprehensible language here, they were
1036 ibid.






1039 Status: June 2017; cf. Bundeswehr, ‘Bundeswehr: Mach, was wirklich zählt’, Bundeswehr, accessed 01
July 2017, https://www.bundeswehrkarriere.de.





1041 Hamel, Herzlich Willkommen auf der Website für Reservisten der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr, 2018),




not able to present the recruitment process without resorting to military terminology.1042
Also, the second part of the brochure, which elaborates on reservists’ duties, lacks to
provide real-life examples but strikes the informed reader as a mere summary of the
LSMPA and LSRA.1043
Social Media. By the time this study had been completed in 2018, the MoD had not
undertaken any measures to update the reserve’s communication platforms to appeal more
efficiently to civilians. However, regarding recruitment strategies for the Bundeswehr’s
regular units, and especially for the voluntary conscripts, the Bundeswehr’s public relations
team has begun to explore new means of appealing to potential recruits, namely, adolescents.
The most prominent development to mention in this context is the launch of an official
YouTube channel focusing on a Reality TV-style series called Die Rekruten.1044 Here, a
camera team followed selected new voluntary conscripts and documented their journey
from civilian to soldier.1045
In support of this new endeavour, the MoD has also updated parts of its web presence. First,
the Bundeswehr’s career portal has been redesigned to include dynamic visual effects and
now uses colloquial language;1046 site visitors are addressed personally, and the appropriate
formal salutation Sie has been dropped in favour of the informal du.1047 Second, the MoD
has launched an additional website explicitly geared toward pupils.1048 Here, the armed
forces are portrayed similarly to a sports association by accentuating group activities and
fun.
Advertising Costs. Given the attempt to blend information on military careers with
social situations and hobbies adolescents may easily relate to suggests that the MoD
has shifted to a more aggressive public relations strategy for recruiting; a development,
1042 ibid., 8.
1043 ibid, 11 et seq.
1044 ‘The Recruits’. Translated by the author; cf. ‘Die Rekruten’, Die Rekruten TV, Official YouTube
Channel, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZPAni75bkLnjGO8yhuJpdw, 06 July 2017.
1045 ibid.
1046 cf. ‘Bundeswehr, ‘Bundeswehr: Mach, was wirklich zählt’.
1047 cf. ibid.
1048 See Bundeswehr, ‘Bundeswehr: Entdecke die Bundeswehr’, Bundeswehr, accessed 01 July 2017,
https://www.bundeswehrentdecken.de.
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which is also reflected by the MoD’s growing expenditure on advertising. As presented
in Table 4.6, advertisement costs increased by a stunning 264 per cent in ten years. The
most profound leaps can be observed from 2010 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2012, where
advertising expenditure rose by 33.2 per cent and 80.0 per cent respectively. However,
considering that conscription was suspended in 2011, these numbers are hardly surprising
as the MoD was forced to implement new marketing strategies to advertise to young
adults. Regrettably, the published advertising costs are not broken down according to
categories, i.e., one cannot estimate the percentage spent on the recruitment of Zeitsoldaten,
Berufssoldaten, voluntary conscripts or reservists. However, the budget marked advertising
costs as Nachwuchsgewinnung, a term which suggests marketing to young talents.1049
This, in turn, allows inferring that the MoD intends to focus primarily on appealing to
young adults. Moreover, it implies that, by the time this thesis was completed, no sufficient
recruitment strategy of civilians for the reserve was in place.
Table 4.6: Advertising Expenditure in Million Euros (2006-2015)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Expenditure 9.7 10.4 10.3 12.0 12.0
Annual D in per cent -0.6 7.2 -1.4 16.5 0.0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Expenditure 16.0 28.9 30.0 30.0 35.3
Annual D in per cent 33.2 80.9 3.7 0.0 17.7
Source: The German Federal Ministry of Finance, including own calculations.
4.3 Key Findings
1. The analyses of relevant government publication has implicitly revealed empirical
proof for the 2008 financial crisis’ influence on German defence planning. While
no specific economization goals were mentioned in the 2010-CSR or the Inspector
General’s report, both documents emphasised that 40,000 troops were to be cut to
1049 ‘Young Talent Recruitment’. Translated by the author.
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contribute to overall government savings.
2. Explicit empirical evidence for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis was discovered
in contemporary financial statements and defence budgets. Here, it was found that
the MoD needed to contribute C8.40 to overall economization measures after the
emergence of the 2008 financial crisis. While savings could not be realised to the
full degree, significant economies were achieved as regards personnel costs.
3. In general, it was found that the government estimated that Germany’s security
environment was stable as defence planners did not anticipate imminent territorial
threats. Nevertheless, in relevant publications, the government listed numerous
threats, which authors connected with the negative implications of globalisation, e.g.,
(cyber) terrorism, uncontrolled migration due to failed states and climate change.
However, no specific measures on how to encounter these challenges were expressed
by the government.
4. The discussion on the 2010 Bundeswehrreform and the 2012-COR has highlighted
that both the regular and reserve force underwent profound restructuring as of 2010.
Here, the suspension of conscription was identified as the most incisive decision as it
significantly reduced the Bundeswehr’s troop strength and shifted former conscripts’
duties to the reserve. On the one hand, the government envisaged that reservists
would fill conscripts’ responsibilities in the societal sphere. On the other hand,
reservists were to relieve the regular force as regards homeland defence and to fill




and the Reserve Force
Krieg ist nicht mehr die ultima ratio, sondern die ultima irratio.1050
- Willy Brandt -1051
In the previous chapter, the changing roles and responsibilities of reservists following
the implementation of the 2012-COR has been discussed in light of the suspension of
conscription. To examine this phenomenon, political, financial, strategic and structural
characteristics were elaborated. Following the same blueprint, this chapter explores the
2012-COR’s historical counterpart. Due to the lack of a specific reserve forces review
following the 1973 oil price shock, the reform of the Bundeswehr’s post-1973 reserve is
referred to under the umbrella of the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform.
1050 ‘War is not the ultima ratio any more, it is the ultima irratio’. Translated by the author; Willy Brandt, Willy
Brandt: Nobelvorlesung, Speech, Oslo, 11 December 1971, published by the Nobel Prize Committee,
accessed 01 January 2017, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-lectur
e-t.html.
1051 German Chancellor (1969-1974).
171
5.1 The Wehrstrukturreform in Context
5.1.1 The 1970s: A Decade of Defence Reviews
In the 1970s, the Bundeswehr had been subject to various defence reviews. In total, the
government published four Defence White Papers and one separate reserve forces’ review,
namely, the 1971-COR. Additionally, two supplemental reports on Wehrgerechtigkeit
and Wehrstruktur were commissioned by the government and delivered by the 1972
Commission on Structural Reform (1972-CSR) in 1971 and 1972 respectively. Although
not all of these documents were relevant to the analysis of changing reservists’ roles and
responsibilities following the 1973 oil price shock, the preceding defence reviews are
discussed in this subsection to illustrate the evolution of Germany’s military posture in the
1970s. The 1979 Defence White Paper, on the other hand, has been omitted as it outlined
measures that only became relevant in the 1980s.1052
5.1.1.1 Defence Reviews (1970-1972)
Impetus for Reform. The roots of the 1970s defence reviews can be traced back to 1969.
Following the general election on 28 September 1969, a coalition of the Social Democrats
and the Liberals assumed government.1053 Headed by the social democratic Chancellor
Willy Brandt, this constellation constituted a caesura in postwar German politics, which had
primarily been dominated by the Conservatives.1054 Soon after taking office, Willy Brandt
addressed the Bundestag in a government declaration, where he discussed issues concerning
federal finances and the Bundeswehr.1055 While highlighting that the government needed
to increase collaboration with Germany’s European and international partners to counter
1052 As of 1979, the Army underwent yet another reform to adapt its structures. This reform is known as
Heeresstruktur 4; Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1979 Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 148 et seq.
1053 Der Bundeswahlleiter, ‘Wahl zum 6. Deutschen Bundestag am 28. September 1969’, Der Bundeswahl-
leiter, accessed 15 November 2016, https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/1969.html.
1054 Der Bundeswahlleiter, ‘Willkommen beim Bundeswahlleiter’, accessed 15 November 2016, https:
//www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundeswahlleiter.html.
1055 Willy Brandt, Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in
Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969, Government Declaration (Bonn, 1969), published by Bundeskanzler-Willy-
Brandt-Stiftung, accessed 09 April 2016, http://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Regi
erungserklaerung_Willy_Brandt_1969.pdf, 5, and 16.
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imbalances in the federal budget, Willy Brandt refrained from demanding to balance
budgets by cutting defence expenditure.1056 He instead noted that the Bundeswehr needed
to undergo a thorough review, which would have to respect societal changes, the subjects of
Wehrgerechtigkeit, technological advancements and NATO partners’ demands as guiding
directives.1057
1970 Defence White Paper. As announced by Willy Brandt, a review of the Bundeswehr
was conducted quickly, and its results were published in May 1970.1058 The key problems
identified by the MoD were threefold; first, as already mentioned in the 1969 government
declaration, the MoD judged that the drafting process in its contemporary form was not
fair and needed to be reformed to ensure the highest degree of Wehrgerechtigkeit.1059 This
was thought to be achieved through drafting more Wehrpflichtige into service by reducing
the length of mandatory basic training and service.1060 However, no specific number
was stated.1061 Second, the MoD stipulated that the Bundeswehr needed more officers,
Zeit- and Berufssoldaten;1062 especially in the Army.1063 To motivate more individuals
to pursue a career in the Bundeswehr, the MoD, therefore, aimed to introduce various
measures to give Zeitsoldaten a competitive advantage when transitioning from military
life to the civilian job market;1064 again, no specific measures were elaborated in detail.1065
However, merit-based promotions within the Bundeswehr were supposed to become more
frequent.1066 Fourth, the MoD stipulated that the Bundeswehr’s equipment was out of date
and needed to be replaced to meet the demands of NATO’s recently adopted strategy of
flexible response.1067
1056 ibid., 5.
1057 The changes in society are addressed in detail in Subsection 5.2.2; cf. ibid., 15-16.
1058 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der
Bundeswehr.








1067 At the beginning of the 1970s, the Bundeswehr stilled used equipment provided by the allied forces in
the mid-1950s. According to the doctrine of massive retaliation, the equipment was unsuitable to serve
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The latter was undoubtedly paramount to military planners; however, the defence budget
would not allow tackling this problem in 1970. Although Willy Brandt had not connected
federal finances with the Bundeswehr’s budget, the 1970 Defence White Paper indeed did.
As stipulated by its authors, total government spending was planned to be approximately
DM90.40 billion in 1970, of which the government had assigned DM2.68 billion to
economic stimuli packages.1068 Noting that all ministries had to contribute to these
consolidation efforts, the government demanded that the MoD would have to realise
DM1.08 billion or 40 per cent of federal economies.1069 To meet this financial directive,
the MoD enforced a procurement freeze, which also stopped equipment acquisition plans
that had already been (partially) initiated;1070 therefore, torpedoing a crucial goal of the
1970 defence review.
The Commission on Structural Reform I. In addition to reviewing the Bundeswehr’s
structures on the ministerial level, the government further decided to have the Bundeswehr
examined by an independent commission. On 09 July 1970, the 1972-CSR was established
and instructed to submit suggestions on two specific issues; first, Wehrgerechtigkeit needed
to be improved.1071 Second, the Bundeswehr’s structures were supposed to be adapted to
meet the demands of the 1970s security environment.1072
The first report on Wehrgerechtigkeit was submitted to the government on 03 February
1971.1073 The key problem, as identified by the 1972-CSR, was that the contemporary
drafting process was not fair as up to 30 per cent of Wehrpflichtige were able to evade
draft.1074 Consequently, draft evaders did neither have to serve as conscripts nor were they
required to participate as reservists in military exercises upon completion of their term.1075
the new strategy of flexible response. Moreover, due to its age, the costs to maintain the equipment were
disproportional to its benefits; ibid., 139-141.
1068 ibid., 183.
1069 ibid.
1070 ibid., and 139.
1071 Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
Analyse und Optionen (Bonn: Wehrstruktur-Kommission, 1972/1973), 25.
1072 ibid.
1073 Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, Wehrgerechtigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
Bericht der Wehrstruktur-Kommission an die Bundesregierung (Bonn: Wehrstruktur-Kommission, 1971),
5.
1074 ibid., 23-24.
1075 Peter Richard Munz, ‘Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur’, (doctoral thesis, University of Gießen,
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While these circumstances did not pose a problem as regards military strengths, which
with approximately 1.5 million reservists largely exceeded required numbers, 30 per cent
of an age cohort enjoyed significant advantages over their peers.1076 First, they could make
an immediate transition from the Abitur to university.1077 Second, their careers were not
interrupted by reservists’ duties.1078
To overcome this injustice, the 1972-CSR suggested increasing the drafting ratio by 15 per
cent.1079 This goal was thought to be best achieved through legislation and incentives. First,
the 1972-CSR recommended granting fewer exemptions based on physical impairments or
exceptional circumstances.1080 Moreover, to ensure that all drafted individuals were able
to serve as conscripts, the 1972-CSR suggested reducing the mandatory service period
from 18 to 16 months.1081 Second, the 1972-CSR proposed that conscripts’ salaries should
be increased to convince more Wehrpflichtige to refrain from attempting to evade draft.1082
The 1971 Conception of Reserve. Independent from the 1972-CSR, the MoD also
conducted a separate review of the Bundeswehr’s reserve force, which was published on 09
July 1971.1083 The findings of the 1971-COR were later included in the 1971/72 Defence
White Paper.1084 In accordance with the contemporary Zeitgeist, its primary purpose was
to make mobilisation of reservists fairer.1085
In the 1970s, there were two kinds of mandatory exercises for which reservists were
1978), 19.
1076 ibid., 19, and Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
zur Lage der Bundeswehr, 59.
1077 cf. Peter Richard Munz, ‘Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur’, 18 et seq.
1078 ibid.
1079 Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, Wehrgerechtigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
Bericht der Wehrstruktur-Kommission an die Bundesregierung, 23.
1080 ibid., 24.
1081 ibid., 23.
1082 While these suggestions aimed at increasing Wehrgerechtigkeit, the 1972-CSR also noted that these
measures would result in an additional burden on the defence budget. According to the 1972-CSR’s
calculations, higher salaries and an increasing number of conscripts would account for DM200.00
million annually; ibid., 23, and 79-80.
1083 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Reservistenkonzeption 1971, cited in Dietmar Schössler, and
Armin Steinkamm, Reservisten ‘71/‘72: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Reservistenverbandes,
169-191 (Bonn: Mönch, 1972), 169.
1084 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 50 et seq.
1085 ibid., 51-52.
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mobilised on a regular basis;1086 those aiming to maintain training levels and those testing
reservists’ operational readiness.1087 Considering that reservists constituted 65 per cent
of the Army, 43 per cent of the Air Force and 49 per cent of the Navy, keeping reservists’
skills up to date was crucial for the Bundeswehr’s defence posture.1088 However, similar
to the drafting process, mobilisation for reservists’ duties followed somewhat unfair rules.
Reservists belonging to Mobilisation Group I and II, namely, individuals who had recently
completed their term as conscripts, as well as specialists or highly skilled reservists, were
called up for duty more frequently.1089 The remaining reservists were categorised as
Mobilisation Group III and were mostly treated as backup with little to no obligation to
participate in exercises.1090
Broadly speaking, this system put highly skilled and fit reservists at a disadvantage as they
were mobilised regularly, while the less capable were exempted from serving beyond their
term as conscripts. Although the MoD acknowledged that it would not be able to limit the
mobilisation of specialists, Wehrgerechtigkeit was believed to be enhanced by calling up a
higher ratio of reservists from Mobilisation Group I and II.1091
To do so, the MoD decided to cut the mandatory reservists’ service period.1092 Before the
1971-COR came into effect on 01 January 1971, reservists’ obligation to serve in military
exercises could range from 12 days (operational readiness) to four weeks (maintenance
of training levels) annually.1093 Following the implementation of the 1971-COR, the
total required serving period was limited to 48 days.1094 Moreover, non-officers could
now only be mobilised within the first two to three years following their Wehrdienst;1095
non-commission officers and commissioned officers, on the other hand, were now relieved
1086 cf. Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage
der Bundeswehr, 51.
1087 ibid.
1088 The Army consisted of the Feldheer and the Territorialheer. Here, reservists provided 45 per cent and
85 per cent of troop strength respectively; Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der









of reservists’ duties after turning 45 or 60 respectively.1096
In addition to changing mandatory service periods for reservists, the 1971-COR also aimed
to redistribute the concentration of Army and Navy reservists.1097 As regards the former,
the MoD stipulated that it was necessary to increase the number of available reservists at
the border to the GDR.1098 Reservists for the Navy, on the other hand, were supposed to
be recruited more proactively in coastal regions to ensure prompt availability of troops
in case of emergencies.1099 For the reserve in general, the 1971-COR judged that the
number of non-commissioned and commissioned officers was too low.1100 According to
the 1971-COR, this was particularly evident in the Air Force and the Medical Service;1101
here, they advocated recruiting fewer but better-qualified reservists and increasing the
number of reservists’ medical training centres respectively.1102
1971/72 Defence White Paper. Soon after publishing the 1970 Defence White Paper,
the 1971-COR and the first 1972-CSR report, the MoD released the results of yet another
defence review in December 1971.1103 Both as regards finances and structural changes, it
can be interpreted as the continuation and (or) implementation of its predecessor. While
no concrete economies are discussed, the MoD highlighted that it was increasingly com-
peting with other ministries for federal funds, which resulted in the relative decline of
its budget.1104 To compensate for this development, the MoD decided to adhere to the
notion of procurement freezing.1105 Concerning Wehrgerechtigkeit, the government tried
to achieve more fairness by cutting the length of mandatory basic training as proposed from
18 to 15 months;1106 with this measure, the MoD hoped to increase the annual number
1096 ibid.
1097 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Reservistenkonzeption 1971, cited in Dietmar Schössler, and
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of conscripts undergoing training.1107 Besides, service members’ military training and
education was to be more tailored to the demands of the civilian job market by emphasising
the acquisition of transferable skills.1108
The Commission on Structural Reform II. The second 1972-CSR report on the Wehr-
struktur was submitted on 28 November 1972 and identified four key issues.1109 First,
with 325,000 troops, of which only 65 per cent were combat-ready, the Army did not meet
the readiness required stipulated by the SACEUR and was, therefore, thought not be able
to defend the West-German territory sufficiently.1110 Second, the 1972-CSR estimated
that the defence budget was too low in comparison to overall government spending.1111 If
this ratio would not improve in favour of the MoD, the 1972-CSR presumed that crucial
investments in equipment could not be realised.1112 Third, the 1972-CSR considered the
number of Zeit- and Berufssoldaten too low as not enough conscripts could be motivated to
enlist in the Bundeswehr upon completion their term.1113 Fourth, and despite this recruit-
ment problem, the MoD could not draft more conscripts due to financial and operational
considerations.1114 Keeping in mind that the baby boomers started to come of age in the
1970s, the 1972-CSR, therefore, anticipated that the issue of Wehrgerechtigkeit would
exacerbate.1115
To overcome these issues, the 1972-CSR examined three models for a 1973 Wehrstruk-
turreform, which the commission labelled A, B, and C.1116 Model A, which proposed an
all-volunteer force, was dismissed almost immediately as the 1972-CSR judged that it
would not provide sufficient numbers of troops to encounter a potential attack from the
Warsaw Pact.1117 In Model B, the 1972-CSR proposed a militia structure, which chiefly
1107 ibid.
1108 ibid.
1109 Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:










echoed the Swiss militia system. The 1972-CSR favoured this model as it was supposed
to ensure the highest degree of Wehrgerechtigkeit;1118 however, the 1972-CSR ultimately
dropped this model, as they judged that a militia based force could not meet defensive
alliances’ proficiency requirements.1119
With Model C, the 1972-CSR proposed a mixed force structure, which was supposed
to consist of Zeitsoldaten, Berufssoldaten and Wehhrpflichtigen.1120 While this model
chiefly resembled the Bundeswehr’s contemporary structures, it proposed some additional
features, which the 1972-CSR believed would aid in making structures more efficient and
affordable and drafting a fairer process.1121 First, the total number of troops was set to
be approximately 490,000, which, according to the 1972-CSR, should be mobilised in
full within three days.1122 Second, to support this readiness commitment, the Army was
supposed to receive more troops and better equipment.1123 Third, the Wehrdienst was to
be reduced from 18 to 15 months.1124 Fourth, the 1972-CSR proposed to grant former
conscripts several perks, including career support, preferential treatment for social benefits
and bank loans, as well as a one-time tax cut of DM1,500.1125 Fifth, Ungediente, who had
been deemed fit for duty but were not drafted, should be levied with a one-time tax burden
of DM1,500.1126 Sixth, Kriegsdienstverweigerer should continue their service in social
organisations in lieu of military service.1127
5.1.1.2 Defence Reviews (1973-1979)
1973/74 Defence White Paper. The first two 1970s Defence White Papers mainly fo-
cused on the issue of Wehrgerechtigkeit. Besides, the 1972-CSR had highlighted that the
defence budget needed to increase in order to upgrade the Bundeswehr’s equipment to
1118 ibid.
1119 ibid.









international standards.1128 Previously, the MoD’s strategy had been to favour the former
over the latter. This, however, changed with the 1973/74 Defence White Paper.1129 Now,
the government intended to increase the Bundeswehr’s combat strength, which, according
to the MoD, was only to be achieved by upgrading the Bundeswehr’s equipment.1130 To
do so, large investments had to be made.1131 However, as noted by in the 1973/74 Defence
White Paper, the defence budget was still too small as its share of federal spending was
continuously decreasing.1132 While this funding enabled the Bundeswehr to continue
running at contemporary capacity, it did not allow for necessary investments in equipment
or structural adaptations.1133 As the MoD did not expect defence budgets to rise anytime
soon, military planners started to look at personnel costs as a source for internal fund-
ing.1134 Noting that the latter had increased disproportionally in the past decade, the MoD,
therefore, decided to free financial sources by implementing severe cuts to manpower.1135
In consequence, it was determined to reduce the number of Zeit- and Berifssoldaten by
30,000.1136 In order not to jeopardise military capabilities, the MoD decided that reserv-
ists had to compensate for this reduction in manpower.1137 The accompanying shift of
responsibilities is discussed in detail in later in this chapter.
1975/76 Defence White Paper. With the 1973/74 Defence White Paper, the MoD had
begun a Wehrstrukturreform, which was partially based on the 1972-CSR’s 1972 recom-
mendations. In the subsequent defence review of 1975/76, no further structural adaptations
were suggested.1138 As regards the defence budget, the Defence White Paper highlighted
that initiated measures had been successful in reallocating funds to procurement.1139 Ac-
1128 cf. ibid., 26.
1129 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr.
1130 cf. ibid., 61.
1131 ibid., 175.
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cording to the MoD, allocated funds were sufficient for supporting contemporary structures,
which, in turn, allowed the Bundeswehr to operate on satisfactory levels.1140
5.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure
As seen in Subsection 5.1.1, financial constraints exercised significant influence on the
MoD in the early 1970s. With a savings goal of DM1.08 billion, the government expected
the defence budget to contribute a disproportionally large percentage to overall federal
consolidation efforts in 1970.1141 While the MoD first tried to absorb imposed economies
by introducing a procurement freeze, it changed strategy in 1973 and implemented a
Wehrstrukturreform in 1973, which aimed to save funds through redundancies. On the
following pages, this development is explored in detail by examining defence expenditure
in the context of federal budgets and economic stimuli packages.
5.1.2.1 Defence Expenditure in Context (1970-1974)
The 1970s were characterised by economic turmoil, which the government tried to en-
counter with a mix of budget cuts and economic stimuli packages.1142 The former were
mostly enforced from 1970 through 1974 and accounted for a total of DM30.20 billion;1143
government investment was approximately DM21.10 billion during this period.1144 The
primary purpose of these measures was to foster economic growth and later to support
industries that were most affected by the 1973 rise in commodity prices such as oil.1145 As
illustrated in Table 5.1, federal expenditure rose by DM43.45 billion from 1970 to 1974.
Combined with inflation, this upward trend reflects the said investments.
Economies, on the other hand, are not visible in the total federal expenditure. The reason
being that savings were to be realised by freezing ministries’ budget at contemporary
1140 ibid.
1141 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der
Bundeswehr, 139-141.
1142 Claus-Martin Gaul, Konjunkturprogramme in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Einord-
nung und Bewertung der Globalsteuerung von 1967 bis 1982 (Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Dienste des





Table 5.1: Federal Defence Expenditure (1970-1974)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
Federal Expenditure
In DM billions 90.95 100.14 109.28 120.39 134.4 555.16 111.03
Annual D in per cent n/a** 10.11 9.12 10.17 11.64 n/a 10.26
Inflation Rate
In per cent 3.45 5.24 5.48 7.03 6.99 n/a 5.64
Defence Expenditure*
In DM billion 20.16 22.84 31.59 27.27 28.95 130.81 26.16
Annual D in per cent n/a** 13.29 38.31 -13.68 6.16 n/a 11.02
In per cent of Federal Expenditure 22.17 22.81 28.91 23.03 21.54 n/a 23.69
Annual D in per cent n/a** 2.89 26.74 -20.34 -6.47 n/a 0.71
*MoD, foreign troops, civil defence.
**Baseline = 1970.
Sources: The German Federal Government, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.
levels;1146 at least until 1973. As displayed in Table 5.1, 1973 marked the beginning
of declining defence expenditure; both in total and relative numbers. As regards the
former, funding dropped by 13.68 per cent in 1973; when factoring in inflation, however,
real defence spending even decreased by 20.71 per cent. Moreover, relative defence
expenditure, namely, the MoD’s share of total federal spending, dropped to 23.03 per cent.
In 1974, on the other hand, it appeared that expenditure had risen by 6.16 per cent. When
considering 1974’s inflation of 6.99 per cent, however, the MoD’s budget decreased by
0.83 per cent. Besides, the MoD’s share of total federal expenditure continued to fall and
accounted for only 21.51 per cent.
Notwithstanding the continuation this downward trend, 1974’s numbers have to be treated
with caution. As of 01 January 1974, the government had decided to bundle all government
pensions in one designated budget.1147 Therefore, the MoD did not have to pay former
service members or civilian employees from its own budget; therefore, the negative
adjustment of defence expenditure in 1974 can partially be justified.
1146 cf. Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage
der Bundeswehr, 139-141.
1147 Pensions were now paid out of Budget Section 33 ‘Versorgung’; Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch
1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 208.
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5.1.2.2 Defence Expenditure in Context (1975-1979)
Similar to the first half of the decade, the government continued its policy of economic
stimuli and invested approximately DM44.30 billion in the economy from 1975 through
1979.1148 However, in contrast to the preceding period, no economies were levied on the
federal budget.1149 As illustrated in Table 5.2, the latter continuously grew and reached
a maximum spending of DM204.44 billion in 1979. A similar trend can be observed
as regards defence expenditure. As seen in Table 5.2, the MoD was not imposed with
direct economies. Nevertheless, defence expenditure’s share of total government spending
continued to drop and eventually accounted for less than 20 per cent of overall government
spending. Moreover, the annual increase hardly compensated inflation.
Table 5.2: Federal Defence Expenditure (1975-1979)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
Federal Expenditure
In DM billion 153.95 168.09 171.8 188.64 204.44 886.92 177.38
Annual D in per cent 14.55 9.18 2.21 9.8 8.38 n/a 7.39
Inflation Rate
In per cent 5.91 4.25 3.74 2.72 4.04 n/a 4.13
Defence Expenditure*
In DM billion 31.37 32.9 33.85 36.74 38.63 173.49 34.70
Annual D in per cent 8.36 4.88 2.89 8.54 5.14 n/a 5.36
In per cent of Total Expenditure 20.38 19.57 19.7 19.48 18.89 n/a 19.60
Annual D in per cent -5.39 -3.97 0.66 -1.12 -3.03 n/a -1.87
*MoD, foreign troops, civil defence.
Sources: The German Federal Government, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.
5.1.3 Security Environment
In order to assess a given nation’s security environment, this thesis looks at both territorial
and ideological parameters. While distinguishing between these two was already tricky
1148 Claus-Martin Gaul, Konjunkturprogramme in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Einord-
nung und Bewertung der Globalsteuerung von 1967 bis 1982, 14.
1149 ibid.
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in Chapter Four, it was somewhat more challenging for the 1970s example. During this
period, Germany was at the centre of conflicts stemming from the Cold War’s confrontation
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Hence, both territorial and ideological threats met at
the border of West-Germany and the GDR. Nevertheless, the decade was also characterised
by the so-called détente, which, based on several international and bilateral agreements,
contributed to an improvement in threat levels. This subsection, therefore, examines
both the said treaties and the German government’s perspective to estimate the security
environment’s stability.
5.1.3.1 The Global Perspective of Détente
Initial Postwar Period. From the end of World War Two until the mid-1960s, relations
between East and West were characterised by hostility, mistrust and the fostering of the
communist and capitalist agenda in the states dependent on the Soviet Union and the United
States respectively.1150 NATO’s strategic answer to growing Warsaw Pact aggression at
the time was the doctrine of massive retaliation.1151 It was mainly built on deterrence by
emphasising that the United State was capable of completely annihilating any adversary
daring to attack NATO.1152 Considering this threat, and the Soviet Union’s willingness to
respond to aggression in a similar way, initiating talks aiming to decrease tension between
the two blocs were hardly feasible.1153 Nevertheless, tentative attempts to improve relations
with the East were undertaken by both France and Germany in the early 1960s.1154 Due
to pressures from NATO allies, however, then-President de Gaulle’s and then-Minister of
Foreign Affairs Gerhard Schröder’s efforts were scotched almost instantly.1155 Here, it
became apparent that consultations regarding the improvement of relations were highly
dependent on the superpowers’ backing.1156 In the 1960s, however, both the Soviet Union
1150 cf. Wolf-Dieter Karl, ‘Entspannungspolitik: Der Weg von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation in den






1156 cf. ibid., 137.
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and the United States were preoccupied with other pressing matters;1157 while the former
was busy trying to foster her influence in her Eastern satellite states, the latter saw herself
confronted with the challenges of the war in Vietnam.1158
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although NATO changed its doctrine from massive retali-
ation to flexible response in the mid-1960s, this step did not contribute to decreasing the
tensions with the Warsaw Pact but further fostered the notion of ‘us against them’.1159
Nevertheless, the first signs of détente were felt in 1968 when the Soviet Union, the United
States and numerous other countries, including Britain and Germany, signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1160 In this agreement, signatory nations accepted three terms;
first, existing nuclear arsenals should be frozen at current levels.1161 Second, countries
possessing nuclear weapons should not equip other nations with a nuclear arsenal.1162
Third, countries who had not developed or obtained nuclear weapons in the past should
refrain from doing so in the future.1163
Helsinki Accords and MBFR. Around the same time the NPT was negotiated, both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact toyed with the idea of entering further talks to improve rela-
tions.1164 However, due to divergent expectations and contesting agendas, the preparation
of a multinational conference, which later became known as the Helsinki Accords, proved
to be a difficult process. In 1967, the incumbent Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Pierre Harmel, proposed reviewing NATO’s situation and to publish recommendations
on the alliance’s future strategy.1165 The findings of the so-called Harmel report were
twofold; first NATO’s emphasis should be shifted from retaliation to defence.1166 Second,
1157 cf. ibid.
1158 ibid.
1159 Dieter O.A. Wolf, ‘Zur Deutschland-, Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’,
eds. Günter Walpuski, and Dieter O.A. Wolf (Munich: Oldenburg, 1979), 126-127.









NATO members should proactively determine approaches that would aid in improving the
relationship with the Eastern Bloc.1167 In principle, the Warsaw Pact’s strategic estimates
mirrored this reasoning why it suggested entering negotiations with the West, which were
supposed to lead to troop reductions in Europe.1168
Notwithstanding common interests, the Warsaw Pact initially did not want to consult with
the United States but was interested in talks with European nations.1169 In 1969, the
Finnish Government proposed holding talks in Helsinki and the Eastern Bloc submitted
a list of suggested topics, which included mutual renunciation of violence as well as
economic, academic and technological co-operation.1170 While supporting this approach,
NATO did not just yet agree on a meeting, as member countries demanded the participation
of the United States and Canada.1171 Moreover, NATO stipulated that the subject of MBFR
needed to be added to the agenda. Eventually, in 1970, both parties agreed on the agenda,
and the Warsaw Pact consented to allowing the United States and Canada to be part of the
conference.1172
In 1972, negotiations eventually commenced and proceeded in three phases.1173 From
late 1972 to the spring of 1973, the participating nations started preparing the meeting
in Helsinki.1174 Subsequently, in the summer of 1973, participating countries’ ministers
for foreign affairs convened to commence negotiations.1175 Finally, from autumn of 1973
through the summer of 1975, delegations from 35 states held talks and agreed in a final
act on numerous measures that were believed to foster mutual trust.1176 Widely regarded
as one of the most crucial documents for starting the era of détente, the Helsinki Accords
of 01 August 1975 included propositions for co-operation in trade, academia, technology













be fostered by facilitating cultural and educational exchange.1178 Besides, the Helsinki
Accords further marked the West’s acceptance of the status quo in Europe and the Soviet
Union’s recognition that the United States reserved the right to intervene in European
affairs.1179
Although demanded by NATO in 1969, MBFR was not discussed in Helsinki.1180 Instead,
separate negotiations commenced on 30 October 1973 to confer if it was possible to
agree on means to reduce troops on a mutual and balanced basis.1181 Moreover, strategies
concerning arms control and co-ordinated crisis management were put on the agenda.1182
Although no tangible progress was made until the end of the 1970s, negotiations were
appreciated as a forum to discuss and built trust.1183
SALT-I and SALT-II. Simultaneously to the Helsinki Accords and MBFR negotiations,
the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the so-called Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT), which aimed to limit the expansion of anti-ballistic missile systems.1184
The first round of meetings, SALT-I, were held between 1969 and 1972 and concluded
with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM-Treaty).1185 In Article 1, the superpowers
agreed not to install a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system.1186 Moreover, Article 9
prohibited signatories to share this technology with other nations, while Article 5 banned
the instalment of an early warning system.1187
The SALT-II negotiations took place between 1972 and 1979 and somewhat constituted
the continuation of SALT-I.1188 Its primary goal was to limit a nuclear arms race, however,







1184 cf. Dieter O.A. Wolf, ‘Zur Deutschland-, Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land’, 136.
1185 ibid., and Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. S.U.-U.S., 26 May 1972.
1186 ibid.
1187 ibid.




Four Power Agreement on Berlin. Due to the involvement of the two superpowers and
numerous European actors, the above-discussed treaties had a truly global character. The
Four Power Agreement on Berlin, on the other hand, not only intended to stabilised the
European security situation but also had implications for the citizens of West-Berlin.1190
Signed on 03 September 1971, the agreement’s primary goals were threefold; first, it aimed
to prevent future conflicts by placing relations of the involved parties as regards Berlin on a
firm legal footing.1191 Therefore, jurisdictions and allied rights in Berlin were affirmed in
Art. 1(3).1192 Furthermore, the signatories agreed to solve arising difficulties by peaceful
means.1193 Second, the Soviet Union agreed not to block access routes to West-Berlin
and guarantee a safe passage for transit.1194 Third, to facilitate contact between family
members on both sides, the Soviet Union was not to intervene in telecommunications
between the enclave and the GDR.1195 Moreover, citizens of West-Berlin should be treated
in the same way as other tourists travelling to the GDR.1196
5.1.3.2 The German Perspective Détente
Security Concerns and Strategies. As the aforementioned agreements demonstrate,
Germany’s European and partners were keen to reach détente with the Eastern Bloc during
the 1970s. Their intentions were presumably congruent with Germany’s, namely, to
stabilise Europe’s security situation.1197
From NATO’s perspective, the latter would have been severely harmed by an annexation
of West-Germany as this event would have weakened the alliances’ military and strategic
1189 ibid.
1190 Viermächte-Abkommen zwischen den USA, der UdSSR, Großbritannien und Frankreich vom 3. Septem-
ber 1971, U.S.-S.U.-U.K.-F.R., 03 September 1971.
1191 cf. ibid., Art. 1.
1192 ibid.
1193 ibid., Art. 1(1) and 1(2).
1194 This included all routes, namely, land, air and waterways; cf. ibid., Art. II(B).
1195 ibid., Art. II(C).
1196 ibid.
1197 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 7 et seq.
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clout. Moreover, it would have shifted the Warsaw Pact’s influence further to the West.1198
Therefore, troops from six NATO members where stationed in Germany.1199 For Germany,
on the other hand, easing tensions with the Warsaw Pact was essential for survival. As
she directly bordered the Eastern Bloc, Germany would have been the first victim of the
Warsaw Pact’s aggression.1200 Furthermore, the German government was burdened with
the responsibility to prevent a fraternal war, which the Bundeswehr would have had to fight
with the GDR’s National People’s Army (NPA).
In addition to supporting SALT and signing both the Helsinki Accords and the NPT,
the government, therefore, pursued further strategies to develop good relations with the
Eastern Bloc.1201 Referred to as the Neue Ostpolitik, Germany’s contemporary approach
was primarily based on the attempt to reach bilateral agreements with Eastern countries.1202
Central to the negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR, and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic (CSSR) were to outlaw the use of force and to foster person-to-person
contacts between civilians.1203
Prerequisites and Obstacles. Notwithstanding Germany’s good intentions, the govern-
ment had to deliver specific prerequisites and overcome certain obstacles to enter and




1201 Prior and (or) in addition to the discussed treaties, Germany signed the Outer Space Treaty (1967),
the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971) and the Biological Weapons Convention(1972); cf. Die
Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 42, and Günter Walpuski, Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit:
Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 179 et seq., and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. S.U.-U.K.-U.S., 01 July 1968.
1202 cf. Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 3.
1203 cf. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepub-
liken: ‘Moskauer Vertrag’ vom 12. August 1970, D.E.-S.U., 12 August 1970, Vertrag zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer
gegenseitigen Beziehungen: ‘Warschauer Vertrag’ vom 7. Dezember 1970, D.E.-P.L., 07 December
1970, Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 21. Dezember 1972, D.E.-D.D., 21 December 1972, and
Vertrag über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschech-
oslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: ‘Prager Vertrag’ vom 11. Dezember 1973, D.E.-C.S.S.R., 11
December 1973.
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top priority of every German government.1204 While this aspiration is understandable from
an emotional point of view, it also indicated that Germany did not accept contemporary
borders and nation-state territories.1205 Aware of this quandary, then-Chancellor Willy
Brandt, the architect of the Neue Ostpolitik, chose to abandon reunification for the time
being and instead favour the progress of détente.1206 While this decision was accompan-
ied by a fierce public debate in Germany and was certainly not made lightheartedly, her
allies were less than thrilled to watch Germany engage in bilateral talks with the Eastern
Bloc.1207 Fearing that Germany could draw nearer to the East and leave the Western
alliance, the British, French, and American ambassadors to Moscow tried to intervene
in negotiations and prevent Germany from signing a treaty with the Soviet Union.1208
Perceiving this conduct as an attempt to meddle in German foreign affairs and, therefore,
curtailing Germany’s sovereignty, this endeavour lead to a fallout between Germany and
her allies;1209 most notably with Britain, which German politicians regarded the driving
forces behind this endeavour.1210
Treaty of Moscow. Despite these difficulties, the first treaty of the Neue Ostpolitik, the
Treaty of Moscow, was signed on 12 August 1970.1211 The prerequisite was explicitly
mentioned in Art 3., which stated that peace could only be sustained when both signatory
parties mutually accepted contemporary borders and refrained from making territorial
claims, now and in the future.1212 Consequently, Germany did not only abandon her
quest for a rapid reunification with the GDR but also officially abandoned the idea of
reclaiming former German territories in the East. The most important resolutions, however,
were outlined in Art. 1 and 2;1213 in the former, the Soviet Union and Germany declared








1211 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken:




that it was their goal to preserve peace and that they would strive to work on developing
normal relations.1214 Moreover, in Art. 2, both signatories committed themselves to solve
differences by peaceful means without threatening to resort to violence.1215 Although
the latter may appear logical from today’s perspective, this pledge did indeed mark the
beginning of détente between the Soviet Union and Germany and replaced a 15 years state
of apprehension.
Treaty of Warsaw. Following the Treaty of Moscow, Germany signed another crucial
agreement with an Eastern Bloc country, namely, with Poland.1216 Considering Germany’s
inhuman treatment of the Polish people in the first half of the 20th-century, reaching this
agreement, from a human relations perspective, was even more important than the Treaty
of Moscow. Moreover, for it to come into being, both parties needed to meet some specific
prerequisites, that were less technical than territorial issues. For Poland, signing such an
agreement with the (former) enemy requested working through the grief and humiliation
inflicted upon her people in two World Wars. Due to Germany’s accumulated moral debt,
on the other hand, she had to admit to her guilt publicly and ask for forgiveness. Besides
fulfilling the latter technocratically on the political level, a genuine act of repentance
was expressed by then-Chancellor Willy Brandt when he famously kneeled in front of
the Warsaw Ghetto memorial only hours before the Treaty of Warsaw was signed on 07
December 1970.1217
While negotiations for the Treaty of Warsaw demanded significant political and human
efforts on both sides, the agreement itself largely mirrored the Treaty of Moscow.1218 In Art.
1, both signatories committed themselves to accepting contemporary borders and refraining
1214 ibid.
1215 ibid.
1216 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen
der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen: ‘Warschauer Vertrag’ vom 7. Dezember 1970,
D.E.-P.L., 07 December 1970.
1217 Bernd Rother, ‘Willy Brandt: Der Kniefall von Warschau’, eds. Claudia Fröhlich, and Michael Kohl-
struck (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1999), 299 et seq.
1218 cf. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepub-
liken: ‘Moskauer Vertrag’ vom 12. August 1970, D.E.-S.U., 12 August 1970, and Vertrag zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer
gegenseitigen Beziehungen: ‘Warschauer Vertrag’ vom 7. Dezember 1970, D.E.-P.L., 07 December
1970.
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from claiming territories from the other party, now and in the future.1219 Furthermore,
and again similar to the Treaty of Moscow, Art. 2 determined that conflicts should not be
solved by the use of force or the threatening of the other party but should be answered
by peaceful means.1220 Art. 3, however, was more explicit as regards person-to-person
contacts and stipulated that the normalisation of relations should be obtained by enabling
exchange on the economic, academic, technological and cultural level.
Basic Treaty. Signing such an agreement with Poland had already been a milestone
for the Neue Ostpolitik. However, from an emotional and practical perspective, the
Basic Treaty, which was concluded with the GDR on 21 December 1972, was even more
important for Germany.1221 On the one hand, it entailed the prospect of improving the lives
for civilians on both sides of the border by enabling and fostering contacts between family
members.1222 This, according to the Art. 7 of the treaty, was supposed to be achieved
by mutual socio-economic, technological and cultural exchange.1223 More importantly,
however, was the ambition to improve mail and telecommunication services and to co-
operate in legal affairs.1224
Furthermore, the agreement also marked the establishment of diplomatic relations between
the two German states.1225 This step was mainly enabled through mutual acknowledge-
ment of the political and legal status quo, which was highlighted in several articles of
the agreement.1226 Art. 1, for instance, stated that both countries accepted the other
party as equal before the law and pledged to work towards establishing good and normal
neighbourly relations.1227 In Art. 2, 4, and 6, the pari passu status was further under-
1219 ibid.
1220 ibid.
1221 cf. Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 43.
1222 ibid.
1223 Specific provisions were not stated in the Basic Treaty but were governed by additional treaties. These
included agreements on issues regarding traffic (26 May 1972), health (25 April 1974), banking and
money transactions (25 April 1974), as well as post and telecommunications (30 March 1976); cf. Günter
Walpuski, and Dieter O.A. Wolf, ‘Zur Entwicklung der Internationalen Politik’, 138-139.
1224 cf. Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 21. Dezember 1972, D.E.-D.D., 21 December 1972, Art. 7.




scored;1228 the former specifically acknowledged the status quo as regards the countries
borders and territories and, for the first time, officially recognised the existence of the
‘other’ Germany.1229 In Art. 4 and 6, on the other hand, the signatories emphasised their
sovereignty by stating that both states were autonomous in domestic and foreign affairs and
affirmed that one party could not act on behalf of the other on the international level.1230
As regards the use of force or the threat thereof in times of conflict, Art. 3 was congruent
with the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Poland and emphasised that differ-
ences were to be solved by peaceful means.1231 Nevertheless, the Basic Treaty took this
idea a step forward and highlighted in Art. 5 that their contribution to peace in Europe
was to work together to reduce the number of troops in Europe.1232 In addition to this
medium-term goal, both signatories affirmed their goal was to ultimately banish all nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction from the continent.1233
Treaty of Prague. Similar to the Basic Treaty, the Treaty of Prague, which was signed
on 11 December 1973, marked the beginning of diplomatic relations between Germany and
the CSSR.1234 Again, administrations on both sides had to make specific concessions.1235
First, in Art. 1, both parties declared the 1938 agreement on the Sudetenland invalid.1236
For Germany, agreeing to this provision meant that she she had abandoned plans to reclaim
territories in the East; a decision, which was not well received by displaced persons in
Germany, who were expelled from the Sudetenland after World War Two.1237 The CSSR,






1233 cf. ibid., Art 5(2).
1234 cf. Vertrag über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: ‘Prager Vertrag’ vom 11. Dezember 1973, D.E.-
C.S.S.R., 11 December 1973.
1235 cf. ibid., Art. 1 and 2.
1236 This so-called Munich Agreement or Diktat, signed by Nazi-Germany, Britain, France and Italy, had
forced the CSSR’s predecessor to render the Sudetenland to the Nazis; cf. ibid., and Abkommen
zwischen Deutschland, dem Vereinigten Königreich, Frankreich und Italien, Getroffen in München, am
29. September 1938, D.E.-U.K.-F.R.-I.T., 29 September 1938.
1237 cf. ‘Das Münchner Abkommen 1938’, LEMO: Lebendiges Museum, 02 May 2002, accessed 03 May
2014, https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/ns-regime/aussenpolitik/muenchnerabkommen.
193
territorial claims in the future.1238 In Art. 3 and 4, both signatories further underscored
that they accepted contemporary borders as biding and proclaimed their willingness for
closer collaboration in economics, academia, technology, culture, environmental protection,
sports and traffic in Art. 5.1239
5.2 The Reserve in the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform
5.2.1 The 1970s: Discovering the Importance of the Reserve
As seen in the previous section, the MoD and the 1972-CSR produced various defence
reviews throughout the 1970s and even published the results of an examination of the
Bundeswehr’s reserve in 1971. While the latter was presumably well intended, it did not
significantly adapt the reserve force’s structures but merely limited reservists’ obligations
to participate in military exercises. However, when economic challenges increasingly
exercised financial pressures on the defence budget, the MoD began acknowledging the
importance of reservists’ for Germany’s defence posture. Although no separate review of
the was conducted, reservists’ responsibilities changed significantly as of 1973. On the
following pages, this post-1973 development is discussed by highlighting reservists’ place
in the Bundeswehr’s structures.
5.2.1.1 The Reserve Force and the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform
From Neglect to Necessity. From its foundation in 1955 to the beginning of the 1970s,
the Bundeswehr did not consider reservists’ participation crucial for Germany’s de-
fence.1240 Reasons for this judgement were twofold; first, in the 1950s and 1960s, the
threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion was imminent why the Bundeswehr needed to have large
numbers of combat-ready troops at its disposal.1241 Until the 1970s, the MoD met this
prerequisite comfortably as the conscription ratio was high and cases of conscientious
1238 cf. Vertrag über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: ‘Prager Vertrag’ vom 11. Dezember 1973, D.E.-
C.S.S.R., 11 December 1973.
1239 ibid.




objection were low.1242 Second, due to NATO’s strategy of massive retaliation, which was
primarily built on the United State’s ability to protect her European allies with her nuclear
weapons arsenal, military planners felt somewhat secure in case the Soviet Union was to
launch an attack on Germany.1243
In the early 1970s, however, this deliberate neglect of reservists gradually began to change
and was eventually replaced with a strong dependence on the reserve.1244 This development
commenced in 1973, when the MoD announced its intention to restructure the Bundeswehr
and to ‘outsource’ specific responsibilities to the reserve force.1245 The framing factors
of this strategy change were mainly twofold; first, with NATO’s transition from massive
retaliation to a doctrine of flexible response in the mid-1960s, the Bundeswehr was required
to ensure a rapid augmentation of skilled troops.1246 Therefore, reservists, i.e., retired
Zeitsoldaten and Wehrpflichtige, now needed to be trained more efficiently for cases of
emergencies.1247 Second, due to high birth rates in the previous decades, more youngsters
than ever before reached the military age in the 1970s, which increasingly complicated the
implementation of Wehrgerechtigkeit.1248 Therefore, in conjunction with changing public
attitudes towards the armed forces, the number of conscientious objectors rose dramatically
as of 1968, which made recruitment of skilled service members more challenging.1249
Personnel vs. Procurement. In addition to these unfavourable circumstances, the gov-
ernment also imposed severe economies on the MoD as of 1973 while expressing that
they expected the Bundeswehr to retain combat-readiness.1250 This demand would have
already been difficult to meet under normal conditions; however, it indeed came at the
worst possible time. In the 1970 defence review, experts had already voiced concerns that
military capabilities were at stake if the Bundeswehr was not able to invest in procurement
1242 Please refer to Subsection 5.2.2 for further details.
1243 cf. Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage
der Bundeswehr, 58.
1244 cf. Martin Rink, Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989, 58.
1245 cf. Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage
der Bundeswehr, 68, and 112.
1246 cf. ibid., 58.
1247 ibid.
1248 cf. Peter Richard Munz, ‘Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur’, 19.
1249 Please refer to Subsection 5.2.2 for further details.
1250 cf. ibid., 71-72, and Tables 5.1, and 5.2.
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to keep up with advancements in military technology.1251 Meanwhile, the situation had
further worsened as maintenance costs had increased disproportionally and, therefore,
made retaining outdated equipment more costly;1252 both as regards military capabilities
and financially.1253 In other words, it had become inevitable to discontinue enforcing
the procurement freeze of 1970.1254 To allow compensating for less federal funding and
investment in necessary equipment updates, the 1973/74 Defence White Paper, therefore,
opted to save personnel costs, which, at the time, accounted for the most substantial portion
of operating expenses.1255 Consequently, the MoD determined that troops were to be
reduced by 30,000.1256
Reservists’ Obligation to Serve. While no specific review of reserve forces was con-
ducted, the decision to reduce troop strength had severe implications for reservists. At
the time, military planners calculated that the Bundeswehr needed 1.2 million service
members during times of conflict and 495,000 in peacetime.1257 By cutting manpower
by 30,000, however, the latter would have been reduced to 465,000, which would have
left the MoD with a significant capabilities gap.1258 Therefore, speaking from a strategic
standpoint, implementing the proposed manpower cut of 30,000 was not feasible. On the
other hand, redundancies were deemed inevitable to meet the required savings goals and to
make necessary investments in equipment.1259
To solve this quandary, the MoD, resorted to a trick, which allowed implementing the
proposed redundancies of regular troops but kept total Bundeswehr numbers at 495,000.
Already before 1973, retired Zeitsoldaten and Wehrpflichtige were obliged to prepare to
1251 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der
Bundeswehr. 139-141.
1252 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 76-77.
1253 cf. ibid.
1254 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der
Bundeswehr. 139.
1255 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 71 et seq.
1256 ibid., 68.
1257 ibid.
1258 cf. Wilhelm Langer, ‘Reservisten des Heeres’, 162.
1259 Der Bundeskanzler, Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der
Bundeswehr. 139.
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be mobilised for service in regular Bundeswehr units upon completion of their term;1260
however, the Bundeswehr could only require reservists (Wehrpflichtige) to report for duty
for the first three months after leaving their mandatory service. In the course of the 1973
Wehrstrukturreform, this period was extended to 12 months. Often, this novel provision
meant that new reservists received their marching orders within a couple of days after they
had processed out of the Bundeswehr.1261
Adaptations to Training. During their additional term, reservists did not work jobs
created explicitly for reservists but filled posts that were previously held by Zeit- or
Berufssoldaten;1262 therefore, enabling the MoD to implement the required redundancies
without reducing the Bundeswehr’s total troop strength.1263 To carry out these duties,
reservists needed to acquire specific skills, which were often not taught to conscripts.1264
To eliminate this problem, the MoD decided to select Wehrpflichtige for consecutive
reservist duty already during their mandatory term.1265 Chosen recruits were, therefore,
not attached to combat forces but received specialised on-the-job training to ensure that
they would be capable of filling these posts later.1266
5.2.1.2 Reservists and Homeland Defence
Homeland Defence Structures. In the early days of the Bundeswehr, military planners
had widely neglected to develop solid structures for homeland defence.1267 A first attempt
to close this strategic gap was taken on 01 June 1957, when the Command for Territorial
Defence was established to act as a liaison between the Bundeswehr and NATO troops
stationed in Germany after World War Two.1268 Following the Soviet invasion of the CSSR
1260 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 68.
1261 Wilhelm Langer, ‘Reservisten des Heeres’, 162.
1262 ibid.
1263 ibid.
1264 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 71-72.
1265 ibid., 73.
1266 ibid.
1267 Martin Rink, Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989, 75.
1268 ibid.
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in 1968, however, homeland defence increasingly moved into the MoD’s focus.1269 With
the Blankeneser Erlass of 31 March 1970, the Army was restructured and now consisted of
the Feldheer and Territorialheer.1270 While the former chiefly replaced the now abolished
Command for Territorial Defence, the latter was entrusted with the responsibility of
homeland defence in the event of war.1271 The Territorialheer was structured as an infantry
and consisted of homeland defence units, the so-called Heimatschutztruppen, which were
predominantly staffed with reservists.1272 Until the beginning of the 1970s, the MoD
allocated 235 peacetime troops to the Heimatschutztruppen;1273 in times of conflict, this
number was to be augmented to 9,000.1274
Reservists Responsibilities. By placing the responsibility for homeland defence in the
hands of the Territorialheer and its Heimatschutztruppen, the Bundeswehr had already
been highly dependent on reservists.1275 However, following the implementation of
the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform, this dependence increased further as the total number of
troops assigned to the Heimatschutztruppen rose to 45,000 (peacetime) and 103,000
(wartime).1276 With this augmentation, the MoD intended strengthening the Bundeswehr’s
presence in Germany despite having been forced to implement the aforementioned 30,000
redundancies.1277 Consequently, reservists were mostly assigned the responsibility to
defend German territory and to protect critical infrastructure.1278
Similar to the situation of reservists serving consecutively in regular units, this strategy
was somewhat inhibited by the lack of appropriate training.1279 Again, reservists had to
1269 Wilhelm Langer, ‘Reservisten des Heeres’, 154.
1270 ibid., 153-154.
1271 ibid., 153.
1272 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 96.
1273 Martin Rink, Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989, 76.
1274 ibid.
1275 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 96.
1276 cf. Martin Rink, Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989, 75-76.
1277 cf. Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 61.
1278 Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 113.
1279 cf. Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 112.
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be re-educated to make sure that the MoD would be able to successfully integrate them in
the Heimatschutztruppen’s infantry structures.1280 Training was, therefore, paramount to
enable reservists to fulfil their responsibilities in homeland defence.1281 To ensure a rapid
acquisition of necessary skills, new competencies were taught in the framework of military
exercises, which were held for up to 28 consecutive days.1282 Moreover, by assigning
reservists to the same units, training was repeated regularly.1283
5.2.2 Recruitment and the Außerparlamentarische Opposition
In his government declaration of 1969, then-Chancellor Willy Brandt already referred
to social changes, which he believed would significantly influence how the public will
perceive the Bundeswehr in the years to come.1284 This statement has to be understood in
the light of burgeoning student protests and the strengthening of the Außerparlamentarische
Opposition (APO). Both developments have contributed to a somewhat Bundeswehr
hostile climate, which, in turn, largely resulted in the rise of conscientious objection
in the 1970s. As the MoD already received an insufficient number of applications by
qualified individuals, the Bundeswehr faced substantial recruitment problems. As no
recruitment strategies other than the Wehrpflicht were in place, the Bundeswehr tried
to keep conscientious objection as low as possible by intensifying the scrutiny process
of prospective conscientious objectors. On the following pages, the 1970s increase in
conscientious objection is discussed in conjunction with explaining the origins of the
student protests and the APO’s main characteristics and political goals.
1280 For instance, reservists who were trained to stir a tank had to be taught relevant infantry skills; ibid.
1281 Besides this skills deficit, the Heimatschutztruppen were provided with insufficient and too little
equipment. This problem persisted throughout the 1970s; cf. Die Bundesregierung, Weißbuch 1975/1976:
Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, 113, and Gerhard
Brugmann, ‘Reservisten in Planung und Einsatz’, 108.
1282 ibid.
1283 ibid.
1284 Willy Brandt, Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in
Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969, 15-16.
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5.2.2.1 Kriegsdienstverweigerung
Conscious Objection in Numbers. In the 1971-COR, the MoD highlighted that the Bun-
deswehr had sufficient numbers of reservists at its disposal;1285 however, non-commissioned
officers and commissioned officers were rarely found in the reserve.1286 To recruit these
kinds of service members, the Bundeswehr had to rely on conscripts who were willing to
contribute additional efforts to their service and were motivated to advance their military
careers beyond the completion of their Wehrdienst.
As illustrated in Table 5.3, chances of finding such conscripts became increasingly chal-
lenging in the 1970s. As displayed by the numbers in Table 5.3 this trend already started
in 1968, when conscientious objection suddenly increased by 100.4 per cent. Being only
disrupted by three negative outliers in 1974, 1975, and 1978, this development continued
throughout the 1970s when ever more Wehrpflichtige applied to be recognised as Kriegs-
dienstverweigerer. The applications’ approval rates, on the other hand, did not develop
linear and appear somewhat arbitrary; on average, 46.66 per cent approvals were granted.
The Testing of Conscience. In the first years following the foundation of the Bundes-
wehr in 1955, conscientious objection was the exception to the rule.1287 According to
Munz, recruits willingness to serve can be explained by contemporary social norms, which
perceived Kriegsdienstverweigerung a deviation to the norm.1288 Therefore, the Bundes-
wehr generously ignored the few conscientious objectors during this period and did not
require applicants to jump through stringent bureaucratic hoops.1289
As Kriegsdienstverweigerung became more frequent, however, the Bundeswehr increas-
ingly felt the need to put a halt to this development.1290 Changing legislation to limit
individuals’ rights to object conscription was not an option. Being part of the Grundgesetz,
1285 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Reservistenkonzeption 1971, cited in Dietmar Schössler, and
Armin Steinkamm, Reservisten ‘71/‘72: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Reservistenverbandes,
170.
1286 ibid.
1287 ‘Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde’, TV documentary Geschichte im Ersten, reported by Knut Weinrich,
broadcasted by ARD, 12 March 2018.
1288 Peter Richard Munz, ‘Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur’, 81.
1289 ‘Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde’, TV documentary Geschichte im Ersten.
1290 ibid.
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Table 5.3: Kriegsdienstverweigerer (1965-1980)
Year Applications Applications Applications Approvals Approval Rate
(Total) (D in per cent) (Approved) (D in per cent) (In per cent)
1965 3,437 n/a* 2,064 n/a* 60.05
1966 4,431 22.43 2,750 33.24 62.06
1967 5,963 34.57 4,739 72.33 79.47
1968 11,952 100.4 5,588 17.9 46.8
1969 14,420 20.6 7,500 34.2 52.0
1970 19,363 34.3 9,351 24.7 48.3
1971 27,657 42.8 11,033 18.0 39.9
1972 33,792 22.2 13,132 19.0 38.9
1973 35,192 4.1 16,649 26.8 47.3
1974 34,150 -3.0 18,621 11.8 54.5
1975 32,565 -4.6 18,496 -0.7 56.8
1976 40,618 24.7 16,505 -10.8 40.6
1977 69,969 72.3 18,474 11.9 26.4
1978 39,698 -43.3 18,414 -0.3 46.4
1979 45,515 14.7 30,727 66.9 67.5
1980 54,193 19.1 30,250 -1.6 55.8
*Baseline = 1965.
Günter Walpuski, Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,116,
including own calculations.
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Kriegsdienstverweigerung on the grounds of conscience was an undeniable right.1291 To
circumvent this obstacle, the MoD, therefore, began to demand applicants to undergo
a time-consuming, stressful and often humiliation process to prove that they genuinely
wanted to object conscription on the grounds of their conscience.1292
This method became known as the Gewissensprüfung or the testing of one’s conscience
and consisted of a two-step process.1293 First, applicants needed to submit a written request
explaining their motivation.1294 Subsequently, prospective conscientious objectors were
forced to appear in front of a Bundeswehr panel and repeat their reasons.1295 During
these encounters, Bundeswehr representatives often confronted applicants with indiscreet
personal and trick questions. A frequently asked question was to require applicants to
elaborate on what they would do if an armed assailant attacked their mothers, partners or
wives. If they answered that they would defend them with force, the MoD usually denied
the approval as conscientious objectors.1296
In an attempt to counter the Bundeswehr’s conduct, a network of dedicated lawyers tried
to coach prospective conscientious objectors.1297 However, as seen in Table 5.3, approvals
and rejections did not follow a discernible pattern but were somewhat arbitrary. Reasons
for this were twofold; first, these panels were not based on due process.1298 Instead of
unbiased judges, Bundeswehr representatives constituted these committees.1299 Instructed
by the MoD to decrease the numbers of Kriegsdienstverweigerer, these people cannot
be described as impartial.1300 Second, the MoD did not publish any generally binding
guidelines on how to conduct the hearings.
1291 To change the Grundgesetz, the government needs the consent of two-thirds of the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat; GG Art. 4(3), and GG 79(2).
1292 cf. Patrick Bernhard, ‘Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Zivildienst’ (bpb Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 2013), accessed 15 July 2019, http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verteidigungsp
olitik/216758/kriegsdienstverweigerung.









Social Reservations, Acceptance, and Zivildienst. Reflecting this somewhat hostile
and biased process, the high number of applicants for conscience objection in the 1970s
is quite astonishing. Nevertheless, the contemporary social climate at the time seemed
to have supported this development. When Kriegsdienstverweigerung became more
frequent, society initially sided with the Bundeswehr;1301 conscientious objectors were
largely shunned and perceived as cowards or being lazy.1302 Over time, however, attitudes
gradually changed and acceptance for their decision grew.
Evidence for this can be found by looking at the number of posts offered to Zivildienstleis-
tende. As illustrated by Table 5.4, only a small number of posts was available until 1968.
Yet, coinciding with the rise in Kriegsdienstverweigerung in 1968, ever more organisations
started offering opportunities to fulfil the Wehrpflicht by contributing time and efforts to
social causes. In consequence, society started accepting that conscientious objectors were
not lazy but instead were genuine when they stated that they did not want to serve the
country by carrying a rifle.1303
5.2.2.2 Student Protest and the Außerparlamentarische Opposition
The 1968 Generation. The first generation of Bundeswehr recruits was born between
1937 and 1950. Being the children of former Wehrmacht soldiers, these youngsters were
raised to accept that serving in the armed forces was the norm.1304 However, as discussed
on the previous pages, these attitudes drastically changed in the late 1960s. Instead of
blindly following their parents’ directives, young adults began questioning their countries’
and their parents’ past.1305 Known in Germany as the 1968 Generation, this generation
demanded the full democratisation of the nation by calling for ‘former’ Nazis to be removed
from their jobs in the public sector.1306 As regards the Bundeswehr, the 1968 Generation’s
1301 ibid.
1302 ibid.
1303 cf. Patrick Bernhard, ‘Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Zivildienst’.
1304 Peter Richard Munz, ‘Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur’, 81.
1305 ‘Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF’, TV documentary, broadcasted by
ZDFinfo, 08 January 2015.
1306 Following World War Two, a workforce shortage forced representatives of the allied nations to reinstate
‘former’ members of the Nazi party as judges, teacher, professors, politicians, police officers and Bun-
deswehr service members. Despite their disreputable past, these individuals worked in their professions
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Table 5.4: Zivildienstleistende (1965-1980)
Year Total Total Available Posts Available Posts
(D in per cent) (D in per cent)
1965 1,416 n/a* n/s** n/s**
1966 11,75 -17.02 n/s** n/s**
1967 1,542 31.23 n/s** n/s**
1968 1,762 14.27 2,815 n/s**
1969 2,589 46.94 4,720 67.67
1970 4,853 87.45 5,879 24.56
1971 6,148 26.68 8,032 36.62
1972 8,762 42.52 11,145 38.76
1973 10,640 21.43 16,709 49.92
1974 13,643 28.22 22,000 31.67
1975 15,105 10.72 24,214 10.06
1976 16,254 7.61 30,941 27.78
1977 18,316 12.69 36,108 16.70
1978 25,513 39.29 37,802 4.69
1979 26,794 5.02 43,800 15.87
1980 31,871 18.95 47,099 7.53
*Baseline = 1965.
**No statistics kept.
Günter Walpuski, Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 117,
including own calculations.
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attitudes were as firm. Stipulating that the Wehrpflicht violated a conscript’s constitutional
rights of personal freedom and physical integrity, serving in the Bundeswehr was frowned
upon as an act of voluntarily giving up one’s human rights.1307
Even though it cannot be claimed that all members of this age cohort shared the exact
same values, peer pressure might have worked as a catalyst for objecting conscription;
especially in the group the Bundeswehr was most interested in for recruiting officers
from, namely, students. Triggered by the United State’s war in Vietnam, German students,
alongside their peers in France and North America, started organising themselves in
protests against militarism and the ongoing violation of human rights.1308 Being the
host of numerous American military bases, students particularly perceived the German
government as complicit in this war on humanity.1309
Außerparlamentarische Opposition. Another issue on the 1968 Generation’s agenda
was preventing the ratification of the so-called emergency laws. When the Grundgesetz
was drafted and approved by the allies, the latter retained the right to intervene in Germany
if their interests or their troops’ safety was compromised by civil unrest, external military
aggression or other domestic circumstances.1310 In order to put some authority back
into German hands, the incumbent grand coalition sought to amend the Grundgesetz by
including legislation that would allow the government to act during domestic emergencies
without requiring the consent of the Bundestag.1311 While this undertaking is generally
comprehensible and appears logical, the intellectual youth of Germany and their supporters
were alarmed.1312 In addition to removing power from the parliament, these new laws
included the infringement of GG Art. 10, which guaranteed the privacy of correspondence,
posts and telecommunications.1313 Although claiming that legislation would only be
applied in the state of emergency, students worried that the government would declare their
unchallenged for almost two decades; ibid.
1307 ibid., and ‘Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde’, TV documentary Geschichte im Ersten.
1308 ‘Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF’.
1309 ibid.
1310 Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris (2005), 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005, 100-101.
1311 cf. Jeannine V. de Soet, ‘Public Opinion Pressures on German Security Policy’, eds. Alexandre
Vautravers, and Daniel Donovan (Geneva, GE: Uni-Mail), 170.
1312 ibid., 171.
1313 Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris (2005), 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005, 102.
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protests a state of civil unrest and use the laws to spy on them.1314 However, the public’s
greatest fear at the time was to relapse into the Weimarer Republik, when emergency laws
enabled the Nazis to rule uncontestedly and, therefore, eventually contributed to Hitler’s
rise to power.1315
Due to the small Bundestag’s opposition, the grand coalition could not be overruled, which
made the passing of the emergency laws very likely.1316 In an attempt to bring their
views forward, students, politicians from the opposition as well as various other supporters
such as lawyers and journalists formed the APO.1317 With frequent protests in all major
German cities, the APO tried to sway lawmakers’ votes.1318 Nevertheless, the Bundestag
passed the emergency laws on 05 May 1968;1319 yet, they were not as far-reaching as
initially intended.1320 First, instead of placing power into the hands of the government,
an emergency parliament resembling Bundestag’s allocation of seats was to convened in
cases of emergency.1321 Second, the executive, namely, police forces, were prohibited
from violating the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications.1322
5.3 Key Findings
1. The chapter’s evaluation of Defence White Papers and accompanying government
publications highlighted that the MoD had to contribute to overall economization
measures in the 1970s, which were the direct result of financial constraints following
the 1973 oil price shock. At the same time, the MoD needed to update its equipment,
which would have increased defence expenditure. The MoD, therefore, ultimately
decided to favour procurement plans and implemented 30,000 redundancies in the
regular force to realise savings.
1314 cf. ‘Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF’.
1315 Jeannine V. de Soet, ‘Public Opinion Pressures on German Security Policy’, 171.
1316 ibid.
1317 ibid.
1318 cf. ‘Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF’.





2. By examining the development of defence spending throughout the 1970s, statistical
evidence for the influence of the 1973 oil price shock on the MoD’s budget was
found. It was highlighted that defence expenditure started to decrease after 1973
both in total and relative numbers.
3. The analysis of various international and bilateral agreements has revealed that the
Soviet threat was of central concern to German defence planners in the 1970s. How-
ever, it was stipulated that the government placed great trust in these contracts, and,
therefore, estimated that the détente aided in improving Germany’s contemporary
security situation.
4. The chapter outlined that the reform of Germany’s reserve forces was an ongoing
process in the 1970s. While only moderate adaptations to training obligations were
implemented before the 1973 oil price shock, the MoD started to realise the potential
of reservists once it had to enforce significant redundancies in the regular force.
In fact, the examination of reservists’ roles in homeland defence revealed that the




Comparative Analyses and Conclusion
Qui bene distinguit, bene docet!1323
This study commenced based on the motivation to explore how governments reform their
national reserve forces in times of economic turmoil. By comparing European countries
with a high extraneous and experimental variance, it was further aspired to assess whether
financially driven defence reviews produce similar adaptations to national reserve forces or
not. Therefore, Chapters Two through Four explored examples of reserve forces’ reforms
in times of economic turmoil in Britain and Germany. While the chapters followed a
similar blueprint, country-specific aspects were respected in the discussions. For instance,
the investigation of the British examples concentrated on the implications of the reforms
for the single services. As regards the German examples, on the other hand, the exploration
focused on the suspension of conscription and societal developments and obstacles.
In this chapter, Britain’s and Germany’s reform attempts are compared to assess whether
both countries shifted their reserve forces’ roles and responsibilities in a similar way
following the launch of financially driven reforms. The comparative analyses of the
contemporary and historical examples are then used in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 to develop a
theory on how governments reform national reserve forces in times of economic turmoil.
1323 ‘S/he who distinguishes well teaches well!’ Translated by the author.
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6.1 Comparative Analyses
6.1.1 The Contemporary Examples
6.1.1.1 General Observations
As seen in Chapters Two and Four, both Britain and Germany launched comprehensive
defence reviews in 2010, which governments also complemented with separate reserve
forces’ reforms. The biggest difference between these reforms was the suspension of
conscription in Germany. While Britain had already maintained professional forces for a
long period of time, Germany only made this transition with the 2010 Bundeswehrreform.
Another difference was found as regards the angle from which London and Berlin started
reviewing their national armed forces. In Britain, the approach was rather concentrated, as
the government published the strategic paper (2010-NSS) and structural plans (2010-SDSR)
only one day apart. In contrast, Germany’s review process was somewhat scattered. First,
the government published the 2010-CSR’s and the Inspector General’s reports in 2010,
which alluded to envisaged structural adaptations of the Bundeswehr. The 2011-DPG,
which summarised strategic evaluations, were issued several months later.
These divergent approaches suggest that in Britain structure followed strategy, while in
Germany, strategy followed structure. In light of the contemporary financial constraints,
this allows concluding that Britain decided first to determine the affordable strategic scope
and subsequently adapted her defence posture’s structures accordingly. In Germany, on
the other hand, this conduct indicates that the government opted first to evaluate which
structures were fundable at the time and afterwards defined what strategic focus these
structures would support.
6.1.1.2 Examination of the Assumed Explanatory Factor
Change in Government. As already mentioned, the 2008 financial crisis was the as-
sumed explanatory factor for reserve forces reforms in Britain and Germany in 2010.
However, Chapters Two and Four also highlighted another possible explanation for the
governments’ motivation to conduct defence reviews; i.e., a change in government. In
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Britain, the Labour government was forced out of office by the first post-war coalition
government consisting of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. In Germany, on
the other hand, coalition governments are the norm rather than the exception. Here, a
Conservatives/Liberals administration relieved a coalition of the Social Democrats and
The Greens. In other words, both countries moved more to the conservative end of the
political spectrum in 2010 and 2009 respectively.
This observation could be interpreted as Conservative governments’ inclination to conduct
defence reviews. This conclusion, however, would be short-sighted. The analysis of the
British political discourse, for example, revealed that Gordon Brown’s Labour government
already acknowledged that the country’s defence posture had to be scrutinised. Therefore,
as elaborated in Chapter Two, a National Security Strategy and a Green Paper on defence
were published in 2008/2009 and early 2010 respectively. In Germany, a similar process
was observed; while the 2010 Bundeswehrreform was widely regarded as the most incisive
post-war reform of the Bundeswehr as it entailed the suspension of conscription, the Social
Democrats/Greens coalition had also launched defence reviews during their term.1324.
Therefore, the conservative agenda cannot be confirmed as an impetus for defence reviews.
Circumstances rather suggest that reforms were launched in order to deliver results as
promised in the election campaigns.
The 2008 Financial Crisis. The 2008 financial crisis, however, could be established
as an explanatory factor in both Chapters Two and Four. Here, empirical and statistical
evidence was sought and found in relevant government publications, defence budgets
and personnel statistics. As seen in Table 6.1, both the British and German MoDs were
obliged to make significant contributions to overall economization efforts. Furthermore, the
envisaged measures to achieve these savings were rather similar; except for the scrapping
of equipment, which was extensively discussed in Britain but was not central to the 2010
Bundeswehrreform.
However, as elaborated in Chapters Two and Four, reducing personnel costs was paramount
for both Britain and Germany. Therefore, as highlighted in Table 6.1, it is not surprising that
both countries envisaged significant reductions; both as regards regular service member
1324 Most notable the 2003-CFR
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and civilian employees. Although slightly differing in total numbers, both countries
had in common that only non-frontline service members were made redundant. The
British government explicitly voiced this strategy; in Germany, however, this conduct was
expressed more subtle as a large percentage of redundancies were achieved through the
suspension of conscription, i.e., by making non-deployable recruits redundant.
Table 6.1: Contemporary Examples: Defence Budgets and Economisation Measures
Britain Germany
Defence Budgets
Planned Defence Budgets Cuts yes yes
Envisaged Economies £4.30bn C8.40bn
Financially Driven Defence Reviews yes yes
Economisation Measures
Manpower Reductions (Regulars) 33,000 40,000
Workforce Reductions (Civilian) 32,000 50,000
Scrapping of Equipment yes no
Sale of Surplus Land and Real Estate yes yes
Renegotiation of Procurement Contracts yes yes
Sources: Chapters Two and Four.
Despite a similar set of measures, Chapters Two and Four demonstrated that Britain was
more successful in achieving the required savings. Moreover, when directly comparing the
numbers in Table 6.2, it becomes apparent that British defence expenditure significantly
exceeded Germany’s; both regarding total expenditure and per capita. Moreover, although
accounting for approximately 10 per cent of federal spending, the low total and per capita
defence spending suggests that Germany’s investments in defence were already small.
Hence, the German government had fewer options to reduce the MoD’s budget than their
British counterpart.
Security Environments. In Chapters Two and Four, the contemporary British and Ger-
man security environments were examined by respecting both the territorial and ideological
characteristics. When comparing the countries directly, it becomes apparent that both
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Table 6.2: British and German Defence Expenditure (2010-2014)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Â x
British Defence Expenditure
In US$ billion 58.08 60.27 58.50 56.86 59.18 292.89 58.58
Per Capita in US$ 917.48 944.50 910.43 879.65 910.29 n/a 912.47
In per cent of national exp. 5.39 5.38 5.24 5.04 4.87 n/a 5.18
British Inflation Rate
In per cent 2.50 3.84 2.58 2.31 1.45 n/a 2.54
German Defence Expenditure
In US$ billion 46.3 48.1 46.5 45.9 46.1 232.90 46.58
Per Capita in US$ 571.80 594.81 573.25 565.19 565.75 n/a 574.16
In per cent of federal exp. 10.00 10.20 10.50 10.70 10.90 n/a 10.46
German Inflation Rate
In per cent 1.10 2.10 2.00 1.50 0.90 n/a 1.50
Financial Year.
Sources: SIPRI, including own calculations, and OECD.
governments assessed that they operated in somewhat stable conditions. In this context,
both London and Berlin cited the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of
the Soviet Union as the main factor for stabilising European security. Furthermore, by
stipulating that both countries were members of the EU and NATO, Chapters Two and Four
judged that Britain and Germany were surrounded by allied and (or) friendly neighbours,
who did not express any aspirations to invade either country.
In addition to these framing factors, Chapters Two and Four further explored the threats
which the British and German governments deemed most harmful for their countries.
When consulting Table 6.3, it appears as if both London and Berlin identified similar
threats. However, the discussions in Chapters Two and Four also revealed that governments
prepared differently for these risk factors. In contrast to Germany, where the government
merely listed anticipated threats, Britain has developed a sophisticated risk assessment
framework to cater to the volatile nature of contemporary threats such as (cyber) terrorism.
In doing so, the British government created a tool, which would allow the MoD to prepare
more flexible responses.
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Table 6.3: Contemporary Examples: Perceived Threats
Britain Germany
Globalisation opportunity opportunity/threat
New Technologies opportunity/threat opportunity/threat
Failed States threat threat
Uncontrolled Migration not specifically mentioned threat
Terrorism threat threat
Cyber Terrorism threat threat
Shift in Power Equilibrium threat threat
Climate Change not specifically mentioned threat
Natural Disasters threat threat
Pandemics threat not specifically mentioned
Sources: Chapters Two and Four.
This divergence again points to Britain’s proactive and Germany’s reluctant attitudes as
regards defence policies and their enforcement. Further proof for this inference is found
when considering Britain’s and Germany’s engagements in Afghanistan. While Britain
joined the United States’ efforts from the beginning, Germany only followed suit after the
UN had supported the operation in 2002. Moreover, Britain’s contribution was larger than
Germany’s. Strategically, Britain took a leading role in Helmand and deployed, during
the operation’s peak period, about 9,500 troops; this conduct cost the British taxpayers
approximately £3.07 billion annually. Germany, on the other hand, sent about 5,350 during
the same period and only spent C1.20 billion on average annually.
This different degree of engagement in Afghanistan suggests that Britain, in general, acts
more self-confident in the global theatre and deliberately assumes greater responsibilities;
a fact, which is also reflected in the government’s decision to maintain British nuclear
deterrent. Germany, on the other hand, is not only more reluctant but somewhat limited as
regards the enforcement of defence policies as the Grundgesetz prohibits the government
to engage in unilateral operations. Therefore, broader British engagements in international
security suggest that Britain operated in a stable, yet slightly more complex security
environment than Germany in 2010.
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6.1.1.3 Reservists Roles and Responsibilities
The examination of Britain’s and Germany’s security environments revealed that both
countries did not anticipate any imminent threats to their territorial integrity. However, the
nuances of the security environments were somewhat different due to the government’s
divergent perceptions of their roles in international security, different legislative circum-
stances and engagement levels. As highlighted in Table 6.4, these differences also reflect
on reservists’ scope of duties. While both the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR have produced
similar shifts in reservists’ responsibilities, legislation again somewhat limited the em-
ployment of German reservists. For instance, the reserve may only be deployed to assist
during natural disasters or for crisis management, if the Bundesländer specifically request
support. Moreover, reservists cannot be ordered to participate in overseas or peacekeeping
missions; here, reservists need to specifically request a deployment.
This, again, suggests that the British MoD has more leeway as regards the enforcement of
defence policies. Nonetheless, as indicated by Table 6.4, the goals of the FR-2020 and the
2012-COR were somewhat similar and primarily expanded reservists’ responsibilities as
regards homeland defence. As elaborated in Chapters Two and Four, both the British and
German MoDs had made significant numbers of regulars redundant to achieve required
economies. Simultaneously, reservists’ numbers increased in most branches of the British
Armed Forces (except for the Army) and all Bundeswehr services following the imple-
mentation of the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR. This development, therefore, infers that the
main objective of this shift in responsibilities was to compensate for redundant regulars.
Moreover, the employability of reservists was thought to be increased by integrating them
more efficiently in regular structures while simultaneously adding their civilian acquired
abilities to the armed forces’ skills set.
Although appearing logical from a strategic standpoint, Britain did not support this step
on the structural level. Quite the contrary, the MoD closed 40 Army Reserve bases, and
smaller reserve units were consolidated; therefore, limiting the presence of the reserve
throughout Britain. Germany, on the other hand, moved in the opposite direction. By
establishing at least one RSSU in each Bundesland, the MoD has ensured that reservists
are present in every part of the country.
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Table 6.4: Contemporary Examples: Implications for Reservists
Britain Germany
Homeland Defence
Augmentation/Resilience/Border Defence yes yes
Natural Catastrophes yes limited
Crisis Management yes limited
Military-Civilian Co-operation (Planning Stage) all reservists Territorial Reserve
Safeguarding of Major Events yes no
Arial and Coastal/Naval Surveillance yes yes
Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure yes yes
Specialised Roles yes yes
Cybersecurity yes yes
Out of Country Deployments
Overseas Deployments (UNSC) yes limited
Peacekeeping yes limited
Structures
Integration in Regular Units Army Reserve Troop Reserve
Reserve Forces’ Bases closed/consolidated evenly spread
Other
Agents of the Armed Forces in Society yes yes
Increase in the Number of (Volunteer) Reservists RAF, RN all services
Sources: Chapters Two and Four.
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6.1.1.4 Explanatory Factor and Outcome
Chapters Two and Four established that the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR were the result of
financially driven defence reviews, which governments in London and Berlin had launched
following the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, the comparative analysis
shows that Britain and Germany similarly adapted their reserve forces in the course of
the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR. This observation is quite interesting when considering
Britain’s and Germany’s slightly different security environments, which mostly varied as
regards the assumed responsibilities in international security.
Therefore, as seen in Table 6.5, this thesis concludes that financial constraints exercised
more considerable influence on both British and German defence planning in 2010. Hence,
the 2008 financial crisis can be confirmed as the explanatory factor for the FR-2020 and
2012-COR.
Table 6.5: Contemporary Examples: Explanatory Factor and Outcome
Britain Germany
Outcome/Dependent Variable
Implemented Reserve Forces Reform yes yes
Explanatory Factor
2008 Financial Crisis confirmed confirmed
Sources: Chapters Two and Four.
6.1.2 The Historical Examples
6.1.2.1 General Observations
Chapters Three and Four examined British and German reform attempts in the 1970s.
Similar to the contemporary examples, both governments conducted general defence
reviews and scrutinised the structures and roles of their national reserve forces. However,
the separate reserve forces’ reviews were not as clearly linked to their parent reforms as
they were in 2010. In Britain, the government conducted the Majury Review (Army) before
commencing the 1975 Mason Review. Moreover, the Mitchell Committee convened to
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assess the RN’s reserve elements while the 1975 Mason Review was still in the assessment
phase. Therefore, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the results of both reviews were
widely ignored in the 1975 Mason Review. In Germany, the situation was slightly different.
A separate review of the reserve, the 1971-COR, was conducted before the 1973 oil
price shock struck the German economy. Thereafter, matters concerning the reserve were
included in the subsequent Defence White Papers.
Nevertheless, a direct comparison of the review processes allows concluding that the British
administration seemed to be more experienced in conducting defence reviews than their
German counterpart. As discussed, the 1975 Mason Review had already been Labour’s
second defence review and constituted the third postwar defence reform in Britain. In
Germany, on the other hand, the government did not deem a review of the Bundeswehr
necessary until the late 1960s. However, the publication of five Defence White Papers in
the 1970s indicates that the German government began to understand the importance of
regular defence scrutiny in this decade.
The varying degree of defence planning experience, however, was not the most apparent
difference in the 1970s review process. In contrast to the contemporary examples, Britain
and Germany differed significantly as regards their armed forces’ structures; i.e., while
Britain already maintained professional forces in the 1970s, the Bundeswehr was still
conscription-based. Therefore, Germany was in a more comfortable position as regards
troop numbers and recruitment.
6.1.2.2 Examination of the Assumed Explanatory Factor
Change in Government. Comparable to the contemporary examples, economic turmoil
was the assumed explanatory factor for the 1975 Mason Review and the 1973 Wehrstruk-
turreform. However, and again similar to the situation in 2010, the reforms were preceded
by a change in government. This time, Labour replaced a conservative administration in
Britain in 1974. In Germany, on the other hand, a grand coalition of Conservatives and
Social Democrats was relieved by a coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals in 1969.
In contrast to 2010, these general elections shifted both Britain and Germany to the
left/liberal political spectrum. Nevertheless, an inclination to conduct defence reviews
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cannot be attested for left/liberal governments either. As elaborated in Chapter Three, the
incoming Labour government felt pressured to conduct a defence review as its Conservative
predecessor had restored cost-intensive engagements such as ANZUK. In Germany, on
the other hand, the 1970s have to be understood as the turning point for the MoD, as this
decade marked the beginning of the formalisation process of defence planning. In other
words, previous administrations had neglected to bring the latter on a practical and formal
footing. Therefore, a review of the Bundeswehr’s structures, roles and responsibilities had
been inevitable no matter the incoming government’s political affiliation.
The 1973 Oil Price Shock. Considering the envisaged measures, however, suggests
that the 1973s oil price shock did indeed influence defence planning in both Britain and
Germany. As seen in Table 6.6, MoDs in both countries needed to contribute significant
sums to overall government economies. Simultaneously, Chapters Three and Five revealed
that the British Armed Forces, as well as the Bundeswehr, would have needed an upgrade
of their equipment to cater to the advancements in military technology. Nevertheless, the
British government decided to scrap numerous ships and aircrafts; most notably in the RN.
Table 6.6: Historical Examples: Defence Budgets and Economisation Measures
Britain Germany
Defence Budgets
Planned Defence Budgets Cuts yes yes
Envisaged Economies £4.70bn DM1.08bn
Financially Driven Defence Reviews yes yes
Economisation Measures
Manpower Reductions (Regulars) 38,000 30,000
Workforce Reductions (Civilian) 30,000 not specified
Scrapping of Equipment yes no
Procurement Freeze no initially
Renegotiation of Procurement Contracts yes yes
Sources: Chapters Three and Five.
In Germany, on the other hand, the Bundeswehr couldn’t afford to lose any equipment as it
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still largely used materials dating back to its foundation in the 1950s. Being confronted
with the quandary, both Britain and Germany, therefore, also opted to reduce the number of
their regular troops. Moreover, Britain also aimed to lay off numerous civilian employees.
Table 6.7: British and German Defence Expenditure (1970-1974)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Â x
British Defence Expenditure*
In US$ billion 6.07 6.72 7.86 8.45 9.35 38.45 7.69
British Inflation Rate
In per cent 6.36 9.44 7.08 9.18 15.99 n/a 9.61
German Defence Expenditure*
In US$ billion 6.2 7.3 9.0 11.9 4.4 38.75 7.75
German Inflation Rate
In per cent 3.45 5.24 5.48 7.03 6.99 n/a 5.64
*Financial Year.
Sources: SIPRI, and OECD.
Table 6.8: British and German Defence Expenditure (1975-1979)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Â x
British Defence Expenditure*
In US$ billion 11.54 10.77 11.58 14.22 18.37 66.49 13.30
British Inflation Rate
In per cent 24.11 16.77 15.89 8.28 13.35 n/a 15.68
German Defence Expenditure*
In US$ billion 15.3 15.5 17.3 21.4 24.8 94.23 18.85
German Inflation Rate
In per cent 5.91 4.25 3.74 2.72 4.04 n/a 4.13
*Financial Year.
Sources: SIPRI, and OECD.
When consulting Tables 6.7 and 6.8, it becomes apparent that the proposed measures were
only partially successful. Generally speaking, Britain and Germany spent approximately
the same amounts in real terms on defence in the first half of the 1970s. However, starting
with the 1973 oil price shock, spending developed differently. In Britain, 1973 marked the
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year when defence expenditure began to rise continuously until 1979; however, inflation
also grew disproportionally during this period. This constellation suggests that Britain’s
financial commitment to defence declined significantly in the 1970s. In Germany, on
the other hand, defence spending showed a sharp decrease in 1974, namely, in the year
following the oil price shock. Thereafter, expenditure started rising again; however, from
1975 through 1977, increased funding must largely be perceived as a compensation measure
for rising inflation rates.
Security Environments. As regards the security environment, Chapters Three and Five
suggest the London and Bonn came to different conclusions as regards the stability of the
security situation. This reasoning was derived from three observations; first, as seen in
Table 6.9, both countries estimated that the Soviet threat was paramount to defence planning
in the 1970s; however, the reactions to this hazard were different. As discussed in Chapter
Three, the British government anxiously observed the Warsaw Pact’s augmentation efforts.
Moreover, defence planners judged that the signed international treaties did not provide
sufficient levels of protection from a Soviet attack. In Chapter Five, on the other hand, it
was described that the German government firmly believed in the transformative power of
détente. At first glance, this suggests a certain degree of gullibility on Germany’s part. Yet,
considering that the government managed to sign several additional bilateral agreements
with the Soviet Union and her satellite states, it can be argued that Germany’s security
situation was indeed more stable than Britain’s. Second, while Table 6.9 highlights that
both Britain and Germany contributed to NATO commitments in Europe, Britain estimated
that her share of responsibilities was significantly larger as she provided approximately 70
per cent of NATO’s naval strength in Europe. Moreover, with Polaris, Britain contributed
to Europe’s deterrence with nuclear means; a service, which Germany could not provide.
Three, although both countries were confronted with domestic terrorism, only the conflict
in North Irland influenced defence planning as British troops were deployed to this region.
Germany’s struggle with the Red Army Faction, on the other hand, concerned the police
rather than the Bundeswehr as domestic incidents cannot be dealt with by deploying the
armed forces; therefore, the Red Army Faction was also not discussed in Chapter Five.
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Table 6.9: Historical Examples: Perceived Threats and Strategical Focus
Britain Germany
Soviet Threat yes yes
détente mistrust promising
NATO Commitments mainly navel mainly ground forces
Domestic Terrorism Nationalists vs Unionists Red Army Faction vs FRG
Sources: Chapters Three and Five.
6.1.2.3 Reservists Roles and Responsibilities
This divergent assessment of the 1970s security situation also reflected on the envisaged
role of the reserve during this decade. As described in Chapter Three, both the TAVR and
the RNR underwent separate scrutiny. However, in comparison to Germany, these reviews
did not constitute true reserve forces’ reforms. As seen in Table 6.10, British reservists
were thought to fulfil the same duties they were entrusted with before the Majury Review
and the Mitchell Committee’s report; i.e., augmentation, resilience, border defence and the
protection of British citizens in Britain. Nevertheless, two small adaptations to the TAVR
and RNR were discovered as regards deployment and structures. First, after the 1975
Mason Review, reservists were earmarked for service in the UKLF and BOAR. Second,
reserve forces’ units’ integration with their regular counterparts was to be advanced.
In Germany, on the other hand, reservists’ importance for the national defence posture was
emphasised for the first time in the Bundeswehr’s history. As elaborated in Chapter 5, the
MoD had initially neglected the reserve force as an integral part of the Bundeswehr. This
changed, however, when the MoD was forced to enforce significant redundancies in the
regular force in the course of imposed economization measures. As seen in Table 6.10,
the responsibility for homeland defence was almost entirely transferred to the reserve’s
Territorialheer and its Heimatschutztruppen.
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Table 6.10: Historical Examples: Implications for Reservists
Britain Germany
Homeland Defence
Augmentation/Resilience/Border Defence yes mostly Territorialheer
Defence of Citizens all branches mostly Territorialheer




Increase in the Number of Reservists Army, RN, mostly Territorialheer
Specialised Roles yes yes
Structures
Integration in Regular Units Army, RN all services
Sources: Chapters Three and Five.
6.1.2.4 Explanatory Factor and Outcome
Comparable to the situation in 2010, Chapters Three and Five established that the 1975
Mason Review and the 1973 Wehrstrukturreform were financially driven defence reviews in
the aftermath of the 1973s oil price shock. The comparative analysis, however, has revealed
that Britain did not launch a comprehensive reserve forces’ reform in the 1970s. Here, it
was inferred that Britain perceived her security environment too complex and unstable to
transfer responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force. As regards Germany, the
complete opposite was stipulated for the 1970s example. Not only did the government
judge Germany’s security environment to be improving, but it also acknowledged that
reservists may make Germany’s defence posture more robust and affordable.
Therefore, as seen in Table 6.11, this thesis confirms economic turmoil as the driving force
for changing reserve forces’ roles and responsibilities in Germany in the 1970s. For the
historical British example, this conclusion cannot be drawn.
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Table 6.11: Historical Examples: Explanatory Factor and Outcome
Britain Germany
Outcome/Dependent Variable
Implemented Reserve Forces Reform limited yes
Explanatory Factor
1973 Oil Price Shock inconclusive confirmed
Sources: Chapters Three and Five.
6.2 Findings
The exploration of the four examples and the subsequent comparative analyses have
revealed that Britain and Germany conducted defence reviews both in 2010 and in the
1970s. The examinations further stablished two factors that preceded the reforms, namely,
a change in government and severe economic turmoil. After comparing the examples, it
can be concluded that the specific political agendas can be excluded as the impetus for
defence reviews as administrations from both sides of the political spectrum engaged in
reform efforts.
Preceding economic turmoil, on the other hand, was identified as an influential factor in
all four reforms; at least, at the planning stage. Here, the thesis highlighted that both the
British and German MoDs attempted to realise savings through a combination of specific
measures. In both the contemporary and historical British examples, economizations
included adaptations to equipment, e.g., scrapping of equipment and renegotiation of
procurement contracts, as well as redundancies in the regular force and civilian workforce.
In Germany, on the other hand, the Bundeswehr’s equipment was primarily spared from
economies and was even upgraded during the 1970s. However, in both examined periods,
regular troops were made redundant; civilian employees were mainly laid off during the
2010 Bundeswehrreform. At the same time, all four examples showed that an increase in
reservists’ numbers accompanied the decline in regular troop numbers.
Congruent with this similar sequence of events, the study confirmed that defence budgets
declined in either real or relative terms in all four examined examples. Nevertheless, for
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the historical British example, it was concluded that inflation and not the 1975 Mason
Review’s adaptations caused this decline. Moreover, despite the similar sequence, a shift
of responsibilities from the regular force to the reserve force was only found in both
contemporary and the historical German examples. This development was not confirmed
for Britain in the 1970s as the government envisaged only limited adaptations to the
TAVR and the RNR. The comparative analysis of the historical examples, therefore,
suggests that the perceived security environment exercised greater influence on British
defence planning as regards the reserve in the 1970s. In contrast to Germany, where the
government judged that the Soviet threat had been mainly contained due to international
and bilateral agreements, Britain did not estimate that her security environment was
improving. Moreover, it was stipulated that defence planners judged that regulars should
fulfil most of the armed forces’ responsibilities due to Britain’s extensive responsibilities
in NATO’s European naval commitments.
Table 6.12: Findings
Britain (2010) Britain (1970s) Germany (2010) Germany (1970s)
Framing Factors
Financially Driven Defence Reviews yes yes yes yes
(Perceived) Security Environment vulnerable/stable complex/unstable stable improving
Outcome/Dependent Variable
Implemented Reserve Forces Reform yes limited yes yes
Explanatory Factor
Economic Turmoil confirmed inconclusive confirmed confirmed
Sources: Chapters One through Six.
When following the framework of the explanatory factor and outcome, which was intro-
duced in Chapter One, the observations mentioned above produce Table 6.12. Here, it is
highlighted that the explanatory factor, i.e., economic turmoil, was confirmed for finan-
cially driven defence reviews and subsequent reserve forces’ reforms, when governments
conduct their defence planning in somewhat stable or improving security environments.
Moreover, as shown in Table 6.12, economic turmoil does even exercise influence on
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reforms when the security situation is perceived as complex or unstable. Nevertheless, a
shift of responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force cannot be confirmed for these
kinds of circumstances.
6.3 Conclusion
The findings of this thesis suggest that economic turmoil tends to exercise some degree of
influence on national defence planning. The reason being that, due to their workforce and
equipment intensive structures, MoDs are prone to be subject to government economization
measures in times of financial constraints. However, the results of this study also indicate
that the extent of the impact on defence planning varies depending on the government’s es-
timates of the contemporary security environment. In this context, the thesis stipulated that
perceived stable or improving security situations result in comprehensive reserve forces’
reforms. Here, the study highlighted that the reserve is used as a tool to create savings
while also maintaining proficiency levels. In other words, when MoDs need to enforce
redundancies in the regular force due to financial pressures, shifting responsibilities to the
reserve force may contribute to making a country’s defence posture both more affordable
and sustainable. As elaborated in the thesis, reasons for this are twofold; first reserve units
are cheaper to maintain than their regular counterparts. Second, reservists can be trained to
assume any role within the armed forces.
In conclusion, this thesis’ results have produced the following theory:
Countries operating in stable or improving security environments, who ex-
perience severe economic turmoil, tend to engage in comprehensive reserve
forces’ reforms, which allow the MoD to realise savings through redundancies
in the regular force while maintaining proficiency levels with the support
of reservists; i.e., financially driven defence reviews in stable or improving
governments tend to shift responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force.
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6.4 Suggested Further Research
This thesis studied how reservists’ roles and responsibilities changed following the imple-
mentation of financially driven defence reviews in Britain and Germany. To select these
two focus countries, the study used the MSSD approach; here, the thesis demonstrated that
Britain and Germany possessed a sufficient extraneous variance, experimental variance in
relevant areas and the same assumed explanatory factor. However, the historical British
example illustrated that the latter, even though it was present at the time, did not shift
reservists’ roles and responsibilities to the same degree as it did in the other examples.
Thus, it would be advisable to conduct further research on the topic of reserve forces’
reforms in times of economic turmoil. Here, examples with both stable or unstable security
environments should be considered.
A subsequent study may advance this topic by using one of two strategies. First, one
could aim for increasing the statistical validity of this thesis’ findings by building on this
study’s MSSD approach.1325 Here, other European countries, e.g., France, and (or) Spain
could serve as examples; combined with Britain and Germany, these countries constitute a
larger sample, which, in turn, would increase the validity of results.1326 Alternatively, this
study’s MSSD approach could be copied to investigate a different set of nations with high
extraneous variance, e.g., Asian, South American, or Anglo-Saxon countries.1327
Second, another approach would entail using the MDSD strategy and compare countries
with low extraneous variance.1328 As argued by Jahn, this route allows to test hypotheses
and make generalised assumptions about phenomena.1329 Again, this study’s examples
could be used as a starting point; however, either Britain or Germany would need to be
compared to countries such as Brazil and (or) Japan.1330
Both strategies have the potential to further contribute to the subject of reserve forces’
reforms in times of economic turmoil. However, since both approaches need to gather and
1325 cf. Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 234.
1326 cf. ibid., 233.
1327 ibid., and B. Guy Peters, Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and
Methods, 40.
1328 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, 29-30.
1329 cf. Detlef Jahn, Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 234.
1330 cf. ibid.
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analyse primary sources published in different languages, it would be advisable to trust a
diverse team with advancing this study’s research focus. In doing so, the full exploitation
of primary sources and thus, the drawing of informed conclusions, could be ensured.
Besides exploring this thesis’ research focus further by using additional examples or
the MDSD, a future project may want to investigate how the FR-2020 and 2012-COR
played out beyond the first implementation stage. This should include an evaluation of
reservists’ satisfaction levels, which could be achieved by conducting a large-sample
survey. Moreover, a future study should explore what measures are needed to increase
recruitment for the reserve. Again, a large-sample survey could aid in this endeavour.
Here, youngsters graduating from either secondary school or undergraduate university
programs should be surveyed to ascertain what incentives MoD’s should offer to encourage
adolescents and young adults to consider a career as a reservist. Moreover, a similar survey
should be conducted with adult specialists. Here, groups should be identified, who possess
skills that are most valuable to the reserve.
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Abitur The German equivalent to the British A-Levels.
Berufssoldat A career soldier who intends to stay with the Bundes-
wehr until retirement; see ‘Bundeswehr’.
Brexit Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
Britain The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv The federal archives, military section.
Bundesland A German federal state, e.g., Bavaria. Germany con-
sists of 16 Bundesländer. Being a federal republic,
each Bundesland has its own capital, parliament, and
constitution. Therefore, legislation may differ accord-
ing to the region, e.g., educational policies are in the
jurisdiction of the individual Bundesland. Policies af-
fecting the whole of the country, e.g., defence, is in the
jurisdiction of the federal government.
Bundesrat Federal Council, the upper house of the German parlia-
ment.
Bundestag Federal Parliament, the lower house of the German
parliament.
Bundesverfassung (CH) The Swiss Constitution; abbreviation in the legal con-
text: BV.
Bundeswehr Literally ‘Federal Defence Force’; Germany’s armed
forces. The Bundeswehr consists of three services
(Army, Navy and Air Force) and two support services
(Joint Support Service and Medical Service). In the
political discourse, references are usually made to the
Bundeswehr as a whole and not to the individual ser-
vices.
Bundeswehrreform The reform of the Bundeswehr. The term has also been
used for previous reforms of the Bundeswehr. There-
fore, it is usually accompanied by the commencement
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year of the respective reform, e.g., 2010 Bundeswehrre-
form.
Conscript (FRG) A service member forced to serve in the Bundeswehr
under the Wehrpflicht; see ‘Wehrpflicht’.
Conservatives (FRG) The German equivalent to the British Conservative
Party. The conservative party in Germany consists of
two so-called sister parties, namely, the CDU (Chris-
tian Democratic Union) and the CSU (Christian Social
Union). The latter is only electable in Bavaria, while
the former competes for votes in the remaining Bundes-
länder. They usually enter the campaign for the federal
elections together and combine votes.
Draftee (FRG) See ‘Conscript’.
Feldheer The 1970s Feldheer was part of the German Army. The
Feldheer was under NATO command and served as a
liaison between the Bundeswehr and NATO commands.
Germany The term ‘Germany’ is used to refer to the Federal Re-
public of Germany (1949-1990, excluding the German
Democratic Republic) and the re-unified Federal Re-
public of Germany (as of 1990, including the former
territories of the German Democratic Republic).
Grundgesetz The German constitution; abbreviation in the legal con-
text: GG.
Heeresstruktur 1, 2, 3, 4 Literally ‘Army Structure’; a term used to refer to re-
structuring efforts in the German Army. During the
Cold War, four reforms were conducted, hence the
numbering.
Heimatschutz Homeland Defence.
Heimatschutztruppe A unit in the Territorialheer; see ‘Territorialheer’.
Kriegsdienstverweigerer Conscientious objector; a term widely used until the1990s.
Kriegsdienstverweigerung The process of conscientious objection; a term widely
used until the1990s.
Landesverteidigung Homeland Defence.
Liberals (FRG) The Free Democratic Party. The German equivalent to
the British Liberal Democrats.
Militärgesetzes (CH) The Swiss Military Act; abbreviation in the legal con-
text: MG.
Neue Ostpolitik Initiated by the Brandt administration in the early 1970s,
the Neue Ostpolitik refers to a West-German attempts
to normalise relations with the Soviet Union and other
Eastern Bloc countries.
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Regular Service Member Also referred to as ‘regular’; an active service member,
who is not part of the reserve.
Regular Troops Also referred to as ‘regulars’; active, non-reservist
troops.
Regular Units Active, non-reservist units.
Rekrutenschule (CH) Basic training in the Swiss Armed Forces.
Reservist (FRG) In Germany, there are/were four kinds of reservists; a
volunteer (e.g., Ungedienter), a former Wehrpflichtiger
(until 2011), a former Zeitsoldat or a former Berufssol-
dat. Depending on their status and period of service,
the obligation to serve varies/varied in length; see ‘Un-
gedienter’, ‘Wehrpflichtiger’, and ‘Zeitsoldat’.
Reservist (UK) Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of reservists in
Britain; ex-regulars (regular reservist), who may be
obliged to serve for a specified period upon completion
of their service and volunteer reservists, who sign up
for reservist duty without having served in the armed
forces before.
Social Democrats (FRG) The Social Democratic Party of Germany. The German
equivalent to the British Labour Party.
Territorialheer The 1970s Territorialheer was part of the German
Army. The Territorialheer had been assigned the re-
sponsibility to defend the West-German territory in
wartime and entirely remained under the command of
the German government.
The Greens (FRG) Alliance ‘90/The Greens. The German equivalent to
the British Greens Party.
Ungedienter A German citizen without prior military experience.
Voluntary Conscript (FRG) A citizen who completes basic military training and
serves in the Bundeswehr for a limited period on a
voluntary basis.
Wehrdienst Literally ‘Defence Service’; (Mandatory) Military Ser-
vice. The Wehrdienst describes the period a Wehrpflich-
tiger received basic military training and served in the
Bundeswehr under the Wehrpflicht; see ‘Wehrpflichti-
ger’.
Wehrgerechtigkeit This term refers to the attempt for a fair drafting process.
Wehrgerechtigkeit is achieved when all (male) members
of society are drafted equally no matter their social
standing, educational background or physical abilities.
Wehrmacht The armed forces of Nazi-Germany.
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Wehrplicht Literally ‘Defence Duty’; (Mandatory) Military Ser-
vice. A Wehrpflichtiger received, if drafted, basic milit-
ary training and subsequently served in the Bundeswehr
for a specific number of months.
Wehrpflichtiger A (male) German citizen of military age. All Wehr-
pflichtige underwent medical examinations by a Bun-
deswehr physician to determine their fitness for duty.
If deemed fit, they either served as service members
in the Bundeswehr or as Zivildienstleistende in social
organisations; see ‘Zivildienstleistender’.
Wehrstruktur Defence Structure.
Wehrstrukturreform Defence Structure Reform.
Wiederholungskurs (CH) Literally ‘Repetition Course’; annual training for Swiss
reservists.
Zeitsoldat A soldier who serves in the Bundeswehr voluntarily for
an extended period. Upon completion of her/his term,
s/he enters the civilian workforce.
Zivildienst Literally ‘Civil Service’; before the suspension of con-
scription took effect in 2011, all young men of military
age, who were deemed fit for duty, could opt out of
military service and work in the public sector instead.
They usually assisted in hospitals, retirement homes or
kindergartens.
Zivildienstleistender A conscientious objector serving in the Zivildienst.
Please note that...
...all German words have been translated into English by the author. The Glossary of
Terms lists all German words in their masculine and singular form. To simplify matters,
this thesis uses the masculine form throughout the text; however, it should be taken to refer





Definition and Regulations. With the ‘Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research
Opportunities’, King’s College London has established a policy, which allows King’s staff
and doctoral students to conduct research and gather information with human participants
when unanticipated research opportunities arise, e.g., serendipitous interviews. In order to
conduct this kind of research, staff and doctoral students are requested to sign and register
the ‘Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research Opportunities’ form with the Research
Ethics Office. Submission to and registration of the form with the Research Ethics Office
is required before conducting any serendipitous research; the processing and using of
information acquired before submission of the form is prohibited.
Submission and Registration. The author signed and submitted the ‘Code of Conduct
for Serendipitous Research Opportunities’ form as indicated on the form to sshl@kcl.ac.uk
on 10 May 2013. On 13 May 2013, the Research Ethics Office confirmed via email that
the form had been received and logged.
Formal Ethical Approval
Ethical Approval Application. Ethical approval for this thesis was sought for conduct-
ing structured interviews with individuals who work/worked in the field of British and
German defence or related fields. Being a non-high risk application, the author sought
ethical approval from the War Studies Group Research Ethics Panel (WSG REP). To obtain
ethical approval, the RESC/REP Application Form A, an information sheet and a consent
form were submitted.
Submission. A hard copy of the ethical approval application was submitted as indicated
on the form to the Research Support Office, 5.2 Franklin Wilkins Building, (Waterloo
Bridge Wing), Waterloo Campus, King’s College London, Stamford Street, London SE1
9NH on 11 June 2013. A scan of the ethical approval application was further sent to
rep@kcl.ac.uk the same day.
Approval and Registration Number. Full ethical approval was granted on 23 July 2013.
The ethical approval is registered with King’s College London’s Research Ethics Office
under REP(WSG)/12/13-47. The ethical approval for conducting structured interviews
was granted until 23 July 2015.
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